



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

August 16, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 538

It has been 3,458 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 173 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. Today's report is combat only.

- The table of heavy equipment losses for Russia and Ukraine, based on information from the Oryx Database, was updated on August 16, 2023
- Positional fighting continued north of Kupyansk
- Commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi, confirmed our assessment that the Russian attempt to maintain offensives in the Svatove and Kreminna areas of operation (AO) has culminated
- House-to-house fighting is confirmed in Klishchiivka
- Ukrainian forces continued to advance from Urozhaine with fighting on the edge of Zavitne Bazhannya
- Ukrainian forces control northern and most of central Robotyne
- A Russian Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter was shot down near Robotyne
- Ukrainian forces made marginal gains toward Verbove
- Ukrainian forces have started night operations using NATO-provided equipment in the Orikhiv AO

- The first ship to sail through Ukraine's green corridor out of Odesa, the 94,000-ton Joseph Schulte, departed with 2,114 cargo containers
- A Russian collaborator in Crimea claimed the Chongar Bridge has been repaired while officials urged people not to share information from "social activists"
- A Russian training base in occupied Kherson was attacked with M30A1 rockets fired by HIMARS
- Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland are discussing a coordinated closure of their borders with Belarus
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a Stavka with a public readout
- There is a very solid chance the TikTok envelope will be opened within the next week as Ukraine has entered the third phase of their summer offensive

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. The growing number of combat ineffective and combat destroyed Russian units is forcing Russian commanders to rotate remaining reserves to hotspots in regions outside their assigned AO. In our assessment, Ukraine has the battlefield initiative in every AO except Dvorichna.


2. We assess the next phase of the summer offensive has likely started in two operational areas, but we still require more data to make a firm declaration.
3. We remain concerned about Ukraine's capacity to turn tactical gains into operational success and strategic victories.
4. It is unlikely that Ukraine will execute a wet crossing of the Dnipro River with a battalion-sized or larger force.
5. Despite Ukraine's likely start of the next phase of its summer offensive, we maintain that Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition dates, negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
6. We maintain that Russian and Belarusian aggression and threats on the borders of Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Black Sea coast will continue to expand and lead to an international incident if Ukraine's allies do not take a stronger posture.
7. We maintain Russian President Vladimir Putin's stature, both inside and outside of Russia, remains weakened after the failed Prigozhin Insurrection, and there continues to be a small but very real possibility of another insurrection or coup attempt. Additionally, his weakened state, coupled with economic uncertainty, makes it more difficult to do another wave of formal mobilization.

8. Our assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces, was accurate, with continued reports of fighting between units, fratricide, and desertions.
9. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community is negatively impacting Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
10. Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
11. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)




TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorychna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure

Free Kharkiv/Luhansk

The spokesperson for Operational Command East (OKE), Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, reported that Russian forces fired 404 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad and Smerch rockets, drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs from Dvorichna [Kharkiv] to Bilohorivka [Luhansk] and carried out 18 airstrikes. There were only reports of positional fighting.



Dvorichna Operational Area

Mutual fighting was reported northeast of [Synkivka](#), with Russian sources falsely claiming Ukrainian forces retreated from the settlement.^{1 2 3} The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the area of [Vilshana](#).⁴

¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11144>


² <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17370> [Late Report, August 15, 2023]

³ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14388>

⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/29384 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents

Free Luhansk

During a press briefing, Commander of the Ground Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Colonel-General Oleksandr Syrskyi, said, "Based on the results of work with the commanders in this area, a number of important decisions were made that will ensure the reliability of the defense. In the Lyman direction, the enemy is regrouping, replacing units that have lost their combat capability due to the losses incurred and is not abandoning plans for new offensive actions. Our task is to make the most of this situation and significantly improve our position. The commanders and I worked out the decisions necessary for this directly in the area of hostilities."⁵

⁵ <https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2880>




Svatove Operational Area

Positional fighting continued in [Novoselivske](#), with Russian forces occupying the train station and house-to-house fighting within the village.^{6 7} We did not adjust the map. RMOD claimed Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the area of [Stelmakhivka](#).⁸

