Hello and welcome history friends patrons all to the final instalment of our CWCC. I hope you’ve enjoyed this mini exploration of the world which housed the KW, and that you feel as though you’re now ready to grasp the events of that conflict with the context of post-war Europe in mind. The CW, in the sense that we understand it, emerged out of the ashes of post-war Germany as we saw, in a region where several differences of opinion and vision for the defeated Nazi Germany existed. Initially split into four zones, by April 1949, the French joined their zone to that of the Anglo-American side, creating in effect the West German state, which was granted its first administration following elections on 15th September of that year. Stalin responded to this by incepting an East German state – the Democratic Republic of Germany – on 7th October 1949. The creation of the two Germanies; a tale of two Germanies as we designated it in the last episode, was developed during the tense days of the Berlin blockade, and emerged out of its relieved aftermath.

In this episode, we’ll examine this event in more detail and denote its significance. We will ascertain whether Stalin’s moves were belligerent as is sometimes presumed, and we’ll see how Stalin reacted not merely to the increasing activism and unity of the west, but also towards the increasing independence of one of his eastern neighbours in particular, even while most of eastern Europe was acquiring a distinctly Soviet face. The picture, as we’ll see, builds up by the end of 1949 to depict Stalin as weak, not strong, and as flying by the seat of his pants, rather than as cultivating any significant long-term plan for the takeover of Europe. If you’re ready then, I will now take you to 26th June 1948, where the first transport plane had just flown into an isolated Berlin…

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*It’s quite clear – it’s got to look democratic, but we must have everything in our control.* East German leader Walter Ulbricht, speaking in 1945.[[1]](#footnote-1)

Had he wanted to, Stalin could have rolled over Berlin. 300 Red Army divisions were within striking distance of Berlin by the time the last land route to the city was cut off in late June 1948, compared to the 7k soldiers that the US could muster. Berlin was also awkwardly situated within the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence in East Germany, and was thus surrounded by ‘hostile’ Soviet land. As per the terms of the Paris Peace Agreements though, and the Potsdam agreement before that, the division of Germany into four was also to be applied to Berlin. In that city then, once the capital of Nazism, the division of Germany on a smaller scale was underway, as the city was split into four zones, with the French, American and British zones on the west of the city, and the Soviet side on the east, mirroring the division of Germany’s east-west divide still further.

If the city was split into four zones, then much like the situation in Germany, the passage of time had resulted in a gradual de facto merging of the western side, with the result that Berlin had become a city divided by eastern and western zones. West Berlin was recognisably different to the East, and the Soviets did not treat the western portion of the city as part of their wider Soviet East German occupation. That is, they didn’t attempt to treat it as such, until the land access from West Berlin and East Germany was gradually severed. On 26th June 1948, as per the decisions reached by the Anglo-American negotiations in the weeks before, the first of over 270k flights arrived at Tempelhof airfield in West Berlin. Over the course of the 11 month blockade by the Soviets, the allies would conduct 277,500 flights, would ship some 2.3 million tons of food and would lose 77 airmen. It was an astonishing feat of organisation, engineering and defiance, and in the western sense it appeared absolutely necessary.

The Victorious February revolution in Prague had hardened western attitudes and demonstrated that Soviet influence was on the rise. The Czechs hadn't been in the definite Soviet camp, and the coup to establish a communist government in line with Moscow had been far from predictable. For a time, Czechoslovakia had been a kind of weather vane between east and west, but its sudden plummet into the Soviet camp was a wake-up call to the British, American and French delegates already having given up on talking to the Soviets about the future of Germany. Just as the Soviets had torpedoed all talk of a German settlement, now in February 1948 they torpedoed the Czech effort to establish a native government, and Moscow seemed content to follow this belligerent stance up with the ratcheting up of tensions and the stakes in Berlin that summer.

Over the course of the 11 months of the blockade, which ended officially on 12th May 1949, tensions between the Soviet Union and the western allies crystalized. By the time the city was reopened, Stalin’s bluff had been successfully called, and western cooperation became the order of the day. The French, as we know, allowed a capitulation of their own, by merging their zone with the Anglo-American’s bi-zone, creating the basis for a West German state of 49 million inhabitants, compared to the Soviet Union’s 17 million East German citizens.[[2]](#footnote-2) While the blockade may have been seen as an act of Soviet aggression, Stalin’s policy as always was based on improvisation.

