Episode 10

Hello and welcome history friends patrons all to episode 10 of \_\_\_\_. Last time we looked at the summer and autumn of 1845, as the British tried to arrive at a settlement over the future of Oregon. In the meantime, as we also saw, the French offered their own perspectives on how matters might progress. In particular, discussions over the fate of California in the event of a Mexican-American War drove the French Ambassador in Washington into a kind of frenzy of speculation and suggestion. This tripod of Britain, France, and the US is central to this period, not just because of what the French did, but because PM Peel considered British policy in terms of Britain’s relationship with the French. Peel did not like what he saw in Paris, and believed that years of minor disputes and quarrels confirmed that the French were not to be trusted, that Louis Philippe’s regime was fickle and opportunistic, and that France’s revolutionary past recommended a cautious approach at best.

There was also talk of increasing British armaments, so that the country would be in a better position to meet whatever challenges emerged on the horizon – the ultimate nightmare of war with Paris and Washington still held purchase, but considering what we know of the French ambassador in Washington, the prospect was highly unlikely. As President Polk’s administration prepared the country for war with Mexico, indeed, it seemed possible that another scenario might take effect, with Britain and France cooperating in a time of American distraction. All the while, Peel’s domestic concerns became central when he was forced to resign, taking Aberdeen with him, in mid-December 1845.

By the time he and Aberdeen returned to the Oregon question after the Whigs failed to form a government, a new energy and sense of priority appeared to empower the Tories. They would resolve Oregon whatever it took, and with the aid of some remarkable propaganda, military threats, and other devices, they would persuade the US to drop its intransigence, and usher in a new era of AA cooperation. Where have we heard that before? In this episode, we’re going to examine how Aberdeen particularly worked both behind the scenes and publicly to bring the Oregon question to a close. The challenges were insurmountable, but if anyone could do it, it was this Scottish FS. Without any further ado then, I will now take you all to December 1845…

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By the time Peel and Aberdeen had returned to power on 19 December 1845, the Oregon question was nearly two years old. From the beginning, Aberdeen had wanted to compromise. There was little value in pushing the US towards war for the sake of territory which the FS himself never rated very highly. More important to Aberdeen was the language used; if Britain gave anything up to arrive at a resolution, it would be necessary to ensure that these concessions were not spoken of as some form of dishonourable capitulation. The memory of Palmerston’s campaign against the WA Treaty of 1842 remained, but the American President also had a critical role to play.[[1]](#footnote-1) President Polk could be conciliatory, or he could be demanding and uncompromising, but if he chose the latter, then negotiations would predictably take longer and require a greater effort. By the time he returned to office, Aberdeen had come to terms with the fact of Polk’s intransigence.

What was more, it seemed like Polk’s administration had little interest at all in resolving Oregon, and preferred to letter it simmer in the background. The uppermost limits of territory were loudly insisted upon – expressed in the call for 54 Forty or fight – and Washington apparently refused to countenance any suggestion that Britain and the US shared equal rights to dispose of the Oregon land. This was despite the existence of a treaty from 1827 which empowered both sides to jointly administer Oregon. Yet, so high had the temperature risen in Washington, that it was now said that Polk intended to renounce that 1827 Treaty altogether, wiping the slate clean in Oregon, and administering it as though it was an integral part of the Republic. This would in fact be done by mid-January 1846, and although both parties were technically entitled to abrogate the treaty provided they gave one year’s notice, the fact that no new settlement was negotiated to replace it was an incredibly provocative step. To the British, it confirmed that the Americans intended to raise the tensions further. So how could the FS resolve the crisis? Aberdeen’s ability to bring the US towards the Oregon Treaty in June 1846 is addressed in an article co-authored by Wilbur Jones, wherein it was stated:

Aberdeen's skill in preparing public opinion and gaining the cooperation of the opposition party was to a considerable extent responsible for this quiet acceptance of a settlement less favourable than his predecessors demanded. But fundamental to his success in these matters was his ability to maintain his country's prestige and honor. Had it appeared that Aberdeen was being forced to surrender to the United States, no amount of persuasion, propaganda, or pleading would have won approval of the compromise at the 49th parallel. Concessions might be freely given by Britain, but they could not be wrested from her. The British government could afford to lose territory, but it could not sacrifice national honor or prestige. This fact has been accorded only incidental recognition in previous studies. However, Aberdeen's skilful use of diplomacy and military preparations to uphold his nation's dignity deserves detailed study.[[2]](#footnote-2)

