



**MALCONTENT NEWS  
RUSSIA-UKRAINE  
SITUATION REPORT**

May 28, 2023 – A



# Malcontent News

## Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

### 5/28/23-A 23:59\* PST

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## Notes on Sourcing Information


**Malcontent News** uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.



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## **SUMMARY – DAY 458**

This is the first update for May 27, 2023. It has been 3,379 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 93 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

Monday, May 29, 2023, is a federal holiday in the United States, and we will give the team a well-deserved day off. We will summon the writing and analyst team if there is a major event or World War III.

- The Daily Assessment will be updated with each report
- Weather and soil conditions will be in the last report of the day
- If an anticipated report is not created, weather and soil conditions will be released as a Flash Report
- Each report will contain unique information and continue in a condensed format

The map is back! [War Map](#)



## **DAILY ASSESSMENT**


We assess the following:

1. Russian launched its largest missile attack since March 9, 2023, with up to 40 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles and used over 125 stand-off weapons in the last 36 hours. In our assessment, the Kremlin appears to believe the information in the leaked Pentagon documents that Ukraine would be critically low on air defense resources by June.
2. These attacks continue to have little success due to the targeting of civilians and civilian infrastructure, the poor intelligence-gathering abilities of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and their inability to overwhelm ever-improving Ukrainian air defenses.
3. In preparation for larger offensive operations, Ukrainian forces continue shaping operations on multiple axes, creating panic and uncertainty among gauleiters, Russian administrators, and military leaders.
4. Current weather models indicate soil conditions will become favorable for large-scale military operations by June 5.

5. We have identified shaping activity by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in four locations that could indicate a larger attack is being prepared.
6. While Russian forces are continuing limited localized attacks in the Dvorichna, Siversk, and Marinka operational areas, the decreasing number of attacks and increased use of artillery indicates that Russian forces are in a defensive posture and waiting for Ukraine to launch its offensive.
7. Anger and frustration among Russian state media, propagandists, milbloggers, and residents of the oblasts that border Ukraine continue to swell due to the Kremlin's inability to respond to continued border incursions, with growing criticism of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu.
8. Despite being declared the commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, Chief of Staff for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, has been nearly invisible while outlasting all previous Russian generals given the responsibility of capturing the Donbas.
9. Assigning a person deep within Putin's inner circle, such as Gerasimov, to oversee Russian military operations in Ukraine makes it near impossible for President Putin to dismiss him despite continued failures to achieve critical military objectives.

10. We assess that Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
11. Private Military Company Wagner Group leader Yevgeny Prigozhin continues to escalate his war of words with the Kremlin, criticizing Russian President Vladimir Putin as rumors in the Russian information space swirl that Prigozhin has further political ambitions or is planning a coup.


# TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



**About the maps:** Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


## [Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

# UKRAINE WEATHER



Thunderstorms and heavy rain will persist through May 31 before a drying trend finally arrives. Temperatures will start to warm up through the week, with highs from 14° to 27° Celcius, with the coldest temperatures on May 31, ushering in more stable air and ending the thunderstorms – lows from 8° to 19°. The full moon is on June 4, the new moon is on June 18, and the longest day of the year is June 21.


## SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



*The June 5, 2023 GFS forecast indicates soil saturation to 40 centimeters deep will be between 25% in eastern Kherson and western Zaporizhia and up to 80% in localized areas of the Donbas.*


More thunderstorms moved through Ukraine on May 27, causing urban, street, and small river flooding in the Odesa region. Soil saturation along the coast and most of the Donbas is near or at 100%. Conditions will start improving on May 31, and soil saturation should be able to support heavy equipment and armored vehicles theaterwide by June 5.

# KHARKIV



**Russian Objective:** Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, hold current defensive lines, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

**Ukrainian Objective:** Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorychna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



## Dvorichna Operational Area


On May 28, reports of a Russian advance south of [Masyutivka](#) came into alignment, and based on the intelligence from Ukrainian and Russian sources, we adjusted the map to record an advance in the direction of Lyman Pershyi.<sup>1 2</sup> Fighting continued in the area of Masyutivka, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported fighting between surveillance, reconnaissance, and sabotage (DRG) units in [Lyman Pershyi](#), confirming our

<sup>1</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16679>

<sup>2</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/12801>



prior assessment that the village has not been under full Russian control.<sup>3 4 5 6</sup>



## Svatove Operational Area

RMOD alleged that Ukrainian DRG units were operating in the area of [Berestove](#).<sup>7</sup>

<sup>3</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>4</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)


<sup>5</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16679>

<sup>6</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/26910](https://t.me/mod_russia/26910) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>7</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/26910](https://t.me/mod_russia/26910) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


