



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

October 17, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

10/17/23 23:59* PST

Malcontent News is an independent group of journalists and researchers in the United States, Canada, Ukraine, Israel, Georgia, and the United Kingdom. We are part of Badon Hill Group, LLC, and operate independently from all entities.

We are funded through Patreon, grants, and donations and aided by volunteers. For media inquiries, you can contact social@malcontentnews.com. For news tips, you can contact our newsroom at tips@malcontentment.com.

[Patrons at the Bronze level or higher](#) can access the annotated Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report (SITREP). Patrons at the Silver level or higher get a monthly Q&A viz Zoom Meeting with our Chief Content Officer or other senior staff.

This update is copyright © 2023 by Badon Hill Group LLC, all rights reserved. No parts of the original content can be reused without express written permission. Authors and Analysts: David H. Obelcz, Adam Irving, Jeff Davis, Katie Livingstone, Oskar Hallgrímsson, Ryan Evans, Michael Hering, and Ana Ras, Spanish Editor in Chief. The executive producer and co-host of the Russia-Ukraine War Report Podcast is Zarina Zabrisky, with her co-host Marina Yevshan.

The reader accepts that the information contained in the Malcontent News Situation Report will not be used for travel, navigation, or personal security assessment. The reader agrees to get realtime information from official channels provided by national, oblast, raion, hromada, city, or local officials and follow their security recommendations.



SUMMARY – DAY 600.....3

DAILY ASSESSMENT5

TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP.....8

KHARKIV9

DONBAS REGION 12

LUHANSK 12

NORTHEAST DONETSK..... 16

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK..... 19

ZAPORIZHZHIA.....24

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION28

KHERSON29

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE.....30

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE..... 31

RUSSIAN FRONT 31

THEATERWIDE 32

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES.....35

RUMORS.....36

SUMMARY – DAY 600

It has been 3,521 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 236 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

Summary:

- There are minor map updates
- Fighting continues north and east of Kupyansk, with Russian forces suffering significant losses near Ivanivka
- Russian forces are probing Ukrainian defense lines west of Svatove
- The Russian Ministry of Defense reported glorious victory near Dibrova, Kuzmyne, and Shypylyivka, but videos tell a different story
- There is no information on the missile strike on the Russian helicopter base near occupied Luhansk
- Fighting continued east of Klishchiivka
- A Russian missile hit the college of agriculture in Slovyansk
- The intensity of fighting in the Avdiivka AO declined, with no new advances by Russian forces
- It was the same in Marinka and Novomykhailivka

- Russian forces tried to advance on Prechystivka and Zolota Niva near Velyka Novosilka
- Russian forces launched a significant counteroffensive near Verbove, and it is going about as well as the Avdiivka offensive from last week
- Fighting continued west and south of Robotyne
- ATACMS missiles destroyed six helicopters and an ammunition depot in occupied Berdyansk
- Yes, Ukraine got ATACMS missiles, less than a dozen of M140 M39 munitions with a 165-kilometer range
- There are reports Ukrainian forces made a successful wet crossing of the Dnipro River and have occupied the left (east) bank of the Konka River at Poyma and near Peschanivka
- A Russian base in Kursk, Russia, was hit by Ukrainian drones, killing 18
- Ukraine has drilled a significant number of new natural gas wells through 2023 and has become less dependent on other nations for its own energy needs
- The United States, Japan, and South Korea are preparing a sternly worded letter to send to North Korea for sending munitions to Russia
- The last Wagnerites have left Belarus
- Ukraine has received the 31 promised M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks
- Lithuania is ready to repair combat-damaged Leopard tanks for Ukraine

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

1. The soft response by Ukraine's allies after Russian aggression on Ukraine's border will eventually lead to a significant incident that could result in military intervention.
2. We maintain that the Ukrainian summer-fall counteroffensive is likely reaching its culmination point due to a number of factors, even though Ukraine still maintains significant combat potential and is maintaining the initiative in the Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia regions.
3. The Russian Federation has launched multiple large-scale attacks in an attempt to force Ukraine to utilize its reserve forces and accelerate the consumption of ammunition, with United States military aid remaining in limbo. While Russia has taken the initiative in three areas of operation (AO), the poorly executed offensives have caused catastrophic Russian losses.

