



Malcontent News Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

6/17/23 23:59* PST

Malcontent News is an independent group of journalists and researchers in the United States, Canada, Ukraine, Israel, Georgia, and the United Kingdom. We are part of Badon Hill Group, LLC, and operate independently from all entities.

We are funded through Patreon, grants, and donations and aided by volunteers. For media inquiries, you can contact <u>social@malcontentnews.com</u>. For news tips, you can contact our newsroom at <u>tips@malcontentment.com</u>.

<u>Patreons at the Bronze level or higher</u> can access the annotated Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report (SITREP). Patreons at the Silver level or higher get a monthly Q&A viz Zoom Meeting with our Chief Content Officer or other senior staff.

This update is copyright © 2023 by Badon Hill Group LLC, all rights reserved. No parts of original content can be reused without express written permission. Authors and Analysts: David H. Obelcz, Adam Irving, Jeff Davis, Katie Livingstone, Oskar Hallgrimsson, Ryan Evans, Michael Hering, and Ana Ras, Spanish Editor in Chief

The reader accepts that the information contained in the Malcontent News Situation Report will not be used for travel, navigation, or personal security assessment. The reader agrees to get real-time information from official channels provided by national, oblast, raion, hromada, city, or local officials and follow their security recommendations.



SUMMARY – DAY 478	3
DAILY ASSESSMENT	3
TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP	5
UKRAINE WEATHER	6
SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY	7
RUSSIAN FRONT	8
KHARKIV	10
DONBAS REGION	13
LUHANSK	13
NORTHEAST DONETSK	16
SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK	17
ZAPORIZHIA	23
BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION	27
WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE	29
NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE	33
THEATERWIDE	34
RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EOUIPMENT LOSSES	35



SUMMARY – DAY 478

It has been 3,398 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 113 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine. Today's report is combat only.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:

- 1. The infighting between Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu and Private Military Company leader Yevgeny Prigozhin is creating instability within the Russian Federation, with factions threatening criminal charges and violence and aligning themselves to different spheres of influence.
- 2. A compelling body of evidence indicates that on June 6, 2023, between 02:25 and 02:50 hours local time, Russian occupiers blew up the Kakhovka Hydroelectric Power Plant, dam structure, or both, causing its catastrophic failure.
- 3. We maintain the current activity is subordinate offensives, and the main operation has not started.




- 4. The Russian Ministry of Defense is in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces.
- 5. Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.

Jump to the Action Report.



TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP




About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted <u>like this</u>, it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

Russia-Ukraine War Report Map




UKRAINE WEATHER



The ECMWF Euro ensemble weather forecast model is little changed, with a chance of scattered thunderstorms on June 21. Skies will be mostly clear through June 23, with temperatures from 22° to 30° Celcius and lows from 10° to 19°. The new moon is on June 18, and the summer solstice is on June 21.



SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



June 24, 2023, GFS forecast indicates that dry conditions will be across most of Ukraine, with soil saturation from 15% to 45% to 40 centimeters deep in central, northern, southern, and eastern Ukraine.

The soil saturation model does not consider flooding in the Dnipro River basin. Soil saturation is between 25% to 65% in eastern Kherson and southern Zaporizhia, with the Melitopol region drier than the surrounding area. The rest of eastern Ukraine is at 15 % to 30%. Soil moisture will continue to decline through June 23.



RUSSIAN FRONT



Russian Objective: Repel Russian partisan attacks, stabilize the border, and maintain civil order

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest



Belgorod Region


Belgorod Regional Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov reported that 11 settlements were shelled with 205 munitions, including artillery rounds, mortars, rocket-propelled grenades, and drone-delivered IEDs. There was no significant damage or casualties reported. There was no sign of Chechen forces operating along the border.