These questions of national honour and how Aberdeen managed to uphold them form an important plank in my PhD research, but in our case now, it is useful to allude to those diplomatic partners which Aberdeen either made of us, or benefited from indirectly. The first and most important was Louis McClane, the new American ambassador to Britain, who arrived in London just before Peel’s government was temporarily removed from power. The relationship between Aberdeen and McClane was a vital one, not least because it reminded the FS that American diplomacy could be rational and detached when materially unimportant questions were proposed. Not every discussion had to be a battle, and Aberdeen seems to have found McClane’s straightforwardness refreshing. He was even able to offer a note of optimism: ‘I have never been afraid of the Oregon question, and feel confident that in the course of the year we shall see it finally settled, either by arbitration, or by direction negotiation.’[[3]](#footnote-3)

Jones suspects that Aberdeen’s flash of positivity came from McClane’s personal assurances that the US did not want war, and would not push matters so far in Oregon if another approach was made. If we look to our French friend in Washington though – Alphonse Pageot, the French ambassador – matters appeared less rosy. On 13 December 1845 Pageot wrote to French Foreign Minister Francois Guizot on the current mood in America, which was clearly dependent upon what President Polk did next:

The point of honor, however, can only be avoided through a friendly power as intermediary, in other words, a mediation alone will be able to terminate this difference. But if the moment of arbitration has passed, that of mediation has not yet arrived. Public opinion is not yet prepared, for it, and affairs are not yet desperate enough for it to be invoked. This will be the work of time and of highly inflamed feeling, for it is from the excess of the evil that one may see the remedy come. And if I read the situation well, the events which are going to arise from it will aggravate the crisis to the point where the powers who desire the maintenance of the general peace will have to offer a mediation, and the two interested parties will have to accept it. I shall not be so presumptuous, Mr. Minister, as to give the precise details of a compromise, but it seems to me that Mr. Polk's proposition with the addition of the free navigation of the Columbia, and the concession of some ports on the coast to the north of the river, would present for England advantages worthy of her consideration. The point of departure for any negotiation must be the concession to the United States of the line of 490 to the Pacific Ocean. This country would expose itself almost unanimously to the chances of a war rather than descend, by a degree, below this point, and although England has constantly rejected this, and although she cannot afford it, directly, she will find in the intervention of a friendly power and in the interest of maintaining the peace, an excuse to subscribe to it; while the American government will draw from these same causes the means of abandoning the exclusive claims that it has so imprudently put forward. On each side concessions would be made, and those that would be obtained would excuse those accorded. I ask Your Excellency's pardon for having been so lengthy on this question, but it has assumed too grave a character not to awake the solicitude of every government.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Pageot’s note on the grave character of the Oregon question might have given Aberdeen pause for thought, but he still proceeded with this – what was to be the final appeal for arbitration which the British made. In the meantime, Aberdeen also seems to have worked to soothe domestic opinion both on the language used against the Americans, and the attitudes towards the likely AA settlement in Oregon. To achieve this, Aberdeen employed the services of Edward Everett, McClane’s predecessor in London, who was now living in Boston. Everett wrote to Lord John Russell, the leader of the opposition, presenting the likely terms of a settlement, and asking that Russell pledge his support covertly by not attacking the negotiations as Palmerston had done years before. Everett concluded:

If you choose to rally the public opinion of England against this basis of compromise, it will not be easy for Sir. R. Peel and Lord Aberdeen to agree to it. If you are clearly of opinion, as a point of public interest or honour that this compromise ought not to be agreed to, you will of course encourage the ministers in rejecting it. But if the only point to be saved is one, not of national but merely of ministerial consistency, it will I think deserve your most serious consideration – yours and that of your friends – whether you will encourage and stimulate the government to plunge into a war, for- the sake of adhering to the worst traditions of Lord Liverpool and Lord Castlereagh.[[5]](#footnote-5)

