

**MALCONTENT NEWS  
RUSSIA-UKRAINE  
SITUATION REPORT**

November 19, 2023



# Malcontent News

## Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

### 11/19/23 23:59\* PST

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[Patrons at the Bronze level or higher](#) can access the annotated Russia-Ukraine War Situation Report (SITREP). Patrons at the Silver level or higher get a monthly Q&A viz Zoom Meeting with our Chief Content Officer or other senior staff.

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**SUMMARY – DAY 633 ..... 3**

**DAILY ASSESSMENT ..... 6**

**TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP ..... 8**

**KHARKIV AND LUHANSK ..... 9**

**DONBAS REGION ..... 11**

**NORTHEAST DONETSK ..... 12**

**SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK ..... 16**

**ZAPORIZHZHIA ..... 21**

**KHERSON ..... 23**

**BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION ..... 25**

**WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE ..... 25**

**NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE ..... 25**

**RUSSIAN FRONT ..... 26**

**THEATERWIDE ..... 27**

**RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES ..... 30**

**WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS ..... 31**

**GEOPOLITICS AND ECONOMICS ..... 31**

**RUMORS ..... 32**

## SUMMARY – DAY 633

It has been 3,583 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 268 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

There was significant weather across Ukraine today, including damaging winds, rain, sleet, and snow. Unlike 2022, it appears the winter of 2023 is making an abrupt and timely entry after a very warm and dry fall and a historically hot summer. The weather had a direct impact on combat operations and air operations, particularly in the east. This will likely continue based on the weather forecast through at least November 21. We will restart tracking snow depth and soil moisture in the SITREPS on December 1.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

## Summary:

- There are no map updates
- Severe weather across large areas of Ukraine and parts of western Russia significantly curtailed military operations for both combatants
- Fighting continued in the Kupyansk AO with no changes to the situation
- Fighting continued south of Bakhmut, with Ukrainian and Russian forces trading the same defensive positions north of Klishchiivka
- Russian forces continued attempts to advance from the Krasnohorivka Plateau despite poor weather conditions
- Russian forces appear to be consolidating gains southeast of Avdiivka, while Ukrainian forces pushed Russian troops back from the edge of the Avdiivka Coke Plant
- Fighting continued on the south flank of Avdiivka and the Marinka area of operation (AO)
- The operational tempo slowed in the Orikhiv AO, with multiple reports that Ukrainian troops are continuing to make incremental gains west of Robotyne
- Fighting continued on the east banks of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers, with multiple reports of friendly fire incidents among Russian troops

- A Shahed-136 kamikaze drone broke through air defense around Kyiv on the evening of November 18-19
- Commander of the Medical Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Major General Tetiana Ostashchenko, was dismissed and received a rare public rebuke by President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
- United States Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made an unannounced visit to Kyiv
- Ukrainian teen Bohdan Yermokhin was repatriated from Russia after facing forced mobilization into the Russian Federation Armed Forces
- At least one Ukrainian is being held hostage by Iran-backed Houthi militants from Yemen after they hijacked the British-owned car carrier Galaxy Leader in the Red Sea

## DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:


1. We assess that neither combatant has significant combat potential entering the winter season. Attritional warfare that more closely resembles World War I versus 21st-century combined arms maneuver warfare will likely continue into 2024.
2. We assess that while the combat potential for both combatants is significantly lower compared to November 2022, both Russia and Ukraine remain capable of achieving tactical successes through the winter.
3. Russian commanders have put mission objectives over all other considerations and remain committed to capturing the Avdiivka salient regardless of the cost. Unless military aid restarts in the immediate future, Ukraine lacks the medium-term resources to prevent the capture of the salient.
4. We continue to have grave concerns over the amount of military support Ukraine will receive in 2024, with the United States Congress in paralysis and the European Union not meeting their promised 2023 deliveries.