4. We maintain that the new Russian offensive has exposed the degradation of their artillery capabilities due to a shortage of replacement barrels, a lack of powder charges, and the reluctance to use full charges for maximum range to preserve the life span of existing barrels.
5. The removal of the United States Speaker of the House, Kevin McCarthy, has put future Ukrainian military operations at risk. We further assess that the abrupt ending of U.S. military aid will be catastrophic if a resolution is not reached within the next 9 to 16 days.
6. In our assessment, the promised deliveries of weapons, equipment, and munitions from Western partners appear to be catching up with the commitments made and may assist in extending the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive operations.
7. The Kremlin is using the Israel-Hamas War as a distraction in the information space to fracture support for Ukraine further and has engaged in large-scale disinformation campaigns.
8. We maintain that Russia is stockpiling missiles for large-scale attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure as the weather continues to degrade and the activity to destroy Ukraine's electrical system has started.
9. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia




Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

COPYRIGHT 2023, MALCONTENT NEWS




TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)


KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvornichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



In the Kupyansk Operational Area (AO), the situation remains challenging for Ukrainian forces. North of Kupyansk, Russian forces tried to advance in the direction of [Synkivka](#) but were unsuccessful. Russian forces were also on the offensive on the southern edge of [Lyman Pershyi](#).¹ East of Kupyansk, fighting continued near [Orlyanske](#) and on the eastern fringe of [Ivanivka](#).² Video showed a Russian advance of light infantry supported by a single tank failed. The  [T-72 tank was destroyed](#), and at least a dozen Russian soldiers were killed.³ We made a

¹ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17856>

² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13003>


³ <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1714249457229840562>

small adjustment to the war map based on the new intelligence. Russian forces, probing for weakness in the Ukrainian defense lines, also attacked near [Kyslivka](#) without success.⁴

⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13003>


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, and capture the rest of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents



In the Svatove AO, Russian forces have switched to probing attacks striking near [Serhiivka](#), [Nadiya](#), [Novoiehorivka](#), and [Makiivka](#).^{5 6 7 8} Ukrainian forces were under pressure at Makiivka and Nadiya, which was hit with nine attacks throughout the day.

ASSESSMENT: Our assessment is unchanged from over the summer while the podcast was on a break. The terrain west of Serhiivka is very unfavorable for a Russian advance, and


⁵ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17856>

⁶ https://t.me/mod_russia/31566 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁷ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/14398>


⁸ <https://t.me/wargonzo/15832>

Ukrainian forces have had time to prepare additional defenses and lay mines. It will be extremely challenging for Russia to establish stable defensive positions on the western edge of Nadiya to launch future offensives. A successful offensive push toward Borova will require an advance to Pershotravneve as quickly as possible to establish a bridgehead on the ridgetop.



South of Kreminna, the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMD) claimed Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the areas of [Dibrova](#), [Kuzmyne](#), and [Shpylivka](#).⁹ Once again, Russia's

⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/31521 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


idea of a repelled offensive includes Russian forces getting wrecked. Video west of Shpylivka showed  [Russian troops and engineering equipment](#) for a river crossing being destroyed by the Azov Brigade.¹⁰

There was no information about the results of the reported missile strike, now confirmed to be M140 M39 ATACMS missiles fired by M270 high mobility rocket artillery systems (HIMARS), on the Russian helicopter base **near the occupied city of Luhansk.**

More information about Ukraine receiving ATACMS missiles is in the **Zaporizhzhia** and **Theaterwide** sections.


¹⁰ <https://twitter.com/EjShahid/status/1714328044414914866>

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut AO, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk, collapse the Russian flanks north of Bakhmut, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, liberate the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, advance to the administrative border of Luhansk, and minimize civilian casualties



Mutual fighting was reported in the Klishchiivka AO east of [Klischiiivka](#) and [Andriivka](#).^{11 12 13} There are no changes that we can report at this time.

In Slovyansk, Russian missiles 📷 [struck a dormitory](#) at the agricultural college campus, which is already heavily

¹¹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13003>

¹² <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17856>

¹³ https://t.me/mod_russia/31566 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




damaged from earlier missile strikes.¹⁴ The building was unoccupied, and there were no injuries.