He was not about to go to war over Berlin, but believed that by forcing the issue he could push the allies out of the city, or at least use Berlin as a bargaining chip for delaying the creation of a West German state. In Stalin’s mind, a united, neutralised Germany was the ideal scenario, rather than a German state permanently divided and occupied by the allies. Stalin’s view on the German situation would change in time, but over 1948-49 the Soviet Chairman came to realise the intensity of Western concerns. Stalin couldn’t have imagined that the west had the capacity to supply Berlin by the air – it was a promise reminiscent of Goering’s promise to Hitler that the surrounded German army in the Stalingrad salient would be supplied by the Luftwaffe. Unlike Goering though, the Anglo-American air command was not full of hot air, and they had the resources and technological ability to actually make such an incredible feat happen.

When Stalin realised what was happening, and that his bluff had failed, he did make an effort to change his approach. On 31st January 1949 he proposed the ending of the blockade in return for a postponement of the establishment of a West German state. This the allies refused, since Stalin was plainly in the weaker diplomatic position. Yet, as all sides were still diplomatically open at least, a conference of the different foreign ministers was agreed to take place on 23rd May 1949. The conference was plainly arranged as a Soviet face saving exercise, and there was no question among the American, British or French delegates that attended of giving the Soviets what they wanted by delaying the creation of a West German state, based out of a new capital at Bonn. This fact was starkly apparent to those present when it was learned that this new Bonn government had implemented the German Basic Law, effectively establishing a West German state, enshrined on a provisional basis to acknowledge the idea that the division of Germany was a temporary matter, a question of some sensitivity to the German people.

By the time Konrad Adenauer had secured a majority with his CDU on 15th September 1949, the Soviets were already in the process of establishing their East German state, with the awkwardly divided Berlin as its capital – a situation which was to lead to yet another tense Berlin situation in the early 1960s, when the infamous wall emerged. Indeed by the autumn of 1949 all sides had come to terms with the division of Germany for the foreseeable future, even Stalin, who had initially been so opposed. Having failed either to bluff the allies out of Berlin or delay the establishment of West Germany, the creation of an East German communist satellite state was the consolation prize, but was far from the worst outcome. The Berlin blockade thus had a profound impact on the development of Germany, since it moved the two sides to forge ahead with their plans for the two zones, an outcome which would scarcely have been acceptable four years beforehand.

It also had a further impact, in that the standoff between the two militaries forced the US to reconsider its commitment to Germany. For some time it had been assumed, or at least hoped, that a skeleton force of American soldiers would do the job. In time, a policy of defence through the use of active soldiers would be replaced by a stockpile of nuclear weapons and the creation of bases from which to launch them, and defence would be replaced by deterrence. A two-fold plan thus came into view, with the Americans committing more men and military vehicles, and also properly developing the protocols through which an atomic bomb might be used. This talk of nuclear war says much about the heightened sense of doom enveloping European and American outlook in 1948-49.

For many months, based on logical analysis, I have felt and held that war was unlikely for at least ten years. Within the last few weeks I have felt a subtle change in Soviet attitude which I cannot define, but which now gives me a feeling it may come with dramatic suddenness.

These were the words of General Clay, the American military governor of the US zone in Germany, in the aftermath of the Czech coup of February 1948.[[3]](#footnote-3) It is important not to understate the impact that the Czech coup made on Western thought and perspective. In the US and in Britain, it appeared as though Stalin was readily and determinedly increasing his chokehold on democratic freedoms, and that he was waiting to find the right time to strike. This image of Stalin represents a failure of diplomacy in the strictest sense, since Stalin was operating from a position of weakness rather than strength, as we’ll see in a bit. Thanks to his belligerence and lack of dialogue with the west, Stalin created the image of an all-powerful and aggressive Soviet expansion, but to a degree this may well have suited Moscow, since it put the western back up against the wall. Yet, at the same time, this threat to the west was only useful if it forced the West to back down – if Washington called the Soviet bluff, as was the case, then it would be the Soviets who would be faced with a climb-down, rather than the west.

In this we can discern that not only did Stalin underestimate the western determination, he also played right into the fears of the west and made them far less likely to compromise in the future. This was a still worse situation for Stalin because over 1948-49 the West was strengthening itself, rather than fraying under the Soviet pressures. Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, proposed a Western European Union to Parliament on 22nd January 1948, and from this point, British military and political involvement in Western European affairs skyrocketed. This speech from Bevin was based on the philosophy that British security needs could no longer be separated from those of the continent, which in itself was a highly significant break from the past for that island nation of isolationists and Euro-sceptics.

