



**MALCONTENT NEWS
RUSSIA-UKRAINE
SITUATION REPORT**

August 14, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 536

It has been 3,456 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 171 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. Today's report is combat only.

- The Russia-Ukraine War Map was audited, and the line of conflict was adjusted theaterwide
- The table of heavy equipment losses using information from the Oryx Database was updated on August 14, 2023
- We have red-listed Rybar as a source of information due to three months of consistent disinformation in their reports
- Ukrainian forces have stabilized the Dvorichna and Kupyansk areas of operation (AO)
- Intense positional fighting continues near Dibrova and in the Serebryansky Woods
- A Russian company was combat destroyed in a failed attempt to recapture Andriivka in the Klishchiivka AO
- Clearing operations continued in southern Urozhaine
- A Russian command and control base in Yurivka was hit by at least one Storm Shadow cruise missile, with significant Russian casualties reported

- Fighting in the Hulyaipole AO was reported near Dorozhnyanka
- Multiple Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops are in Robotyne where fighting continues
- Ukrainian forces continue to make progress near Kopani
- A sea mine exploded in the resort town of Costinesti, Romania
- Russia has established five checkpoints on the Crimea Land Bridge route to Russia to alleviate traffic jams
- Residents of occupied Crimea were warned that ongoing gasoline shortages would get worse
- Deputy Minister of Defense of Ukraine, Hanna Maliar, released another cryptic statement about activity on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River
- Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles used for a ground attack struck Dnipro
- Russian cruise missiles targeted Starokostyantynov military airfield in Khmelnytskyi
- Russian cruise missiles were intercepted over Lviv, with debris landing in several neighborhoods and one missile striking near a kindergarten wounding four
- Russian cruise missiles hit the city of Lutsk in Volyn, killing at least three people
- The Cherkasy region was hit by multiple Russian cruise missiles, striking a factory, civilian infrastructure, and a medical facility

- Poland arrested two Russians, accusing them of espionage
- A person reported there was an antipersonnel mine near the Russian Ministry of Defense headquarters in Moscow
- Partisans sabotaged railroad infrastructure in Chelyabinsk
- In occupied Dagestan, a gas station and fuel storage tanks exploded in Makhachkala, killing at least 26 and wounding 75
- We explain why the Ukrainian summer offensive is starting to move forward again in a special assesment
- Norway is providing Ukraine with a military aid package for anti-drone systems worth \$74 million
- The United States announced another \$200 million military aid package

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. Our earlier assesment of Ukrainian military capabilities may have been overly pessimistic, with the

introduction of DPICM (cluster munitions), tactics to identify Russian landmines established and a change of battlefield tactics resulting in new tactical gains and renewed daily progress in multiple AOs. This is the last day of this entry.

2. We remain concerned about Ukraine's capacity to turn operational success and tactical gains into strategic victories.
3. We maintain that signals from Kyiv indicating the next phase of the summer offensive are being prepared, and we now believe there are five operational areas where the next phase could start.
4. It is unlikely that Ukraine will execute a wet crossing of the Dnipro River with a battalion-sized or larger force.
5. Our assessment that the loss of the road bridges at Henichesk and Chongar, and the previous damage to the railroad bridge at Syvash, would degrade Russian logistics appears to be accurate, with fuel shortages worsening and growing complaints of ammunition shortages.
6. Due to a lack of troop rotation, growing ammunition shortages, and weak commanders, Russia is pushing combat ineffective and combat destroyed units to the forwardmost line of friendly troops (FLOT), engaging in attritional warfare against Ukrainian units.

7. Despite Ukraine's plans to move to the next phase, we maintain that Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition dates, negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
8. We assess that Russian and Belarusian aggression and threats on the borders of Ukraine, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, and the Black Sea coast will continue to expand and lead to an international incident if Ukraine's allies do not take a stronger posture.
9. Russian President Vladimir Putin's stature, both inside and outside of Russia, remains weakened after the failed Prigozhin Insurrection, and there continues to be a small but very real possibility of another insurrection or coup attempt.
10. Our assessment that the Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces, was accurate, with more reports of fighting between units, fratricide, and desertions.
11. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community is negatively impacting Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
12. Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies


available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.

13. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)




TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure




Dvorichna Operational Area

Free Kharkiv/Luhansk

The spokesperson for Operational Command East (OKE), Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, reported that Russian forces fired 521 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad and Smerch rockets, drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs from Dvorichna [Kharkiv] to Bilohorivka [Luhansk] and carried out seven airstrikes.

Mutual fighting that was positional in nature continued northeast of [Synkivka](#), with no change to the situation.^{1 2 3}

We made minor adjustments to the map, shrinking the gray area west of Masyutivka and Lyman Pershyi and expanding the areas Ukraine has military control.