In the next episode we will look at how Russell reacted to this initiative, as well as how Palmerston responded when Russell sent him a copy of Everett’s letter. Back to Aberdeen though, and since he would now have to wait until late January 1846 to learn of Polk’s response, he worked in the meantime to further this project of preparing the British public for an American peace. It was not necessarily that Aberdeen wanted to prepare British minds for concessions, but more that he wanted to underline Oregon’s relatively low value, the high actual value of improved AA relations, and, in my view among the most important, the point that national honour was not involved in conceding through amicable negotiation issues which both Britain and America had an equal interest in. In a sense, Aberdeen worked to remove national honour from the equation by bypassing it, and he did this not just through initiatives like contacting Everett, but by reaching out to British newspapers for help. By far the most receptive to Aberdeen was *The Times*, Britain’s foremost newspaper, and commonly viewed as the standard measure of public opinion there. Its issue of 3 January 1846 read:

We think, then, that every purpose both of honour and interest would be answered, if the British Minister [Lord Aberdeen], on whom now devolves the duty of making fresh proposals to the Government of the United States, were to renew on his part the offer made to England…That proposal was to take the 49th degree of north latitude as far as the sea as the boundary line, reserving to Great Britain Vancouver's Island, the harbour of St. Juan de Fuca [?], and the free navigation of the Columbia.

Keen-eared listeners will notice that this would involve Britain’s cession of the disputed territory, or that triangle of land in between the 49th parallel and Columbia River. ‘We concede this’, *The Times* asserted, ‘we concede it because we prefer a settlement to a litigation, a compromise to a contest, peace to war.’ It was also declared that ‘every purpose of honour and interest would be answered’, if the compromise offer was proposed to Polk’s government. This was ‘an honourable compromise and a rational peace’, and ‘We cannot bring ourselves to believe’ that Washington would pursue an alternative course ‘so injurious to the honour of its country.’ The shift in tone was plain. It would be dishonourable, *The Times* inferred, for the Americans to refuse such compromises, or to allow the dispute to degenerate into war.[[6]](#footnote-6)

In his study of British newspapers during the Oregon negotiations, Thomas McClintock noted the striking similarities between this presentation by *The Times*, and Aberdeen’s consistent view of Oregon since the middle of 1845. It was surely no coincidence that Aberdeen’s message gelled so much with this *Times* article, particularly since ample evidence exists to suggest that Aberdeen enjoyed a good relationship with *The Times*’ editor John Delane, whom he met in person virtually every day.[[7]](#footnote-7) Furthermore, Aberdeen wrote to Everett in Boston – where Everett was soon to take up the presidency of Harvard – informing him that the piece was very well written. Everett got the message, and informed the Polk administration that *The Times* article had been written with Aberdeen’s direct input and oversight.[[8]](#footnote-8) On 3 January, Aberdeen also wrote personally to Everett as he awaited the response to the article, saying:

The truth is that everything depends on the real disposition of the President, and of the people by whom he is directed, whether Ministers, or Mob. There is no real difficulty in the matter, and if Mr. McLane had full Powers, I think it probable that we could settle it in an hour. We are sincerely and anxiously desirous of a peaceful issue and if you share this desire, we shall surely arrive at it. But if you desire war, as assuredly you will have it, for well as you know my love of peace, and my determination to preserve it, I shall be perfectly powerless in such a case.[[9]](#footnote-9)

On 2 December 1845 though, President Polk delivered his annual address, wherein once again, he laid claim to all of Oregon in a belligerent speech. On this occasion though, Polk made reference to other matters, such as the French dispositions, and discussions of the Oregon dispute in the French Chamber of Deputies, which he interpreted as favourable towards the US.[[10]](#footnote-10) These sentiments would take a month to filter back to Europe, but before Ambassador Pageot addressed that matter, on 12 January he wrote to Guizot about another more concerning development which Polk had telegraphed – the plan to renounce the old treaty which bound Britain and America to jointly govern Oregon. Pageot wrote:

For eight days the house of representatives has been engaged in a debate on the bill brought in by its committee on foreign affairs for the abrogation of the convention between England and the United States concerning the territory of Oregon. One of the first who spoke was Mr. John Quincy Adams, the ex-president, who pronounced in favour of the proposition and of the extreme claims of the United States. "Once delivered of the convention," he said, "and we are to proceed in the manner of the great Frederick when he seized Silesia: Take the country and then negotiate." This speech by Mr. Adams has renewed all the alarms which that of Mr. Calhoun had for a moment calmed, and its effect, unhappily, has been to bring the most vexatious sort of tone into the entire discussion. An open rupture would be imminent if any unjustifiable aggressions were to result from the feeling excited by the daily speeches that the dispute has brought forth. The bold are encouraged and the prudent are intimidated. Mr. Adams is an ill-tempered and vindictive old man who is gratifying the double hatred that he bears to England and to the south by upholding a policy whose final consequence would be a war that would enfeeble Great Britain and would ruin the south by the slave insurrection that, perhaps, would follow from it.[[11]](#footnote-11)