5. We assess the dismissal of Major General Tetiana Ostashchenko from the office of the Commander of the Medical Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine as long overdue and a positive development after Ostashchenko failed to address numerous battlefield medicine issues.
6. Russia is stockpiling missiles and drones for large-scale attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure as the weather continues to degrade.
7. We maintain that the continued drop in missile and drone strikes in Ukraine is meant to keep the Russia-Ukraine War out of the news cycle as global interest is fixated on the Israel-Hamas War supported by information warfare efforts launched by the Kremlin.
8. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously. Additionally, we are troubled by the most recent International Atomic Energy Agency report, which indicates that are growing maintenance issues at Europe's largest nuclear power facility.






# TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



**About the maps:** Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


## [Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

## KHARKIV AND LUHANSK



**Russian Objective:** Recapture all territory from Kupyansk to Pisky Radkivski and push Ukrainian forces west of the Oskil River, recapture all of the Luhansk Oblast, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

**Ukrainian Objective:** Hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna, Kupyansk, Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk Operational Areas and protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



In the Kupyansk AO of Kharkiv, Russian forces continued their attacks in the areas of [Synkivka](#), the forested regions east of [Petropavlivka](#), and east of [Ivanivka](#). There has been no change to the line of conflict.<sup>1 2</sup>


The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) claimed Ukrainian forces attempted to advance in the area of [Kuzmyne](#), southeast of **Kreminna**.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13706>


<sup>2</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18108>

<sup>3</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/32637](https://t.me/mod_russia/32637) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

# DONBAS REGION




# NORTHEAST DONETSK




**Russian Objective:** Complete the capture of Bakhmut AO, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region by December 31

**Ukrainian Objective:** Defend Siversk, stabilize more advantageous defensive lines on the north flank of Bakhmut for winter, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, and minimize civilian casualties



**In the Klishchiivka AO, significant mutual fighting was ongoing on the northern edge of [Klishchiivka](#), with conflicting reports from numerous sources. Ukrainian source DeepState reported that Russian forces had reached the northern edge of the settlement and took the 215-meter heights back to the north. A prominent Russian milblogger made a similar claim but added that Russian troops had been pushed out. The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU) and RMOD also reported fighting, with RMOD claiming Ukraine was on the offensive, which**

somewhat aligns with the claims made by WarGonzo.<sup>4 5 6 7</sup>  
 No changes were made to the map. Fighting continued east of [Andriivka](#) with no change in the situation.<sup>8</sup>



**In the Toretzkyi-Niu York AO, Russian sources are claiming Ukrainian troops have been pushed off the territory southeast of [Shumy](#). Historically, the quality of Russian HUMINT and OSINT in this area has been extremely low, so we are skeptical of the reports. Adding to our doubts,**

<sup>4</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13706>

<sup>5</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18108>

<sup>6</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/32637](https://t.me/mod_russia/32637) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>7</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/16533>

<sup>8</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13706>

RMOD reported there was fighting “in the area of” Shumy and made no claims that territorial control had changed.<sup>9</sup> No changes to the map were made.


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<sup>9</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/32637](https://t.me/mod_russia/32637) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




# SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



**Russian Objective:** Capture the remainder of the Donetsk Oblast by December 31

**Ukrainian Objective:** Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics




**Heavy fighting continued in the Avdiivka AO.** Avdiivka was hit by 800 artillery rounds, ten airstrikes, and four missiles on November 19 despite the weather conditions.

On the northern flank, Russian forces are maintaining pressure from the Krasnohorivka Plateau. Russian attacks west of [Novobakhmutivka](#) in the direction of Novokalynove and northeast in the direction of Yurivka were unsuccessful.<sup>10 11</sup> Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces had marginal success east of [Stepove](#) and were able to push Russian forces back from the edge of the [Avdiivka](#)

<sup>10</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13706>

<sup>11</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18108>

**Coke Plant**. Russian forces were able to make gains southwest of Vesele in the direction of the **sewage treatment plant**.<sup>12 13 14</sup>