-

¹ https://t.me/vvgladkov/2700




KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, hold current defensive lines, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure





Savatove Operational Area

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) reported that Russian forces attempted to advance on Berestove without success.²

Free Kharkiv

Russian forces fired an antitank guided missile (ATGM) at a civilian car with two volunteer relief workers near the

² General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - PM Facebook Report



border village of Huriv Kozachok, killing the pair instantly.³


³ https://t.me/synegubov/645

⁴ https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/06/17/7407277/



DONBAS REGION


LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, prevent further Ukrainian advances, control insurgent activity

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents






Svatove Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces also attempted to advance in the direction of <u>Noveselivske</u> without success.⁵

⁵ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - PM Facebook Report






Heavy fighting was ongoing at the time of publication in the industrial areas southeast of $\underline{Bilohorivka}$ [Luhansk].^{6 7}

⁶ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report

⁷ https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/11422



NORTHEAST DONETSK




Russian Objective: Capture Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties

There was no significant activity outside of artillery exchanges, airstrikes, and harassment attacks through all operational areas.



SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK




Russian Objective: Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, consolidate gains made during the winter offensive, and set conditions for September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Lock Russian military assets in place, defend the existing line of conflict while finding and exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and



command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



Avdiivka Operational Area

Russian forces continued their attacks from the southeast approach of the Krasnohorivka Plateau in the direction of Stepove with no success. ^{8 9 10} Due to the continued reports of fighting, we expanded the gray zone west of Krasnohorivka back to the railroad tracks. GSAFU reported that Ukrainian positions in Vesele were shelled, a day after Ukrainian source DeepState and Russian mercenary


⁸ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - AM Facebook Report

⁹ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - PM Facebook Report

¹⁰ https://t.me/wargonzo/13306



milblogger WarGonzo reported Ukrainian forces had success in this direction. Russian forces also attempted to advance on Avdiivka with support from Russian army aviation or airforce (VKS) from the Karsnohorivka Plateau and were unsuccessful. 12 13



A Russian source reported that Ukrainian forces made marginal gains in the direction of <u>Vodyane</u>. ¹⁴ A video showed Russian positions south of Vodyane near the

¹¹ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report


¹² General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report

¹³ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - PM Facebook Report

¹⁴ https://t.me/wargonzo/13306



remnants of the E-50 Ring Road being hit by drone-directed artillery strikes.



Marinka Operational Area


Fighting between Ukrainian forces and the Chechen Akhmat 54th Motor Rifle Brigade and the Russian 5th Motor Rifle Brigade of the 1st Army Corps in and near Marinka continued with no change in the situation. 15 16 17

¹⁵ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - AM Facebook Report

¹⁶ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - PM Facebook Report

¹⁷ https://t.me/wargonzo/13306





Vuledar Operational Area

Fighting east of <u>Novomykhailivka</u> continued, with Russian forces unable to advance. ¹⁸ ¹⁹ ²⁰ There are continued Ukrainian reports of Russian forces attempting to advance in the direction of <u>Vodyane</u> [Vuhledar Axis, not the one by Avdiivka], with no reports from Russian sources. There continues to be no intelligence on the direction or depth of attack. ²¹ ²²

¹⁸ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report


¹⁹ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - PM Facebook Report

²⁰ https://t.me/wargonzo/13306

²¹ General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - AM Facebook Report

²² General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine - PM Facebook Report





Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

Fighting continues in the direction of Lyubmivka and Staromlynivka, including near or in the settlements of Novodonetske, Urozhaine, Staromaiors'ke, and Pryyutne.²³ Almost all reports of fighting came from Russian sources, creating significant fog of war. Robert "Magyar" Brovdy, company commander of the Birds of Magyar, is operating in this region, striking Russian tanks, ammo depots, and trucks in Staromairkse and Zavitne Bazhannya.²⁴ ²⁵


²³ https://t.me/wargonzo/13306

²⁴ https://twitter.com/ejshahid/status/1670106742380699648

²⁵ https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16877



ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Prepare for a Ukrainian offensive, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks



Ukrainian Objective: Liberate Russian-occupied areas, prevent further Russian advances, exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, and protect civilians



Orikhiv Operational Area


There was significant fighting along the entire line of conflict, with most information coming from Russian sources. Ukrainian troops allegedly made marginal gains and reached the outskirts of Novopkrovka, where fighting continued in the northwestern part of the settlement. Left Ukrainian forces advanced up to a kilometer in the direction of Robotyne, in the same area where a previous attack ended in failure and significant equipment losses. The same area where a previous attack ended in failure and significant equipment losses.