These observations from Pageot were certainly interesting, and if Aberdeen had read them, he would have been even more assured in his perception of French intentions. Was there truth to the idea that some Northerners believed war with Britain would provoke a slave revolt which would doom the institution they loathed so much? This is harder to gauge, but as Pageot continued in this letter, the AA mood music had never been so troubling, and in such an atmosphere any form of compromise could so easily be condemned as weakness:

Which of the two powers will draw back before the other, such is, Mr. Minister, for the American people in the absence of positive interests the true problem involved in the issue of the controversy. A language too prudent could make it appear that they were afraid, and besides the most moderate hold the belief so generally widespread in this country that a little intimidation is the best means of arriving at an arrangement, while a language too arrogant would so exasperate war-like minds that the most courageous would not dare resist them. The most acute political alchemist could not say in what proportion the dose of moderation and of energy must be administered to this capricious and turbulent democracy. It is an affair of chance, that is to say, Mr. Minister, congress's first step will be directed rather by the impulse that it will receive from public opinion than by a sane appreciation of the situation and of its consequences. But I still persist in thinking that the development of the crisis will ripen the public's reason and that when each shall have been led to weigh coolly the results of a rupture, there will form in the north as in the south a coalition of imposing interests which will save this republic from the disastrous consequences of its mad presumption.[[12]](#footnote-12)

America’s ‘mad presumptions’ notwithstanding, we can see from this that it was highly unlikely Aberdeen’s final offer of arbitration would ever be accepted. And so on 28 January 1846, the Cabinet learned that Washington had rejected it once again. This may have compelled Aberdeen to throw his hands up in despair, but news from further afield suggested that his patience with France was finally bearing fruit. The claim that France’s special relationship with the US prevented it from any course other than favouring Washington was, as we learned in the last episode from Pageot’s despatches, wishful thinking where Polk was concerned. Instead, as Guizot made plain in a communique he sent to Pageot on 29 January, France reserved the right to pursue its freedom of action, and in the event of an AA war, this freedom would steer it towards neutrality:

We address ourselves to the public opinion of the United States themselves. We respect, we like this people already so great, to whose founding France has contributed, but we intend to keep, in regard to them as in regard to any other, our entire liberty of action. We refuse to admit these distinctions between the American governments and the European governments, between monarchies and republics; all civilized nations exist by the same right and are equally bound to mutual respect among themselves. On the special question of Oregon we warmly desire that a pacific solution take place; for it would be doubly regrettable if the peace of the world were threatened by such a matter, and we are in any case firmly decided to keep the most complete neutrality as long as it will be possible for us to do so.[[13]](#footnote-13)

Aberdeen would have rubbed his hands with glee at these expressions, since he had expected a French reaction ever since Polk had name-dropped France in his annual speech. Aberdeen believed then that Polk’s mention of France would ‘produce exactly the effect we most desire, and will greatly promote the policy which I hope may be considered as successful – the separation of France in feeling and interest from the US.’[[14]](#footnote-14) The effect of Guizot’s reaction was not this clear-cut, but it certainly made plain that Washington could no more expect a policy of friendship from France in the event of war than Britain could expect a policy of hostility. Judging by Pageot’s consistent sentiments, at least, the well of French goodwill towards America had all but run dry.