# DONBAS REGION

## LUHANSK



**Russian Objective:** Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, prevent further Ukrainian advances, control insurgent activity

**Ukrainian Objective:** Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents



## Lysychansk Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces made limited attacks on [Bilohorivka](#) supported by the Russian Airforce (VKS) and were unable to advance to new positions.<sup>8</sup>

## Occupied Luhansk

The so-called Luhansk People's Republic (LNR) Joint Center for Control and Coordination reported that Almazna  [was hit](#) by  [three rockets fired by HIMARS](#) and

<sup>8</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)



alleged three civilians were killed and seven wounded.<sup>9 10 11</sup>

<sup>12</sup> We cannot independently verify their claim.

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
<sup>9</sup> [https://t.me/LPR\\_JCCC/8341](https://t.me/LPR_JCCC/8341)

<sup>10</sup> [https://t.me/LPR\\_JCCC/8342](https://t.me/LPR_JCCC/8342)

<sup>11</sup> [https://t.me/LPR\\_JCCC/8335?single](https://t.me/LPR_JCCC/8335?single)


<sup>12</sup> <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/77239>

# NORTHEAST DONETSK



**Russian Objective:** Capture Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region

**Ukrainian Objective:** Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties



## Soledar Operational Area


GSAFU reported that Russian forces attempted to counterattack northeast of [Orikhovo-Vasylivka](#) and were unsuccessful.<sup>13</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)



to be no videos showing Russian-aligned forces moving in the area where the Mig-17 Statute was. The next location was on Shyroka Street, [adjacent to the Avanhard Stadium](#), in the operational green zone for Russian-aligned troops. The final location was at [Ukrposhta 84560 on Tchaikovsky Street](#), southwest of the Medical College. There has been no evidence that Russian-aligned troops have a firm hold on the buildings west of Yuvilenya Street.


In contrast, Ukrainian sources released a video showing they were  [shelling the apartment blocks adjacent to School 40](#), indicating the buildings had again come under Russian occupation.<sup>15</sup>

**ASSESSMENT:** Both videos align with our current war map, and based on the most recent intelligence, we maintain that Ukrainian forces hold approximately 1.50 square kilometers of Bakhmut (.58 square miles), or roughly 2.80% of the city.

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<sup>15</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16689>





## Klishchiivka Operational Area

Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Russia-aligned troops attempted to regain lost positions south of [Ivanivske](#) in the direction of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and were unsuccessful.<sup>16 17</sup>

Ukrainian forces continued to press Russian-aligned troops holding defensive positions northwest of [Klishchiivka](#), and another attempt by Russian troops to improve positions

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<sup>16</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>17</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/12801>

west of the canal in the direction of [Predtechyne](#) failed.<sup>18 19</sup>  
20 21

PMC Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin mocked Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov, sarcastically claiming that the Russian Federation Armed Forces were preparing to launch a massive attack out of Bakhmut in the directions of Kramatorsk and Chasiv Yar and that great success would happen in one lightning blow – maybe. He also hinted that the Russian military was unprepared to take control of Bakhmut. “As I said, our plans include going to field camps before June 1st. We may not have time to hand over everything in a good way, in a full-fledged form, to the military, so it will probably take a few more days. Conditionally, from June 5, the military will receive operational scope for an offensive in a westerly direction. As the Minister of Defense [*Sergei Shoigu – Ed.*] has already said, after the capture of Bakhmut, operational space will open up. The operational space is open, and the Russian army has every opportunity to launch a colossal offensive in the near future with the capture of Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, Druzhkivka, Konstantinivka, Chasiv Yar, that is, the ‘Donbas Ring.’ After the Donbas Ring or in parallel with

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<sup>18</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16679>

<sup>19</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>20</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)


<sup>21</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/12801>

it, it was written in our referendum that Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Luhansk, and Donetsk regions are part of the Russian Federation, so I am sure that our Red Banner Army will reach the borders of these regions. Well, then, it will be necessary to clarify. I don't think that this is a complicated process. This will be done within the framework of one meeting, whether there will be an offensive, lightning-fast, decisive throw towards the Dnipro in order to put our units on the left bank of the Dnipro [*Back in the city of Kherson – Ed.*]. I think that everything is within our power. The enemy will be defeated. Victory will be ours...As far as I understand, this is what Dmitry Peskov said, so everything fits into the general logic and goals of the special operation."<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> [https://t.me/Prigozhin\\_hat/3484](https://t.me/Prigozhin_hat/3484)


# SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



**Russian Objective:** Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, consolidate gains made during the winter offensive, and set conditions for September 2023 elections