²⁶ https://t.me/wargonzo/13306

²⁷ https://twitter.com/moklasen/status/1670149190289088512



Based on the new information, we moved the line of conflict south. There was conflicting information about Pyatykhatky, with some Russian sources claiming Ukrainian forces had liberated the settlement while others claimed Ukrainian troops were pushed out.²⁸



Claims by Russian propagandists that the settlement was leveled by 116 TOS-1 thermobaric rockets are almost certainly false, with no thermal anomalies indicated on NASA Fire Information for Resource Management Systems (FIRMS) in the last 48 hours in or adjacent to Pyatykhatky.

²⁸ https://t.me/rybar/48596



There was significant chatter that Ukrainian forces crossed the now-dry estuary in the southern part of Kamyanske and liberated the dachas and homes. We can verify the claim, but we moved the line of conflict further south without changing the gray area. We have additional intelligence we can't share to support operational security that adds weight to the report of a Ukrainian advance in this area.

Occupied Zaporizhia

Exiled Mayor of Melitopol, Ivan Fedorov claimed that Russian troops got into a gunfight with police units from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) on the night of June 15 - 16. He did not make any claims about casualties or arrests.²⁹

A fire broke out at the port in Russian-occupied Berdyansk, with the source reportedly petroleum products. Local residents did not report an air raid, drone, or missile attack.³⁰

_

²⁹ https://t.me/ivan_fedorov_melitopol/2294

³⁰ https://t.me/brdprotiv/921



Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

There was no update on the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

At the time of publication, Operational Command South (OKS) reported nine Black Sea fleet vessels on patrol, including two frigates capable of launching up to 16 Kalibr cruise missiles.³¹

Occupied Crimea

Project 18280 surveillance ship Ivan Kurs <u>has not left its</u> <u>berth</u> since unexpectedly returning to Sevastopol on May 26 after being attacked by up to three uncrewed surface vessels.³²

-

³¹ https://t.me/operativnoZSU/101621

³² https://twitter.com/MT_Anderson/status/1669454216526725121



Mykolaiv

During the flooding of the Inhulets River in Mykolaiv, Ukrainian officials reported that one of the newly constructed bridges that replaced ones destroyed by Russia during the occupation had failed. Mykolaiv officials confirmed that the newly replaced Vasylivskyi and Novovasilivskyi Bridge, which was feared destroyed, survived ten days of submerging, and traffic was allowed to restart. Two other recently repaired bridges are also intact.³³

Twenty-six homes remain flooded in the region, and a second person was confirmed to have drowned during the flooding.³⁴ Seven settlements are still awaiting total electrical power restoration.³⁵

Odesa

Officials are reporting a sharp increase in stomach illnesses and have moved to prohibit people from going to beaches.³⁶ Pictures and videos showed the orders were being ignored, and in areas where the water was clearer, adults and children were playing in the water. *There have*

_

³³ https://t.me/zinkevich igor/6498

³⁴ https://t.me/shtab kakhovska hes/915

³⁵ https://t.me/shtab_kakhovska_hes/897

³⁶ https://t.me/our_odessa/48812



been no confirmed cases of cholera, salmonella enteritis, or dysentery. Satellite images show that the algae blooms have started to spread across the black sea, including off the coasts of Romania and Bulgaria.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Free Kherson

The number of settlements with flood waters dropped to six, with 1,274 residential buildings still inundated, mostly in low-lying areas of the city of Kherson. Flood waters are 94 centimeters above the mean and 63 centimeters higher than the early morning of June 6, right before the dam collapsed. 37 38 39 40 Electricity has been at least partially restored in all areas except Mykilske and Korabel District

³⁷ https://t.me/shtab kakhovska hes/912

³⁹ https://t.me/shtab kakhovska hes/915

⁴⁰ https://t.me/shtab_kakhovska_hes/891



of Kherson.⁴¹ Explosive ordnance disposal experts (EOD) have searched 310 hectares of land where floodwaters recently retreated, looking for mines and munitions that washed up. So far, they have found four and destroyed all of them in place.⁴² The death toll increased to 16, and 31 are still missing.⁴³

Four Bogun-2 all-terrain vehicles were delivered to the State Emergency Service of Kherson from fundraising through UNITED24.⁴⁴ These replace the single Bogun-2 damaged in a Russian attack on rescue teams last week.