What Aberdeen needed now were expressions of political solidarity at home, and he received these from the new session of Parliament which met in late January, whereupon the Queen’s Speech declared ‘You may be assured that no Effort consistent with National Honour shall be wanting on My Part to bring this Question to an early and peaceful Termination.’[[15]](#footnote-15) The Earl of Home was confident that ‘in the hands of that noble Earl the country will suffer no loss of honour’, and he was encouraged that ‘Your Majesty will continue to make all such Efforts as may be consistent with National Honour to bring this Question to an early and peaceful Termination.’ Lansdowne also expressed his satisfaction that the Government would ‘omit no efforts to maintain, what is of so much importance to the interests of the world, a peace between this country and the United States, without sacrificing any of the honour of this country’, and he concluded that ‘if, with the maintenance of our honour, those efforts should be made, the Government will meet with the unanimous support of every party in England.’ Lord Brougham added to this consensus, declaring that the Government would enjoy the ‘universal and unanimous assent of a whole people’, in its pledges ‘first to leave no effort untried to preserve peace with America; then to leave no effort untried to call forth all the resources of this country, if, consistently with her honour, that peace cannot be preserved.’[[16]](#footnote-16)

Lord Frances Egerton echoed these sentiments in the Commons, insisting that no government ‘could hold its place in the counsels of the country’ if it did not ‘maintain, by every means consistent with the honour and the just rights of both nations, the most cordial terms of amity and friendship with that great confederation, the United States.’[[17]](#footnote-17) This ideology of peace with honour was hardly new, but considering the hostile language of previous years regarding compromise in Oregon, it was important for contemporaries to reiterate their simultaneous commitment to an honourable resolution. But not all were convinced. The *Freeman’s Journal* interpreted these remarks as nothing less than concession in Oregon ‘which is, we perceive, about being yielded up, under the semblance of regret and assurances that “no efforts that be wanted to maintain the national honour.”’ It discerned that the maintenance of national honour – ‘this valuable abstraction’ – was accompanied ‘with a sly intimation that the point in dispute will be terminated speedily and peacefully.’ Surely, said the *Journal*:

This is nothing more or less than the total and unqualified concession of the entire territory to America. In what other manner is the question to receive a peaceful termination but by yielding to the full demands of the republic?

While it asserted that ‘“National honour” is of course a thing to be prized’, ministers were evidently determined to ‘act prudently in soothing John Bull into quietude as he swallows this revolting draught from the hands of American democracy. But so it is. John must submit to his fate – to be subdued by republican energy and firmness!’[[18]](#footnote-18) There was palpable anxiety regarding the looming compromise, and, said the *Caledonian Mercury*:

the misfortune is that the national honour should be to a certain extent committed. But we are glad to say that in the meantime a strong feeling exists on either shore not to suffer this dispute to become the source of incalculable mischief.[[19]](#footnote-19)

National honour could be protected if Aberdeen refused to concede its rights in Oregon – something which he never intended to do – and the fact that the 49th parallel was now widely accepted also granted him more freedom of action. This progress made, Aberdeen could meet with Ambassador McClane for a frank discussion of what must happen next with the Oregon negotiations. Two accounts of this conversation exist, the first was the formalised version given by Aberdeen to Ambassador Packenham in Washington. Therein, Aberdeen said that he doubted ‘the sincerity of the President and Mr Buchanan in their expressed desire to arrive at a pacific conclusion of the affair’, a reasonable assumption, considering Polk’s torpedoing of any negotiations to this point.

McClane was said to have replied that his superiors were sincere, and if he had thought otherwise, he would never have come to London in the first place. Aberdeen brought out the big guns, confirming what rumours in Washington had suspected; that he could not ‘refuse my assent to those measures of preparation which were considered indispensable, both in this country, and in Canada.’ McClane did not believe any real danger would emerge from the stand-off, and promised to speak directly with Polk again about what America would be willing to accept, now that arbitration was definitively off the table[[20]](#footnote-20). Aberdeen concluded to Packenham that their conversation had been friendly and cordial, and advised Packenham not to engage himself with any menacing language.

It is remarkable, then, that McClane’s own version of the conversation was much more menacing in tone than Aberdeen wished. On 3 February 1846 he sent the following account of his meeting with Aberdeen to Washington:

He (Lord Aberdeen) remarked further, that although he would not abandon the desire or the hope that an amicable adjustment might yet be effected, and peace preserved, he would nevertheless feel it his duty to withdraw the opposition he had hitherto uniformly made to the adoption of measures founded upon the contingency of war with the United States, and to offer no obstacle in the future to preparations which might be deemed necessary not only for the defence and protection of the Canadas, but for offensive operations. In the course of the conversation I understood that these would consist, independent of military armaments, of the immediate equipment of thirty sail of the line besides steamers and other vessels of war, of a smaller class; and this information Lord Aberdeen appeared to think he was called upon to communicate in consequence of assurances he had given me in a former interview...[[21]](#footnote-21)