**Ukrainian Objective:** Lock Russian military assets in place, defend the existing line of conflict while finding and exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and

command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



## Avdiivka Operational Area


Russian-aligned forces once again tried to advance on [Pervomaiske](#) from the south, suffered heavy losses, and returned to their defensive positions.<sup>23 24</sup>

**ASSESSMENT:** Not only do the mobik-supplemented ranks of the 1st Army Corps and PMC Storm-Z Project K penal

<sup>23</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>24</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16679>

units need to cross open terrain in daylight assaults against better-armed Ukrainian defensive positions, but the failure to capture the Ukrainian firebase at Nevelske also puts Russian troops under Ukrainian fire control from three directions during these attacks. In our assessment, Russian military commanders were likely hoping for more impact on Ukrainian Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC – supply line) from destroying the Karlovske Reservoir Dam in Karlivka, which did not materialize. Despite the limited impact and a clear bypass route to the north of the reservoir, Russian commanders continued to move forward with ad hoc attacks, wasting personnel and equipment.



## Marinka Operational Area

Checks the calendar and sees it is a day that ends in "Y."  
Fighting for [Marinka](#) continued within the remains of the city and the area around it.<sup>25 26</sup>

## Occupied Donetsk

Ukrainian launched missile attacks on Russian positions in Nikolske and Volnovakha.<sup>27 28</sup> There were Russian and Ukrainian reports about the strike in Nikolske, 📷 [likely from a Storm Shadow cruise missile](#), with limited information on the situation in Volnovakha. We cannot independently verify the impact of the strikes.<sup>29</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)


<sup>26</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>27</sup> <https://t.me/andriyshTime/10181>

<sup>28</sup> <https://t.me/andriyshTime/10187>

<sup>29</sup> <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/77319>

# ZAPORIZHIA



**Russian Objective:** Prepare for a Ukrainian offensive, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks




**Ukrainian Objective:** Liberate Russian-occupied areas, prevent further Russian advances, exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, and protect civilians

## Free Zaporizhia

Russian forces conducted 92 fire missions and one drone attack on 20 settlements along the line of conflict, targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure.<sup>30</sup>

## Occupied Zaporizhia

Storm Shadow cruise missiles struck the Berdyansk area at least three times.

Russian troop positions in Yurivka, near Berdyansk, were  [hit by Storm Shadow cruise missiles](#).<sup>31</sup> There are multiple reports of significant Russian casualties which we cannot independently verify.

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<sup>30</sup> [https://t.me/zoda\\_gov\\_ua/19086](https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/19086)

<sup>31</sup> <https://t.me/andriyshTime/10189>

## Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant


No update.

## BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

### Black Sea

Ukrainian Operational Command South (OKS) reported that six vessels of the Black Sea Fleet were on patrol, including two frigates capable of launching up to 16 Kalibr cruise missiles.<sup>32 33</sup>

### Odesa

Severe weather produced  [urban, street, and stream flooding in Odesa](#) and the surrounding area as thunderstorms continued to move across the southern and eastern parts of Ukraine.<sup>34</sup>

As part of one of the largest drone and missile attacks of 2023, debris from a shot down Shahed-136 kamikaze drone

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<sup>32</sup> <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/31545>

<sup>33</sup> [https://t.me/Nazars\\_look/14414](https://t.me/Nazars_look/14414)

<sup>34</sup> <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/77262>

landed in the Port of Odesa, causing a fire.<sup>35</sup> The drone flying in the area of the port directly violates the Black Sea Grain Initiative.

## WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

### Free Kherson

Russian forces conducted 61 fire missions firing 300 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad and Smerch rockets, drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs, with the city of Kherson targeted six times and hit by 26 munitions. One civilian was wounded in Beryslav by the Russian VKS, which dropped at least two FAB-500S-E UPMK glide bombs on the city.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>35</sup> [https://t.me/our\\_odessa/47789](https://t.me/our_odessa/47789)

<sup>36</sup> <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/6224>



## Khmelnytsky


Starokostyantyniv Airbase was hit by at least one Russian drone or cruise missile on the west end of the airfield, destroying five unspecified drones and setting fire to fuel, lubricants, and materiel.<sup>37 38</sup> Information from NASA Fire Information for Resource Management Systems does not show the impact was near the ammunition depot or primary fuel storage.