A Western European Union or WEU was incepted with the Brussels Pact shortly thereafter, one of many predecessors of the modern EU, but Bevin was adamant in his messages to Washington that such an agreement was useless unless it included an American commitment. How could Bevin present such an agreement though, when it was well-known that the Americans wished to extricate themselves from Europe? Bevin believed he had the solution – any American-European alliance would be presented as one of North Atlantic importance, rather than merely Anglo-American or American-European. This was a timely adoption as the Soviet Union was at that point approaching the Norwegians for a neutrality agreement, and this would present a logistical problem for the west should a conflict break out at sea. By widening the parameters of the agreement, the threat would be greater and thus the American commitment would be lessened. That, at least, was the idea, and its initial appeal to Washington proved the difference. By April 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation had been signed by Britain, America, Canada and 10 European states. NATO and a new era of CW defence was thus born.

***Truman signs NATO clip.***

NATO was a remarkable achievement even in the context of the growing threat that the Soviet Union seemed to pose. The the US would commit to an alliance which would tie its forces to Europe was anathema to many in Congress even in 1947, yet Bevin’s adoption of additional powers and spheres made it far more palatable to its American partners. When the US Secretary of State Dean Acheson presented the agreement before Congress, he made sure to emphasise that NATO would not force a large American military commitment to Europe. The psychology of NATO in its initial stages is very interesting, mostly due to the massive underestimation of the American side of what they expected to have to commit. Before the events of the KW, there seemed little inclination on the part of any members of NATO to build up a large armed force and rest it on the Soviet borders – this is because the members of NATO were far less interested in fighting a war than they were in preventing one, through the age-old lesson of strength in numbers.

Yet NATO was also seen in Washington in a similar light to the Marshall Plan. Just like the US had done before, this latest policy and move towards kinship with Europe was designed to make Europeans feel better about themselves. If the psychological toll of the SWW could be overcome by such cooperation, and Europeans thus be made stand on their own two feet, then the defence against the Soviet Union would be made that much easier. Putting steel into the Western Europeans wasn’t the only positive benefit of the agreement though – many in Europe responded so positively to the arrangement because, unlike in the aftermath of the FWW, America was now tied to the continent in a peacetime military alliance for the first time. This, of course, had an immense calming effect on those that had so feared the prospect of German revanchism rising out of the ashes to strike at Europe again.

The mere fact that NATO played such a role in calming these fears reminds us that to many in Europe – and to the French especially – fear of a German revival on military grounds was something that was still to be greatly feared. The NATO contribution towards French security was thus as material as it was psychological. No longer so insecure about their future, the French could adhere to the Anglo-American ideal of rebuilding Germany to a limited degree, and NATO thus played a significant role in persuading the French to merge their zone with that of the Anglo-Americans, as we saw in April 1949. Indeed, in the words of NATO’s first Secretary General in 1952, the purpose of NATO was ‘to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down.’[[4]](#footnote-4)

However, for all its positive impact and encouragement that it granted to Europe, NATO was neither an immediate fix nor an easy organisation to immediately set in place. It would take some time to properly develop its principles, and to properly discern the military and economic commitments of each of its members. We will see in future episodes the stunning impact that the outbreak of the KW had on NATO’s members and their capacity to rearm, but an issue which the Anglo-American bloc struggled with in NATO’s early days, and in the aftermath of the KW especially, was the question of how, and whether it was even possible, to rearm the West Germans. The idea to put weapons in the hands of Germans who five years before had used them to such devastating effect would understandably spook and perhaps enrage the French and other formerly occupied countries.

Like the case had been with the Marshall Plan though, it didn’t seem logical to spend so much on the improvement and repairing of Germany without asking those same Germans to commit to the project themselves. Similarly, there was hardly much point in making a pledge to defend the West Germans against the Soviets without asking Bonn to supply some soldiers itself. It should be added as well that in the months before the KW broke out, notions about a neutral third way in the world were acquiring supporters, in Germany and France especially. Rearmament would in fact have a critical role in rebuilding the economies of post-war Europe, a strange fact which Adolf Hitler’s economic policies of the 1930s attested to all too well, but in 1949 in particular, the idea of spending precious resources on arms seemed like the antithesis of what Europe actually needed.