Occupied Kherson

Russian Private Military Company Aksyonov, owned by the Russian collaborator and illegitimate leader of occupied Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, is accused of shelling and shooting at the boats of German volunteers who were rescuing people from the east bank, killing three and wounding British volunteer John Jones. Ukrainian drone operators identified the PMC firebase on the upper floor of a nearby flooded house. The building was destroyed.

⁴¹ https://t.me/shtab_kakhovska_hes/921

⁴² https://t.me/shtab kakhovska hes/921

⁴³ https://t.me/shtab kakhovska hes/915

⁴⁴ https://t.me/khersonska0DA/7058

⁴⁵ https://t.me/Crimeanwind/33640



Reuters-Thompson, the BBC, and local Telegram channels recording the collection of bodies of civilians who drowned during flooding in occupied Hola Prystan and Oleskhy, where recovery efforts continue.⁴⁶



A large Russian ammunition depot in Rykove exploded, likely after a Storm Shadow cruise missile hit, cooking off ammunition for hours. 47 48 Thermal anomalies appeared

⁴⁶ https://t.me/ukrarmed forces/4506

⁴⁷ https://twitter.com/Osinttechnical/status/1670286759362428928

⁴⁸ https://t.me/andriyshTime/10831



on NASA FIRMS, which indicated that rockets or air defense missiles were in the stockpile and had cooked off, lighting secondary fires.

ASSESSMENT: It has been speculated for over six months that Russian forces moved ammunition out of the range of HIMARS but did not fundamentally change their logistics, continuing to stack ammunition in large piles with low security and little care for safety. Unlike the Russian strikes on Cold War rocket fuel storage, which had no extended cookoff, the multiple videos clearly show a large ammunition depot cooking off.

Storm Shadow missiles reportedly hit additional targets in Skadovsk and Lazurne.⁴⁹

Dnipropetrovsk

A civilian was killed in Nikopol after Russian forces shelled the raion from Kamianka-Dniprovska, west of Enerhodar and 10 kilometers from the northwest corner of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant reservoir's northwest corner.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ https://t.me/andriyshTime/10831

⁵⁰ https://t.me/vilkul/3608



NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Sumy

In Sumy, there were 21 fire missions, with 11 hromadas fired upon by artillery rounds, mortars, drone-delivered IEDs, and rocket-propelled grenades. Almost 120 munitions were launched. The TV transmission tower in Bilopillia was damaged.⁵¹

_

⁵¹ https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/17062



THEATERWIDE

Portugal reported it would be providing Ukraine with AR3 surveillance drones.



RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the <u>Oryx Database</u> from February 24, 2022, to June 10, 2023. 10,609
Russian vs. 3,585 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	1893	204	9.38:1	$\hat{\mathbf{T}}$
Medium Duty Tanks	132	323	0.41:1	_
Armored fighting Vehicles	879	284	3.10:1	Û
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2393	562	4.25:1	Û
Armored Personnel Carriers	312	273	1.14:1	Û
MRAPs	43	71	0.61:1	Û
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	190	320	0.59:1	_
Command and Communications Vehicles	243	13	18.69:1	_
Engineering Vehicles	310	60	5.16:1	Û
Towed Artillery	232	126	1.84:1	仓
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	414	166	2.49:1	Û
MLRS	206	45	4.58:1	仓
SAMs	118	114	1.03:1	仓
Mobile Radars	32	62	0.52:1	_
EW/ECW	40	2	20.00:1	仓
Winged Aircraft	82	68	1.21:1	Û
Helicopters	90	30	3.00:1	_
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	_



Notes on Sourcing Information

Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.

Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report: We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.

Rybar: We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.

War Gonzo: We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for *unique claims* about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.



Readovka: We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

Igor "Girkin" Strelkov: We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

Andrei Morozov: Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media: We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or unique Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination: We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.



Leonid Pasechnik: We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia: We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense: We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

Denis Pushilin: We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

Ramzan Kadyrov: The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine: We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

DeepState: We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or



misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

Institute for the Study of War: We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

Ivan Fedorov: We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

Vitaly Kim: When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for real-time reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

Oleksiy Arestovych: We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.