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<sup>37</sup> <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/05/29/7404299/>

<sup>38</sup> <https://t.me/khmelnytskaODA/1677>

## Lviv

A Russian cruise missile damaged by Ukrainian air defenses crashed near a farm in the Lviv region, with the warhead detonating on impact. It  [carved a massive crater into the earth](#) near an outbuilding, which burned down.<sup>39</sup>

## NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

## Kyiv

Ukrainian officials updated information from the May 27 – 28 drone attack, reporting 59 drones were launched at Ukraine – 58 at Kyiv, with all 58 intercepted. The 59th struck Zhytomyr, as reported in the May 27 SITREP.<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>39</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/98437>

<sup>40</sup> <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/05/28/7404251/>

Eighteen hours later, Russia launched another wave of cruise missiles and drones, primarily at Kyiv, over a four-hour period during the evening of May 28 – 29. Up to 40 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles were launched by ten Tu-95 strategic bombers that flew from Murmansk to the Caspian Sea. An estimated 35 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones were also launched, although the missile and drone number should be considered tentative. The Ukrainian Airforce reported 37 cruise missiles, and 29 drones were intercepted.<sup>41</sup> Spotty 📷 [damage was reported in Kyiv](#), but there were no reports of electrical, Internet, or water outages, or significant casualties, providing insight that the 📺 [impact was minor, considering how many](#) stand-off weapons were used.<sup>42 43 44</sup>

In the past 36 hours, Russia has launched over 115 drones and cruise missiles toward Kyiv with little impact on the city.

**ASSESSMENT:** The consumption rate of cruise missiles and Shahed-136 drones is unsustainable, with Russian

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<sup>41</sup> <https://t.me/suspilnenews/21172>

<sup>42</sup> <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/77351>

<sup>43</sup> <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/98418>


<sup>44</sup> <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/05/29/7404287/>

launching 317 of the Iranian-source kamikaze UAVs in May, more than all launches from January to April combined.<sup>45</sup> There are no indications that Ukrainian air defenses are constrained by limited ammunition, despite claims in the leaked Pentagon documents that Ukraine would be critically low on air defense resources by June. The Kremlin appears to be testing the theory, despite outwardly saying they didn't believe any of the information leaked by Massachusetts Air National Guardsmen Jack Texieria from January to March 2023 on the Thug Shaker Central Discord server.

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<sup>45</sup> <https://t.me/ShrikeNews/8732>

# RUSSIAN FRONT



**Russian Objective:** Repel Russian partisan attacks, stabilize the border, and maintain civil order

**Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective:** Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest



## Belgorod

Telegram channel Cheka-OGPU reported that local officials in the Belgorod region were negotiating with PMC Wagner to sign a contract to create company-sized rapid response units to deal with future border incursions by Russian partisans or a Ukrainian attack. Because PMCs are illegal within Russian, state officials told Belgorod region authorities that no such agreement is possible. The Kremlin refuses to arm up to 3,000 territorial guards, leaving the Ministry of Internal Affairs, essentially the police, as a supplemental force to the border service and the territorial guard's main offensive weapon, the ability to scream, "Blyat!"<sup>46</sup>

## Krasnodar Krai

Russian officials reported that the oil refinery in Il'skii, 174 kilometers east of the Crimean Bridge, was attacked by "several" drones – the third attack this month. All drones were reportedly shot down, with debris landing in the diesel fuel production area, causing minor damage that did not impact production.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> <https://t.me/vchkogpu/38750>

<sup>47</sup> [https://t.me/shot\\_shot/52042](https://t.me/shot_shot/52042)



## **THEATERWIDE**

There were no significant developments.

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## RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

*Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to May 27, 2023. 10,448 Russian vs. 3,374 Ukrainian*

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
<b>Main Battle Tanks</b>	1859	196	9.48:1	↓
<b>Medium Duty Tanks</b>	131	309	0.42:1	—
<b>Armored fighting Vehicles</b>	862	275	3.13:1	↓
<b>Infantry Fighting Vehicles</b>	2365	541	4.37:1	↑
<b>Armored Personnel Carriers</b>	309	265	1.17:1	↑
<b>MRAPs</b>	43	58	0.74:1	↑
<b>Infantry Mobility Vehicles</b>	188	315	0.62:1	↓
<b>Command and Communications Vehicles</b>	242	13	18.61:1	↓
<b>Engineering Vehicles</b>	306	57	5.37:1	↑
<b>Towed Artillery</b>	220	123	1.79:1	↑
<b>Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars</b>	405	159	2.55:1	↓
<b>MLRS</b>	202	45	4.48:1	↑
<b>SAMs</b>	114	113	1.02:1	↑
<b>Mobile Radars</b>	32	60	0.53:1	—
<b>EW/ECW</b>	37	2	18.50:1	↑
<b>Winged Aircraft</b>	82	66	1.24:1	—
<b>Helicopters</b>	90	30	3.00:1	—
<b>Naval Vessels</b>	12	26	0.46:1	—