British and French military spending had plummeted since 1946, and would reach their lowest points in 1949, before, thanks to the KW and the NATO members commitments therein, surging to a peak between 1951-53. To take one figure in particular, the US budget on defence rose from $15.5 billion in August 1950 to $70 billion in December 1951, to the point that defence spending by the end of the first full year of the KW was consuming nearly 18% of the US’ GNP.[[5]](#footnote-5) Our coverage will return to this incredible leap in spending in the future, as we examine exactly what role the KW played in the deepening of America’s pockets.

Just as Stalin had lost the initiative in Germany, he had also become involved in a miniature cold war with an emerging region power in the Balkans. From 1945 to early 1948, Yugoslavia was the ideal example of a communist power in the Soviet bloc. Josip Tito’s communists had won the preceding civil war in the country, which had been ripped apart by first the Nazi occupation and then the war between the different parties in the aftermath. Tito’s partisans came to power shortly after the end of the SWW, and in the process became the only state outside of the Soviet Union which saw a native communist regime take root. Tito’s regime came into being without Stalin’s direct aid, and for a time this recommended Tito as the ideal communist official, to be admired and mirrored in his ruthless pursuit of the communist ideal. In the communist gatherings between 1945-48, the Yugoslav representatives would talk down to their French and Italian counterparts, and would in turn receive glowing praise from the Soviet Union’s representatives.

In time though, Tito’s efforts became a stockpile of sins in Stalin’s mind. What Stalin disliked about about Tito’s state was its rapid progress in implementing an imitation of the Soviet model. Between 1945-46, Tito’s party liquidated all opposition, motored ahead with the collectivisation of agriculture, and forced state control upon all vestiges of large-scale industry. This at a time when the Soviet satellites in Romania and Bulgaria especially were proceeding with caution, and were devoid of the kind of progress and success that Tito’s regime enjoyed. Of course by progress and success I mean in terms of the communist ideal rather than in the actual sense of the word, since Tito’s regime bulldozed and destroyed much of the country’s infrastructure and condemned to death or prison camp hundreds of thousands of undesirables. However, worst of all in Stalin’s mind wasn’t his neighbour’s success in implementing the communist ideal, but in Tito’s determination to go his own way.

Where to Tito an ideological obedience was enough, to Stalin no communist state could exist without first deferring to Moscow’s – read, *Stalin’s* – supreme authority. This was unpalatable enough to Tito, who had his own ambitions for not merely Yugoslavia, but also the Balkans itself, but Stalin was also greatly concerned by Tito’s tendency to present himself as a kind of leader in his own right. Leadership in any kind of independent sense was impossible in Stalin’s mode of communism. Deferral to the Soviet will was the first part of the plan in the other Soviet satellites, and utter, unswerving obedience was the next. Stalin correctly discerned that Tito had little interest in being a cog in the machine – while always respectful of the Soviet position, Tito was far too ambitious for his own good to know his place.

The historic Yugoslav ambition for a Balkan Federation to include Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Albania and others was a further strike against Tito, particularly as he was known to have some converts in these same states. Several communist officials in Eastern Europe believed that there was the potential in Tito’s proposal to overcome the historic constraints of Balkan nationalism and remove forever the old borders which prevented communism from bringing all Slavs together. The small-state nationalism before the SWW had rendered the likes of Bulgaria and Romania weak and vulnerable to larger neighbours, and Tito’s federation could solve such problems while also uniting the once volatile region under Soviet rule. If Stalin ever approved of this idea, it was only because he believed at one point that Tito could be a useful pawn.

Yet, Moscow immediately lost faith in the idea once it became clear that, unlike his communist peers in the Soviet satellites, Tito was by no means willing to become Stalin’s puppet, nor could he be thought of as the kind of charisma or imagination vacuum which Moscow traditionally selected to rule those same satellites. Tito’s ambitions meant that he verged dangerously close to independence, and this was something which the obedience and authority obsessed Stalin could not abide by. So it was that a miniature cold war took place from spring 1948 on Stalin’s Balkan doorstep, a development from which the Western allies could take full advantage.

Initially, Yugoslavia had been supported by the west once it became clear that Tito’s communists were winning the struggle within the country while it remained under Nazi occupation. From 1943 the British stopped sending aid to Tito’s rivals in Yugoslavia, the Chetnik partisans who fought for a strictly nationalist government. Tito’s flavour of communism was Slavic enough to get most in the country on side, and the British supported his guerrillas against the Nazis because they were a convenient means through which Hitler’s southern flank could be destabilised. When the war ended, the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration sent more money to Yugoslavia than to anywhere else in Europe - $420 million, with over 70% coming out of America’s pocket.[[6]](#footnote-6) Tito’s communist party presented itself as the Yugoslav People’s Front in the 1946 elections – the other choice for the country’s citizens was an urn publicly labelled opposition.