Kupyansk Operational Area

The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near

¹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17364>

² https://t.me/mod_russia/29257 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

³ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14357>

[Pershotravneve](#).⁴ Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo reported that Russian forces tried to attack in the direction of [Kyslivka](#) but didn't make any claims of territorial gains.⁵

ASSESSMENT: There is no evidence that Russian forces have made significant gains after over a week on the offensive. Terrain, landmines, the poor quality of limited artillery resources, and well-prepared Ukrainian positions are exhausting Russian combat power.


Kharkiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA) Oleg Sinegubov reported that another 44 people, including 19 children, departed from the Kupyansk raion due to mandatory evacuation order.

⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/29257 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14357>


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections


Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents



Svatove Operational Area

RMOD reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in [Novoselivske](#).⁶ WarGonzo reported that Russian forces attempted to advance in the direction of [Maisozharivka](#).

⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/29257 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



Kreminna Operational Area


RMOD claimed Ukrainian forces were on the offensive near [Dibrova](#) while intense positional fighting continued in the [Serebryansky Woods](#).^{7 8 9}

⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/29257 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁸ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17364>


⁹ <https://t.me/annamaliar/1007>

NORTHEAST DONETSK




Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties



Klishchiivka Operational Area

Russian attempts to advance into [Klishchiivka](#) not only failed but enabled Ukrainian forces to make marginal gains.¹⁰ The August 12 Russian offensive on [Andriivka](#) ended in disaster. A T-80MV main battle tank (MBT) was destroyed, and  [three T-90M MBTs were damaged and abandoned](#), along with one infantry fighting vehicle and one MT-LB armored personnel carrier.¹¹ The Ukrainian 3rd Assault Brigade, 1st Battalion, led the defense, killing up to 40 Russian soldiers and wounding another 25, rendering a company of the Russian 83rd Brigade combat destroyed.

¹⁰ <https://t.me/annamaliar/1007>

¹¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110057>

Additionally, a junior officer of the Espanyola Platoon was killed during the failed attack.¹² Based on the open-source intelligence, we moved the line of conflict east to the railroad tracks. Russian forces continued to try and retake lost positions west and northwest of [Kurdyumivka](#) without success.^{13 14}

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy visited Ukrainian troops in the Soledar AO and provided a transparent assessment of the situation. "Together with General Bohomolov, commander of the Soledar operational and tactical group, we talked to the brigade and battalion commanders – those who are in combat – about their frontline needs. There is always an overall picture. There are reports on each direction, on each brigade. But it is important to talk directly to the warriors about the war experience of those who are on the ground. Today we had detailed, frank conversations. We talked about our offensive, about supplies to the troops, about the capabilities of commanders, about what these capabilities are now and what they should be. Weapons and scarce ammunition. Repair of equipment. A pressing issue is transportation to evacuate the wounded and the evacuation time. Drones used by the enemy: Lancets, Orlans. Drones

¹² <https://t.me/ab3army/3015>

¹³ <https://t.me/annamaliar/1007>


¹⁴ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14357>

needed by our warriors: from Mavics to every other drone system. An important topic is how commanders can manage their personnel—motivation of warriors, training of warriors, and manning of units. There are a lot of problems due to the poor performance of the military medical commissions. We will develop solutions."¹⁵

ASSESSMENT: As part of the ongoing anti-corruption campaign within the military commissariats, purchasing fake medical exemptions has been identified as an endemic problem. The solutions to these problems are unknown, but more arrests are certain in the coming weeks.

¹⁵ https://t.me/V_Zelenskiy_official/7385


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,


destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



Avdiivka Operational Area

There were no reports of significant fighting in the AO from any source, indicating that Russian combat potential has been exhausted. The People's Military of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic Telegram channel released another video showing a glorious victory by "smashing" Ukrainian in Avdiivka. Video  [didn't show the self-propelled howitzer](#) firing at anything.¹⁶

¹⁶ https://t.me/nm_dnr/10809




Marinka Operational Area


Russian forces attempted to advance on [Krasnohorivka](#), with support from the Russian air force and army aviation (VKS), without success.¹⁷ Positional fighting continued in [Marinka](#), with no change to the situation.¹⁸ The 1st Army Corps urgently requested public funds for drones and medical equipment for the Russian 110th Brigade, fighting in Marinka.¹⁹ South of Marinka near Pobjeda, a Ukrainian

¹⁷ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11084>

¹⁸ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/11084>

¹⁹ https://t.me/nm_dnr/10808

drone-delivered 40 mm grenade  [destroyed a Russian UR-77 Meteorit antimine system.](#)²⁰



Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

Mop-up operations continued in [Urozhaine](#), according to Deputy Minister of Defense for Ukraine Hanna Maliar.²¹ Videos from Russian sources showed Ukrainian troops

²⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110041>

²¹ <https://t.me/annamaliar/1007>

being shelled in the southern part of the settlement, verifying the withdrawal of the main Russian force.²²

Commander of Russian OMON forces of the DNR, Alexander Khodakovsky, appeared to admit defeat in Urozhaine, writing about the 11th Battalion of the 1st Army Corp, the Vostok Battalion, that he used to command. "No additional forces from the reserve were involved in this sector. No new artillery battalions were deployed. The battles are being fought with the available forces. Let's just say – poor [quality] forces."²³

Editor's Note: While Khodakovsky laments there were no additional Russian troops deployed, four brigades, two regiments, and three battalions have been directly involved in the defense of Staromaiorske and Urozhaine, including the 247th Parachute (VDV) Regiment and the 336th Guards Naval Infantry Brigade.


Maliar also reported that Ukrainian forces advanced south and southeast of [Staromaiorske](#).²⁴

²² <https://t.me/milinfoLive/105037>

²³ https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2844

²⁴ <https://t.me/annamaliar/1007>

Occupied Donetsk


At least one Storm Shadow cruise missile struck a Russian command and control base  [at a resort hotel in Hvylya](#).²⁵

²⁶ There were reports of significant casualties that we could not independently verify.

²⁵ <https://t.me/The3rdForceUA/19121>

²⁶ <https://t.me/andriyshTime/12593>

ZAPORIZHIA




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians

Free Zaporizhzhia

Brigadier General Alexander Tarnavskiy, Commander of the Tavriia Operational and Strategic Group of Forces, reported that Ukrainian forces carried out 1,620 fire missions in eastern Kherson and Zaporizhzhia.²⁷




Hulyaipole Operational Area

Ukrainian source DeepState reported there was fighting north of [Drozhnyanka](#).²⁸

²⁷ <https://t.me/otarnavskiy/197>

²⁸ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17364>



Orikhiv Operational Area

Russian sources reported that Ukrainian troops continued to advance in [Robotyne](#), with Semyon Pegov of WarGonzo repeating claims that Ukrainian forces were using terrain to bypass the settlement and advance toward [Novoprokopivka](#).^{29 30 31 32 33} Fighting continued near [Kopani](#).³⁴

²⁹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/14357>

³⁰ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17364>

³¹ https://t.me/mod_russia/29257 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

³² <https://t.me/milinfo/105051>

³³ https://t.me/grey_zone/20041

³⁴ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17364>

ASSESSMENT: Ukrainian forces have started to make consistent daily progress south of Orikhiv again, with multiple Russian sources expressing concern that the first echelon has been breached in multiple locations. No other sources are claiming Ukrainian forces are moving toward Novoprokopivka. However, if Ukrainian forces are moving south of Robotyne using the terrain, it confirms there has been a breach of Russian defenses, which is being exploited.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

There was no update on the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Operational Command South (OKS) reported 15 vessels of the Black Sea Fleet on patrol, including the frigate Admiral Makarov which launched four Kalibr cruise missiles after reloading earlier in the day in Sevastopol.³⁵

³⁵ https://t.me/Nazars_Look/16008

In Romania, a sea mine exploded in the beachside town of Costinesti after it hit a pier. Another mine was located nearby, and explosive ordnance disposal engineers were deployed.³⁶

Occupied Crimea

Due to the damage to the Kerch (Crimean), Chongar, and Henichesk Bridges, the so-called Donetsk People's Republic set up five military checkpoints on the M-14 Highway ground line of communication (GLOC) from Chervone Pole to Novoazovsk manned by OMON and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.³⁷ In Novozaovsk, the Ministry of Emergency Situations set up a tent encampment so civilians can access water, medical care, and cell service. This was done despite repeated claims that travel between Armiansk and Novozaovsk is easy, with multiple resources for civilians along the route.