⁶ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17370> [Late Report, August 15, 2023]

⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/29384 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁸ https://t.me/mod_russia/29384 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




Kreminna Operational Area

RMOD claimed Ukrainian forces remained on the offensive in the area of [Kuzmyne](#).⁹ Touches and harassment attacks were conducted in the [Serebryansky Woods](#).¹⁰

⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/29384 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

¹⁰ https://t.me/mod_russia/29318 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

NORTHEAST DONETSK




Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties


Free Donetsk

Colonel-General Syrskyi also talked about the situation in the Bakhmut AO. "The enemy counterattacks, mines, intensively fires, and uses aviation. At the same time, in such difficult conditions, our troops are gradually moving forward. With the commanders of the brigades fighting in the Bakhmut direction, we discussed the urgent issues of increasing the effectiveness of offensive actions, fire damage to the enemy [*more effective artillery – Ed.*], and a number of other measures aimed at achieving victory."




Bakhmut Operational Area

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported the Russian attempt to advance in the direction of [Bohdanivka](#) was repulsed.¹¹




Klishchiivka Operational Area

Ukrainian forces are  [engaged in house-to-house fighting](#) in [Klishchiivka](#) in what appears to be a mop-up operation in the center of the settlement.¹²

¹¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11144>

¹² <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1691898474533425482>


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,

destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics




Avdiivka Operational Area

Only positional fighting was reported in the area of operation (AO), with a Russian offensive from Spartak in the direction of [Avdiivka](#), supported by the Russian air force and army aviation (VKS), failing.^{13 14} RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near [Nevelske](#).¹⁵ Yes, this is the same report from August 15.


¹³ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11144>

¹⁴ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14388>

¹⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/29384 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Area

The Ukrainian 35th Naval Infantry Brigade released video  [showing the liberation of Urozhaine](#).¹⁹ Ukrainian forces continued to advance south, according to the spokesman of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Andriy Kovale. Ukrainian forces have reached the northern edge of [Zavitne Bazhannya](#).

¹⁹ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5913

ZAPORIZHIA




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



Free Zaporizhzhia

Brigadier General Alexander Tarnavskiy, Ukrainian commander of the Tavria sector, reported that Ukrainian forces carried out 1,393 fire missions. Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo claimed that Ukraine fired over 1,000 artillery rounds into the southern part of Robotyne, where Russian troops remain.



Orikhiv Operational Area

WarGonzo claimed that Ukrainian forces had breached the minefields in the northern part of [Robotyne](#) and had re-engaged using NATO-style combined arms tactics with heavy artillery support. Ukrainian forces are also starting

to  [execute night attacks](#), with August 16 being a new moon. The short clips of night attacks showed  [armor, artillery and light infantry working together](#), indicating that the minefields were breached.²⁰ Russian propagandist Archangel Swat Z described the Russian situation in Robotyne as "severe," while WarGonzo appeared to be setting conditions to accept a Russian withdrawal.²¹

"From the field, they report that the battle does not stop, and the pressure of the Armed Forces of Ukraine only intensifies. The enemy returned to the original tactics, with which the counteroffensive in this sector began. Massive artillery strikes disassemble the positions of our fighters, leaving them no other option but to roll back to the next line. According to one of the sources, more than a thousand shells fly into the settlement every day."²²

The Ukrainian 47th Naval Infantry Brigade [shot down a Russian Ka-52 helicopter with MANPADs](#) near Robotyne, marking the 41st airframe lost since February 24, 2022, and a 30% visually confirmed loss of the entire Russian Ka-52 fleet.²³ The crew was killed in the crash.