This, more than anything, sent a clear message to the west, but also the western communist parties, who continued to compromise in France, Belgium, Italy and elsewhere by entering into coalition with socialists. Tito’s communists, of course, didn’t have to compromise, but his case was all the more extraordinary, because Stalin knew perhaps better than anyone else that communism’s hold over eastern Europe in 1945 was shaky at best, and non-existent at the worst. Another strike against Tito then wasn’t merely the fact that he had established his communist party free from political compromise, he had also done it without needing the Soviet Union’s help. By succeeding on his own merit, Tito didn’t merely present himself as a communist success story, he presented himself as a challenge to Stalin’s power magnet in the Balkans, but also in Eastern Europe generally.

As Tito’s favourable Balkan Federation plan demonstrated to Stalin, and as we have already seen, that alternative communist magnet was already beginning to catch certain communist actors in its pull. Stalin couldn’t allow this cult of Tito to develop on his doorstep – there could be only one cult of personality in the communist world, and it would have to revolve around him. If Tito succeeded on his own power, and initially at least, without the use of force, then it suggested that he had just as much, if not more legitimacy, than Stalin did. The SWW hadn't masked all civil wounds during the Yugoslav civil war, but it did have the effect of recasting the event as a successful struggle by Tito’s communism against fascism. Tito’s opponents in that struggle could be thus branded as fascists – a lesson which Stalin was soon to put to full effect.

***Get clip from CW documentary series on Stalin show trials.***

However, in the countless show trials and purges which were to follow Stalin’s break with Tito in 1948, fascism would not be the only charges levelled at those in power in Eastern Europe – sympathising with or spying for Tito and his so-called ‘nationalist deviation’ in Yugoslavia would also become a common charge. Tito was not merely a rival for Stalin’s cult then, he was also the enemy in a region which still struggled with the legacy of nationalism and historical memory. Communism could wipe the slate clean to an extent, but it was the case that Moscow’s brand of communism would be less attractive to Slavs in the Balkans than the supposedly more ‘native’ communism of Tito. His success could be celebrated as socialism coming from a truly Slavic source, without need for Soviet help or inspiration, and complete with its own vibrant and suitably ruthless leader. Yugoslavia, as Stalin well knew, was precisely so dangerous because to a large extent, Tito’s success, his authority and his presentation were a mirror image of that which the Soviet Union had established for Moscow and for Stalin.

The Yugoslav challenge to Stalin wasn’t just based on the logic that this communism isn’t big enough for the two of us though – Tito was creating practical problems for Stalin as well. In Greece, Tito continued to support the Greek communist insurgents against the legitimate Greek government, destabilising the region and casting a suspicious light on Stalin when in reality he had long since given up on the Greek region. Furthermore, in Italy the disputed Trieste region along the Adriatic was producing grave tensions for Rome as well as Belgrade, and Tito continued to insist on satisfaction for his regime in the hotly disputed area. The act put everyone on edge, but it also made the Italian communists look foolish since they didn’t know how to react to a communist party making such irredentist and nationalist claims. On top of this, in southernmost district of Austria, the region known as Carinthia, Tito was also insisting on satisfaction, a call which Stalin resented since as per the post-war settlement he had been allowed station Soviet troops in that portion of the country and he wanted that state of affairs to continue.

All of this hot points had the potential to become a flash point for WW3 at any time, but Stalin had no interest in seeing any one of them result in a new war. Since he couldn’t make Tito see sense, he began to become increasingly exasperated by Tito’s actions. They must be combined with what we know of the era – the image of Tito’s face plastered next to Stalin’s and that of the Bulgarian communist leaders in all of Sofia’s major train stations. Or who could ignore the Hungarian premier’s musings that Tito’s model of communism was to be admired, and telling the Soviet representatives so?

Stalin was outraged, and we can connect his anger at Tito not merely to the increasing terror and paranoia his regime began to adopt from 1948, but also with his erratic behaviour in the west. The Prague coup in February 1948 was an act by Stalin at a time when he was losing the initiative elsewhere – in both Germany and, as we have just seen, in Yugoslavia, and he needed a win. Further acts like the Berlin blockade from 1948-49 resulted from the insecurity Stalin felt not merely in his own ability to influence affairs in the Soviet sphere and immediately outside of it, but also, perhaps, from his awareness that communism in Eastern Europe wasn’t especially strong without Soviet armed force to back it up. When the leader of the Hungarian communist party returned from Moscow in February 1945, he would have been greeted by only 4k fellow communists out of the entire population. The Romanian situation was similar – out of a population of 20mn Romanians, the communist leader in spring 1945 counted barely 1k party members.