In occupied Crimea, residents were warned to keep their gas tanks full as spot fuel shortages are expected to expand.³⁸

³⁶ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/39534>


³⁷ https://t.me/sons_fatherland/10858

³⁸ <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/39525>

KHERSON

Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, prepare the region for illegitimate elections in September 2023, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



Ukrainian forces maintain their presence from [Dachi](#) to [Kozachi Laheri](#). Discussing the situation on the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River, Deputy Minister of Defense Maliar said, "Certain units performed certain tasks there. Of course, we cannot reveal what exactly was done, but we completed these tasks."³⁹

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Dnipropetrovsk

In Dnipro, Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missiles used for a ground attack struck a commercial enterprise, causing a fire. Two people were wounded, including a 70-year-old pensioner who was hospitalized and a 59-year-old woman who was treated and released.^{40 41}

³⁹ <https://t.me/militarymediacenter/2855>

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/zaborzp/51288>

⁴¹ https://t.me/mykola_lukashuk/5969

Khmelnyskyi

Russian missiles targeted Starokostyantynov military airfield again.⁴² The Russian General Staff remains convinced that Ukrainian Su-24s and Storm Shadow missiles are on the apron with "aim here" signs on them.

Lviv

At least one Russian cruise missile struck civilian areas of Lviv, with debris falling in other areas.⁴³ One missile hit next to a kindergarten, leaving a large crater in the ground. More than a hundred apartments were damaged, with over 500 windows shattered from the concussion. The kindergarten was moderately damaged. A roof partially collapsed at a large grocery store due to rocket debris.⁴⁴ In the Stavchany District, ten homes were damaged. Four people received minor injuries due to the attack.⁴⁵

⁴² <https://t.me/khmelnyskaODA/1968>

⁴³ <https://t.me/suspilnenews/23383>

⁴⁴ https://t.me/zinkevich_igor/7696

⁴⁵ https://t.me/zinkevich_igor/7700

Volyn

In Lutsk, a Russian cruise missile hit a factory, killing at least three people and wounding four.^{46 47}

Cherkasy

A Russian cruise missile hit a private business in Smila, and another struck near a medical facility. There were no casualties reported.⁴⁸ Critical civilian infrastructure was damaged, with water, hot water, and heat knocked out in parts of the city.

⁴⁶ <https://t.me/suspilnenews/23386>

⁴⁷ https://t.me/zinkevich_igor/7701

⁴⁸ https://t.me/zinkevich_igor/7702

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity reported.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Moscow

A person called the Ministry of Internal Affairs, reporting that they had found an antipersonnel mine marked "USA" in the ground near the Aeroflot office on Frunzenskaya Embankment in Moscow. After a significant police response and investigation by EOD experts, it was determined that


 [the object was a lawn sprinkler](https://t.me/shot_shot/55584).⁴⁹

⁴⁹ https://t.me/shot_shot/55584

Chelyabinsk

Partisans destroyed a railroad relay box near the Balandino Station by setting it on fire.⁵⁰ Russian state media repeated its usual claim when freight train lines are attacked, stating that the box was empty and had no impact on logistics.

Occupied Dagestan

Near the Talin Oil Fields in Makhachkala, two large explosions  [leveled a gas station, including two above-ground fuel storage tanks](#).⁵¹ The second blast sprayed gasoline in a 50-meter radius, showering onlookers with burning fuel. At the time of publication, 26 people were reported dead and 75 wounded, many with severe burns.⁵²

53 54

⁵⁰ https://t.me/shot_shot/55554

⁵¹ https://t.me/shot_shot/55611

⁵² <https://t.me/vchkogpu/40856>

⁵³ https://t.me/shot_shot/55611

⁵⁴ <https://t.me/vchkogpu/40856>

BELARUSIAN FRONT

In Poland, two Russians were arrested and charged with espionage for distributing propaganda material, including recruiting information for Private Military Company (PMC) Wagner Group. The head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Poland, Mariusz Kaminsky, did not release any additional information.⁵⁵

THEATERWIDE

Russian launched 28 cruise missiles at Ukraine, including four KH-22 antiship air-to-surface ballistic cruise missiles, 20 Kh-101/Kh-555 cruise missiles, and four Kalibr cruise missiles. Air defenses shot down a combination of 16 Kh-101/Kh-555 and Kalibr cruise missiles.⁵⁶

SPECIAL ASSESSMENT: Russian attempts to seize the initiative at Dvorichna, Kupyansk, Svatove, Kreminna, Lysychansk, and Bakhmut have failed. Additionally, available combat potential in Avdiivka and Marinka is at or has reached exhaustion. On August 14, GSAFU reported

⁵⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/109999>

⁵⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110126>

only 11 combat clashes theaterwide, the lowest operational tempo since August 2022. While Russian forces have tested Ukrainian defenses and had tactical success at Svatove, most of those gains have been given back. Russia has been unable to turn any of the attacks into tactical success. Over the last four to seven days, Ukrainian forces have returned to a state of making steady advances that have transitioned from operational success to tactical gains in Zaporizhzhia and southern Donetsk.