²⁰ <https://twitter.com/GloOouD/status/1691947192410308869>


²¹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14393>

²² <https://t.me/wargonzo/14409>

²³ https://twitter.com/bayraktar_1love/status/1692086731082727482

Insurgents in Nikolske [Donetsk] reported that Russian troops who are rotating out of the Orikhiv AO broke operational security and discussed that orders had been given to retreat "behind the pyramids," which would be the second echelon of the Surovkin Line. It was unclear if these were orders to specific units or for Russian troops to start a retrograde action due to the widening breach.²⁴

Ukrainian forces also made additional gains in the direction of [Verbove](#).^{25 26 27}

While working on the report, a video  [showed a full platoon](#) of Russian troops taken as POWs.²⁸ We're sharing the video due to the large group and because one was struck by a Ukrainian soldier in transit.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

There was no other update on the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

²⁴ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/12651>

²⁵ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17370> [Late Report, August 15, 2023]

²⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/29384 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

²⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14388>

²⁸ <https://twitter.com/PStyle0ne1/status/1692101785253482656>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Operational Command South (OKS) reported seven vessels of the Black Sea Fleet were on patrol with no missile carriers.²⁹

The Singapore-owned Hong Kong-flagged 94,000-ton container ship Joseph Schulte left the port of Odesa with 30,000 tons of cargo in 2,114 containers, becoming the first vessel to sail through the Ukrainian green corridor in defiance of the Russian blockade.³⁰ The Joseph Schulte has been stuck in Odesa since February 24, 2022, and its destination is Turkey.

Occupied Crimea

The former illegitimate minister of transportation for occupied Crimea, Anatoly Tsurkin, claimed that the Chongar Bridge had been repaired.³¹ Shortly after, the

²⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110294>

³⁰ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5911

³¹ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/94918>

current illegitimate minister of transportation for occupied Crimea, Oleg Kryuchkov, said, "The competence of the Russian Ministry of Transport and relevant departments...are urged not to disseminate information from bloggers and social activists."³²

A  [check of traffic patterns](#) in occupied Crimea indicated that the Chongar Bridge has reopened.³³

OKS director of communications, Captain Nataliya Humenyuk, said that Russian logistics are straining due to continued disruptions of critical infrastructure in Crimea. "The peninsula is becoming more and more of an island in a logistical sense because logistics is complicated and slowed down in time – because there are still ways in which it can be carried out. But it is overloaded on those routes because military needs use the same directions as civilian ones."

At the military checkpoints at the Kerch (Crimean) Bridge, civilians are handed pamphlets encouraging them to enlist in the Russian Federation Armed Forces.³⁴

³² <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/39754>

³³ <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1692129361456160806>

³⁴ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/39702>

Odesa

We have more details on the drone strike on the ports of Izmail and Reni on August 15 – 16. One Shahed-136 kamikaze drone destroyed 3,000 to 5,000 tons of grain in Reni. The lost grain would have fed over 5,300 people for a year.³⁵

Errors and Omissions: On August 15, we reported that the Ukrainian port in Izmail was also struck by a drone, based on the available intelligence at the time. The video showing a distant explosion was a drone that was shot down, and there were no direct hits on the port or its infrastructure. We thank you for your understanding as we cut through the fog of war.


³⁵ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/16/7415882/>



KHERSON

Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, prepare the region for illegitimate elections in September 2023, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives




Ukrainian forces maintained their presence from [Dachi](#) to [Kozachi Laheri](#) on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River and expanded control on the right (west) bank of the Konka River near Kozachi Laheri.

GSAFU confirmed the August 15, 2023, report from the Crimean Tartar insurgent organization Atesh that Russian Rosgvardia troops had gone on heightened alert in Hola Prystan.³⁶ Kyiv reported that civilian travel between Hola Prystan and the Kinburn Spit, the entirety of the Dnipro River's left (east) bank, is suspended through August 26. Extreme filtration measures are ongoing at checkpoints. Further away from the river on the E-97 Highway, local residents were reporting that all Russian checkpoints had been removed.

Occupied Kherson

Ukrainian forces conducted another deep strike on Russian positions using M30A1 rockets fired by HIMARS. A Russian base, where fresh conscripts and mobiks are given minimal weapons training before deployment, was attacked in a strike that killed and wounded dozens. Some people may

³⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11144>

find the video disturbing. You can view it by  [clicking here](#).³⁷

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity reported.