But were British military preparations truly significant enough to make Polk believe that war with America was on the horizon? We will assess the extent of these preparations, and the true depth of AA war fever, in our next episode, but first, it is worth returning to McClane’s passage quoted above. The general consensus is that McClane’s allusion to ‘thirty sail of the line’ stunned Polk’s inner circle, and compelled them to treat British negotiations with more respect. We’ll assess the veracity of this idea in our final episode, but first let’s examine what Ambassador Pageot thought of American foot-dragging during the diplomatic limbo period which followed the rejection of the arbitration offer, but preceded the receipt of McClane’s despatch. On 12 February 1846 then, Pageot wrote to Guizot:

It is useless to pretend, Mr. Minister, that Mr. Polk and the other candidates of the democracy at the coming presidential election do not wish to hold off this question of Oregon as a means of arousing the masses and of stirring popular passions in order to keep or to gain power. England's advances will be considered as symptoms of weakness and it would be self-flattery, perhaps, to repulse them regardless of the alternatives: Either to terminate pacifically the difference in terms that they had themselves imposed and thus exhibit a triumph that would crush the opposition; or, if a rupture came, to call on the patriotism of the country, the struggle once begun, to sustain those who had started it. But this last calculation, the justice of which is generally verified in democracies, will be disappointed, I believe, if England remains patient and firm in the presence of provocations which come from here. I do not think, Mr. Minister, that they will ever get an American congress to take the initiative in declaring war on Great Britain in order to get possession of the whole of Oregon. And it seems to me that England has not yet arrived at this point where she can by her immovability alone force this country to the alternative of a declaration of war or the reopening of negotiations. She can safeguard her dignity in renewing the declarations that Sir Robert Peel and Lord Aberdeen have already made of maintaining her rights against whoever should wish to attack them, then await events.[[22]](#footnote-22)

If America would not declare war, and Britain would not back down, then clearly Congress would have only have its mind changed upon receipt of some news from Britain. Something would have to give, and in the next episode we’ll see how McClane’s letter may have spooked Washington into finally taking poor Aberdeen seriously. Until then though, you are a lovely patron, my name is Zack, this has been episode 10, and I’ll be seeing you all, soon.

1. Merk, ‘British Party Politics and the Oregon Treaty’, 655-656. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Wilbur D. Jones and J. Chal Vinson, ‘British Preparedness and the Oregon Settlement’, *Pacific Historical Review*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1953), pp. 353-364; 353. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Jones, *American Problem*, 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Pageot to Guizot, 13 December 1845 in George Vern Blue, ‘France and the Oregon Question’, 59. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Everett to Russell, 28 December 1845 in ‘British Party Politics and the Oregon Treaty’, 657. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. *The Times*, 3 January 1846, p. 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Thomas C. McClintock, ‘British Newspapers and the Oregon Treaty of 1846’, 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. *Ibid*, 99-100. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Aberdeen to Everett, 3 January 1846 in Jones and Vinson, ‘British Preparedness’, 360. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Anderson, ‘British Threats’, 154. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Pageot to Guizot, 12 January 1846 in George Vern Blue, ‘France and the Oregon Question (In Two Parts, Part II)’, *Oregon Historical Quarterly*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Jun., 1933), pp. 144-163; 148. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. *Ibid*, 149. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Guizot to Pageot, 29 January 1846 in George Vern Blue, ‘France and the Oregon Question II’, 150. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Jones, *American Problem*, 48. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. MEETING OF PARLIAMENT. HL Deb 22 January 1846 vol 83 cc. 1-5 [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE SPEECH. HL Deb 22 January 1846 vol 83 cc. 5-505 [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. ADDRESS IN ANSWER TO THE SPEECH. HC Deb 22 January 1846 vol 83 cc. 51-12651 [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. *Freeman’s Journal*, 24 January 1846, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. *Caledonian Mercury*, 1 January 1846, p. 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Jones, *American Problem*, 49. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. McClane to Aberdeen, 17 March 1846 in Jones and Vinson, ‘British Preparedness’, 361. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Pageot to Guizot, 12 February 1846 in George Vern Blue, ‘France and the Oregon Question II’, 153. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)