Russian commanders are using their reserve forces at an alarming rate, pushing them to the forwardmost line of friendly troops (FLOT) in what appears to be a "not one step back" defense. There is the potential, depending on many factors where there remains significant uncertainty, for Ukrainian forces to advance to the second echelon of the Surovikin Line rapidly.

There are hints that the second echelon is not as heavily mined as the terrain Ukrainian troops are starting to breach, and multiple drone videos have shown Russian barrel and tubed artillery adjacent to the line of dragon teeth and antitank trenches. These are areas that theoretically should already be heavily mined. There are also questions about the quantity and quality of troops prepared to man and defend the second line of defense.

Ukrainian forces are demonstrating that coordination between artillery and infantry units is improving, and at Urozhaine, it is approaching a Western doctrine level of proficiency. Instead of signaling a looming attack with an artillery barrage followed by an advance hours later enabling Russian troops to prepare, Ukrainian forces have started to close the time gap. Significant improvements still need to be made, which include sustained fire behind Russian positions in coordination with an infantry advance. Having the route of retreat under fire control adds psychological pressure to defending troops.

Ukrainian forces use squad-sized units and drones to locate Russian strong points, use artillery to strike those areas and advance with a larger force when a gap is formed. This change enables demining activity. As the gaps in Russian defenses widen, Ukrainian armor is able to reengage, forcing Russian units to retreat.

The introduction of DPICM (cluster munitions) has caused Russian casualties to increase significantly. It is neutralizing the Russian tactic of using human wave attacks of squad and platoon sized groups that repeatedly strike the same defensive position from multiple directions. The latest update on Ukrainian versus Russian losses using

information from the Oryx Database also indicates that Russian heavy equipment losses have ticked upward even though Ukrainian forces are on the offensive.

Record heat is forecast through the week, providing Ukrainian forces with the first break in the weather in their favor since October. Hot and dry weather has enabled Ukraine to map Russian minefields using drones with thermal imagers. Antitank and larger directional mines are visible in the early evening as they heat and cool at a different rate than the soil. Ukrainian forces still lack enough mine-clearing equipment, and Russian forces actively target explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) engineers.

Russian commanders continue pulling reserve units from the left (east) bank of the Dnipro River in eastern Kherson, moving them to the Orikhiv AO. While we aren't sitting with the General Staff in Moscow, their actions indicate that in reviewing where the biggest threat lies, a breakthrough at Robotyne or Verbove is a bigger concern than a wet crossing of the Dnipro River.

Rarely a single wonder weapon that can change the battlefield. Ukraine's renewed success over the last week

has come through a combination of very hard lessons learned, DPICM rounds, improved use of artillery, drone warfare, weather conditions, and Russian forces fighting a “no step backward” defense pushing reserves along ground lines of communication under Ukrainian fire control.

Norway is sending a \$71 million military aid package which includes the Cortex Typhoon C-UAS surveillance and remote-controlled anti-drone system. The air defense system is mounted to Dingo 2 infantry mobility vehicles.⁵⁷

The United States announced a \$200 million military aid package to Ukraine.⁵⁸ The tranche includes,

- Additional munitions for Patriot air defense systems
- Additional ammunition for High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS)
- Mine clearing equipment and systems
- 155mm and 105mm artillery rounds
- 120mm tank ammunition
- Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided (TOW) missiles (ATGM)
- Javelin and other ATGM systems and rockets

⁵⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/110037>

⁵⁸ [United States Department of Defense](#) [United States Government website]

- 37 tactical vehicles to tow and haul equipment
- 58 water trailers
- Over 12 million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades
- Demolitions munitions for obstacle clearing
- Spare parts, maintenance, and other field equipment

German announced they would provide 5 billion euros in military aid to Ukraine annually through 2027.⁵⁹

The table for equipment losses was **updated on August 14, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

⁵⁹ <https://t.me/DPSUkr/12904>


RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES


Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to August 14, 2023. 11,687 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,145 Ukrainian


Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2086	258	8.09:1	↑
Medium Duty Tanks	145	350	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	946	306	3.09:1	—
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2645	688	3.84:1	—
Armored Personnel Carriers	343	320	1.07:1	—
MRAPs	46	135	0.34:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	201	353	0.57:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	246	16	15.38:1	↑
Engineering Vehicles	332	74	4.49:1	↑
Towed Artillery	277	145	1.91:1	↑
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	488	199	2.45:1	—
MLRS	255	50	5.10:1	↑
SAMs	144	121	1.19:1	—
Mobile Radars	41	72	0.57:1	—
EW/ECW	49	4	12.25:1	↑
Winged Aircraft	85	69	1.23:1	—
Helicopters	108	32	3.38:1	↑
Naval Vessels	13	27	0.48:1	—


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.