³⁷ <https://twitter.com/Ukrainene/status/1691915826935546022>

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity reported.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Yekaterinburg

A railroad relay cabinet was destroyed by partisans in Chkalovsky, near the Keramik railway station.³⁸ As usual, Russian state media claimed there were no disruptions.

Transbaikalia

The commissariat office in Chernyshevsk was firebombed by a man who drove up in his car and threw a Molotov cocktail. The burning wick fell out preventing an explosion.³⁹

BELARUSIAN FRONT

Lithuania is closing the Shumkas and Tverchus border checkpoints with Belarus on August 18 to prevent smuggling and counter the continued "threats to national security."⁴⁰

³⁸ https://t.me/shot_shot/55671

³⁹ https://t.me/shot_shot/55670

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/The3rdForceUA/19161>

Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland are discussing a simultaneous complete closure of their borders with Belarus, effective at the end of August.⁴¹

THEATERWIDE

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy held a Stavka with most of his commanders with a public readout. The discussion was about critical needs for the Ukrainian military from its partners and drone warfare.⁴²

NATO leadership emphasized that its position regarding the sovereignty of Ukraine remains unchanged. "The information regarding the talks about the possible 'exchange' of part of the Ukrainian territories for joining NATO does not correspond to reality, said the strategic communications coordinator of the National Security Council of the White House, John Kirby. "We said publicly that NATO will be the future of Ukraine.

The chief of staff of the Secretary General of the Alliance, Stian Jenssen, apologized for his statement, saying he

⁴¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110330>

⁴² <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/08/16/7415867/>

made a mistake in the words he chose and that it was “part of a larger discussion” on hypothetical situations.⁴³

The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania, Luminica Odobescu, condemned the new Russian attacks on the Ukrainian ports of Reni and Izmail, less than 500 meters from the Romanian border. “With these flagrant violations of international law, Russia continues to endanger global food security and the safety of shipping in the Black Sea.”⁴⁴

Ukraine Air Force spokesperson Colonel Yuri Ignat said F-16s won't come to Ukraine in 2023. “It is already obvious that we will not be able to protect Ukraine with F-16 aircraft this fall and winter,” but maintained hope that modern fourth-generation fighters will one day become part of Ukraine's air defenses.⁴⁵

The table for equipment losses was **updated on August 16, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

⁴³ <https://t.me/suspilnenews/23448>

⁴⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110331>

⁴⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110381>


RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES


Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to August 16, 2023. 11,712 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,154 Ukrainian


| Equipment | Russian Losses | Ukrainian Losses | Ratio | Change |
|--|----------------|------------------|---------|--------|
| Main Battle Tanks | 2083 | 259 | 8.04:1 | ↓ |
| Medium Duty Tanks | 145 | 351 | 0.41:1 | — |
| Armored fighting Vehicles | 947 | 307 | 3.08:1 | — |
| Infantry Fighting Vehicles | 2654 | 691 | 3.84:1 | — |
| Armored Personnel Carriers | 345 | 321 | 1.07:1 | — |
| MRAPs | 46 | 135 | 0.34:1 | — |
| Infantry Mobility Vehicles | 201 | 353 | 0.57:1 | — |
| Command and Communications Vehicles | 246 | 16 | 15.38:1 | — |
| Engineering Vehicles | 332 | 74 | 4.49:1 | — |
| Towed Artillery | 277 | 145 | 1.91:1 | — |
| Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars | 493 | 199 | 2.48:1 | — |
| MLRS | 255 | 50 | 5.10:1 | — |
| SAMs | 147 | 121 | 1.21:1 | — |
| Mobile Radars | 43 | 72 | 0.60:1 | ↑ |
| EW/ECW | 50 | 4 | 12.25:1 | ↑ |
| Winged Aircraft | 85 | 69 | 1.23:1 | — |
| Helicopters | 108 | 32 | 3.38:1 | — |
| Naval Vessels | 13 | 27 | 0.48:1 | — |


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.