COPYRIGHT 2023, MALCONTENT NEWS


¹⁴ <https://t.me/astrapress/40544>

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK




Russian Objective: Capture the remainder of the Donetsk Oblast by December 31

Ukrainian Objective: Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



In the Avdiivka AO, the intensity of Russian attacks has diminished. For the second day in a row, RMOD didn't mention Avdiivka in its morning report. Russian forces tried to advance in the direction of [Stepove](#) without success.¹⁵

¹⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/15832>



Russian forces switched tactics and did not try to advance on the terrikon from Vesele, instead attacking [Avdiivka](#) with support from the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) from Opytne.^{16 17} The offensive was unsuccessful. Russian attacks south of [Tonerke](#) and near [Pervomaiske](#) were also unsuccessful.^{18 19}

ASSESSMENT: There is not enough information to declare the Russian offensive over or to say that Ukrainian forces have stabilized their defensive lines. Russian forces have


¹⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13003>

¹⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/15832>

¹⁸ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13003>

¹⁹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/15832>


additional reserves and may be in an operational pause. Russian claims that fire control has been established on Ukrainian ground lines of communication (GLOC – supply lines) are exaggerated. Through all this fighting, over 1,600 civilians are still living in Adviiivka.



In the Marinka AO, Russian forces once again attacked Ukrainian troops in and near [Marinka](#) with no change in the situation.^{20 21}

²⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13003>


²¹ <https://t.me/wargonzo/15832>



In the Staromlynivka AO, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported that Russian forces launched counteroffensives in the direction of [Prechystivka](#) and [Zolota Nyva](#), suffered losses and returned to their defensive positions.²²


²² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13003>

ZAPORIZHZHIA




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, prepare to launch a fall-winter offensive to capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks



Ukrainian Objective: Expand the breakthrough at the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



South of Orikhiv, Russian forces have launched a significant counteroffensive on the western edge of [Verbove](#), advancing on their own antiarmor defenses on the second echelon of the Surovikin Line. Videos we reviewed today indicated it is not going well, with Russian forces suffering significant losses. At the time of publication, we had additional intelligence that we could not confirm. Russian forces also continued counterattacks west of

[Robotyne](#) and north of [Novoprokopivka](#) with no success.²³
24 25

The city of Zaporizhzhia was hit by up to six missiles, with one  [striking an apartment building](#) destroying the two uppermost floors.^{26 27 28} Two people were killed, and search and rescue operations were continuing.

Thanks to bad operational security (OPSEC) by Russian forces in occupied Berdyansk, it has been confirmed that the airport north of the city was hit by  [three M140 M39 Block 1 ATACMS missiles](#) built in 1996.²⁹ The missiles were taken from the expired stockpile of United States munitions and have a range of 165 kilometers. Videos shared by Russian troops showed  [multiple fires after the strike and ammunition cooking off](#).³⁰ The Special Operation Forces (SSO) of Ukraine reported that nine helicopters were destroyed, an anti-aircraft missile system, ammunition, and dozens of dead and wounded Russian soldiers.³¹ The evening report by GSAFU reported that six helicopters had

²³ https://t.me/mod_russia/31566 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

²⁴ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13004>

²⁵ <https://t.me/wargonzo/15832>

²⁶ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119452>

²⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119437>

²⁸ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119444>

²⁹ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/6830

³⁰ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/6837

³¹ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/6819

been destroyed theaterwide.³² We're paid to be skeptical, as reported on October 16, but clearly, it was misplaced. There is more information about ATACMS in the **Theaterwide** section.

³² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119453>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Operational Command South (OCS) reported the Black Sea Fleet had a single Kilo-class submarine capable of launching up to four Kalibr cruise missiles on patrol due to poor weather.

The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed it shot down ten Ukrainian drones and destroyed one uncrewed surface vessel.^{33 34}


³³ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119442>

³⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119428>

KHERSON

Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives



In Free Kherson, Kherson Oblast Administrative and Military Governor Alexander Prokudin said Russia carried out 70 fire missions, firing 404 munitions, rockets, drone-

delivered IEDs, and bombs, striking the city of Kherson 16 times.³⁵ Civilian areas and the train station were targeted again, with six people wounded in three separate incidents.

A prominent but very unreliable Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made a successful wet crossing of the Dnipro River and were able to advance to [Pishchanivka](#) and occupied [Poima](#).³⁶ There were no other sources for the claim, and we're including it in the SITREP to address the rumor. We can neither confirm nor deny the report at this time.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

There wasn't significant activity in this region.