In Bulgaria the number was slightly higher, at 8k, but the message from all such states was crystal clear – if Stalin wished to see communist governments installed as satellite buffer states on the Soviet Union’s borders, then the Red Army, as well as soft power in the form of propaganda and perhaps more Red Army would have to be made use of to bring the regime change about. There could be no question of democratic processes in any one of these countries, even though such processes were exactly what had been promised at the inter-war conferences. Had the communists been forced to contest any democratic elections that adhered to even a modicum of fairness, then they would have been electorally decimated, and Stalin knew it.

So it was that Eastern Europe and the Soviet sphere collapsed into a haze of illegitimacy and terror, as communist press gangs roamed the streets and whipped the populations into line. Any promises of democratic representation or of democracy in any form were fulfilled only by the name given to that state. The German Democratic Republic always struck me as especially ironic considering the very lack of either a democracy or a republic at the heart of East Germany’s governing apparatus – East Germany, much like its other petrified Eastern neighbours, were to spend the next forty plus years in a kind of limbo between the SWW and the current state of affairs. *Conflict may have been at an end in the official sense, but a new kind of war, for the sake of personal freedoms and national identity, was only just beginning. A long, cold and grey winter lay between the post-war eastern European generation and such freedoms, but there was little they could do now that the iron curtain had so emphatically rested, and left them on the other side.*

It is easy, as you’ve undoubtedly noticed, to talk about the events of the CW. I’d wager that even the immediate 5 years following the end of the SWW, punctured then by the eruption of the KW, would make for a fascinating podcast in its own right, but this is where we must leave our CW analysis for the moment. We will of course be drawing on all of the lessons we have learned here, on the connection of the KW to the European continent and to the east-west divide as a whole, but for the moment it helps to picture Europe in early 1950 as moving deftly towards its distinct ideological and geographic camps. Any sense of war had been put to bed after the settlements following the Berlin Blockade, and the creation of NATO seemed to forestall any immediate military threat from the Soviet Union for the moment. Both Britain and France were beginning to develop their own nuclear programmes, as a counterweight not merely to the Soviets, but also, perhaps, to the US.

Time would tell when and where such weapons would be used, if indeed they would be used at all, but the point is that by early 1950, President Truman, his advisors and countless other European diplomats on both side of the divide were thinking of many things – Korea, that peninsula, its post-war settlement and its troubled governing systems – certainly were not included among them. Next time, we will officially begin our coverage of the KW, so I’d like to say a personal thanks to you guys for joining me for this scene-setting exercise, and I hope you’ve enjoyed it. If you found yourself a lot more interested in this era than you thought you would be, please check out Tony Judt’s book *Post-War*, which I’ve drawn on for the bulk of this crash course. It is available in audiobook form as well, so if you have 50 hours to spare, head on over to audible now. I don’t have a referral code or any such thing to give you, but the late great Tony Judt deserves to have his work enjoyed – what a shame we can’t have him on the podcast to talk about it himself, but hopefully, you’ve gotten a good flavour of it here.

So that’s it then, you’ve entered the era known as the CW and you’ve come out the other side relatively unscathed, but how will you cope next week when we delve into the events leading up to the KW in more detail, complete with a new style and presentation which I feel you guys will really appreciate? Well, you’ll just have to wait and see, but I want to say a huge thanks again for joining me here. This is obviously a massive jump from the eras I would normally cover, and I’ve had a blast. If *you’ve* had a blast, then make sure you tell someone about WDF and what I’ve just done here, and tell them that Zack Twamley is brave enough to tackle the KW next week. Until then though, my name is Zack, this has been the final episode of the CWCC and you have been listening to WDF. Thanks and I’ll be seeing you all soon!

1. Cited in Anne Applebaum, *Iron Curtain*, p. 94. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. All figures taken from Tony Judt, *Post-War*, p. 146. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Cited in Tony Judt, *Ibid*, p. 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Cited in *Ibid*, p. 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Figures provided by *Ibid*, p. 151. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Figure given in *Ibid*, p. 140. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)