³⁵ <https://t.me/uniannet/114729>

³⁶ <https://t.me/rybar/53351>

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale


Ukrainian Objective: Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity in this region.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

The Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that air defenses shot down 12 drones in the Kursk region and six in the Belgorod region.³⁷ The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that drones successfully  [struck a Russian encampment near Halino airfield](#) in Postoyali Dvory, Kursk.³⁸ The SBU reported that 3,000 Russian soldiers are stationed at the base, and the drone strikes killed 18.

THEATERWIDE

Ukrainian officials reported that 15.8 billion cubic meters of natural gas is in storage, with plans to accumulate another 700,000 million cubic meters before the end of the year. Through 2023, Ukraine dramatically increased the number of natural gas wells and has become more self-sufficient for its internal energy needs.³⁹

The United States, Japan, and South Korea met to discuss the increasing threat from North Korea and their ongoing support of the Russian Federation by supplying ammunition. The U.S. State Department said the "arms supplies between North Korea and Russia, which violate

³⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119442>

³⁸ <https://twitter.com/DevanaUkraine/status/1714563960152654279>

³⁹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119402>

numerous UN Security Council resolutions and threaten stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region, Europe and around the world, as well as undermine the global non-proliferation regime weapons of mass destruction."⁴⁰

You may have noticed the dark potato prince, the self-declared leader of Belarus, Alexander Lukashenko, has gotten awfully quiet. Uncool Lando Calrissian hasn't fallen out of a window, but it is reported that the last Wagnerites have left Belarus and were redeployed to Syria.⁴¹

The Associated Press reported that the United States sent less than a dozen ATACMS missiles to Ukraine on September 21 and hid the shipment by listing them as DPICM.⁴² White House National Security Council spokeswoman Adrienne Watson confirmed that Ukraine has received ATACMS, saying, "We believe that ATACMS missiles will significantly enhance Ukraine's combat capabilities without the risk of weakening our military readiness."

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119436>

⁴¹ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/45326

⁴² https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/45340

The Russian permanent representative for the United Nations, Anatoly Antonov, said that the United States and NATO continue to push Russia, and he called the shipment of ATACMS a "gross mistake."⁴³

U.S. Colonel Martin O'Donnell, the representative of the U.S. Army in Europe and Africa, said that the United States now has all 31 M1A1 Abrams tanks, trained crews, ammunition, and spare parts.⁴⁴ While we welcome this good news, it aligns with our earlier assessment that the full force of the over 70-ton Abrams tank would arrive just in time for Ukraine's winter and likely won't be seen in combat until next spring.

Lithuania announced it would start repairing Leopard tanks damaged in battle for Ukraine.⁴⁵

The table for equipment losses was **updated on September 30, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

⁴³ <https://t.me/uniannet/114807>

⁴⁴ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/6825

⁴⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/119390>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to September 30, 2023.

12,319 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,510 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2179*	292	7.55:1	—
Medium Duty Tanks	150	364*	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	985	327	3.00:1	—
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2817	765	3.68:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	354	347	1.02:1	↓
MRAPs	48	164	0.29:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	212	375	0.57:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	251	17	14.76:1	—
Engineering Vehicles	345	84	4.11:1	↑
Towed Artillery	310	160	1.94:1	—
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	538	222	2.42:1	↓
MLRS	278	50	5.57:1	↑
SAMs	182	129	1.41:1	—
Mobile Radars	45	79	0.57:1	—
EW/ECW	54	4	13.50:1	—
Winged Aircraft	93	73	1.27:1	—
Helicopters	113	37	3.05:1	↓
Naval Vessels and Submarines	17	27	0.63:1	—


RUMORS


Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.


- Will Jim Jordan (R-OH) become the next Speaker of the House tomorrow?
- Is Belarus and Russia planning a false-flag operation to blame Ukraine?
- Is President Biden going to request a one-and-done 2024 military aid package of up to \$100 billion for Ukraine? Appears likely.
- Have more than 280,000 Russian soldiers died in Ukraine since February 24, 2022?
- Were two Russian generals seriously wounded and one admiral killed in Sevastopol? We're still waiting to find out.


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.