On the southern flank of Avdiivka, the situation for Ukrainian troops in the Yasinuvata Two Station area at the interchange of the **former H-20 Highway and the road into Avdiivka** is extremely difficult. Russian artillery and Aerospace Forces (VKS) are focusing on destroying the reinforced defensive positions of Ukrainian forces.<sup>15 16</sup>

<sup>12</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13706>


<sup>13</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18108>

<sup>14</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/16533>

<sup>15</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/16533>

<sup>16</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18108>

Russian forces continued attempts to advance through the [Vodyane-Sieverne](#) no man's land without success. Deteriorating weather conditions will favor Ukraine. Russian and Ukrainian sources reported fighting in the area of [Pervomaiske](#) and [Nevelske](#) with no changes in the situation.<sup>17 18</sup>



**In the Marinka AO, Ukrainian forces continued to cling to the western edge of the city, where fighting continued.**<sup>19 20</sup>


<sup>17</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18108>

<sup>18</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/16533>

<sup>19</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13706>

<sup>20</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18108>

<sup>21</sup> <sup>22</sup> Russian forces also attempted to advance on Pobieda, suffered losses, and retreated to their previously established defensive positions.<sup>23</sup>



In the **Staromlynivka AO**, Russian forces attempted to retake lost positions west of [Staromaiorske](#) and were unsuccessful.


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<sup>21</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/32637](https://t.me/mod_russia/32637) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

<sup>22</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/16533>


<sup>23</sup> <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/13706>

# ZAPORIZHZHIA



**Russian Objective:** Defend against the continued Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

**Ukrainian Objective:** Capitalize on the breakthrough of the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



**South of Orikhiv**, mutual fighting continued on the western edge of [Verbove](#) and west of [Robotyne](#).<sup>24</sup> <sup>25</sup> There were new reports of Ukrainian gains west of Robotyne by Ukrainian and Russian sources, but there continue to be no pictures or videos to verify the claims. In our assessment, Ukraine is advancing in this direction, and both combatants appear to be maintaining operational security despite the public statements of a slow Ukrainian advance. We can't update what we can't see.


<sup>24</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/18108>

<sup>25</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/16533>

## KHERSON

**Russian Objective:** Prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the T-2206 Highway south of the Konka River, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

**Ukrainian Objective:** Further expand existing bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers, lock Russian troops and reserves in place, continue a southern advance into eastern Kherson toward the Crimean Peninsula, minimize civilian casualties





**Fighting continues on the east bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers in Kherson.** GSAFU said, "The defense forces continue to hold positions on the left bank of the Dnipro in the Kherson region. They continue to inflict fire damage on the enemy."

Russian sources reported fighting continued in and near [Krynky](#), [Poima](#), [Pishchanivka](#), and [Pidstepne](#). There was no other information shared from semi-reliable sources. Ukrainian sources reported that the Russian VKS is now targeting Krynky with UMPK glide bombs, and there are no longer any undamaged buildings in the settlement. Multiple Russian sources were reporting there were frequent friendly fire incidents by artillery and the VKS, including two strikes on Russian troops in eastern Krynky. Ukrainian sources also claimed that two UMPK struck Russian positions in the same area.

Rybar, who we red-listed earlier this year, claimed that Ukrainian forces made significant progress in the three previously listed settlements. There were also Ukrainian reports of a Russian platoon surrendering. In our assessment, Ukraine holds the initiative in this area.

## **BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION**

The Crimea Peninsula and Black Sea region experienced severe weather, which likely limited combat operations and made it impossible for either combatant to launch drone attacks.

## **WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE**

**Russian Objective:** Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

There wasn't significant activity in this region.

## **NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE**

**Russian Objective:** Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Officials in Kyiv reported that a Shahed-136 kamikaze drone was able to penetrate air defenses, with an "infrastructure facility" damaged in the attack. There were no casualties nor reports of power outages. There was no other information released. NASA Fire Information for Resource Management Systems (FIRMS) was obscured due to cloud cover.

## **RUSSIAN FRONT**

**Russian Objective:** Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

**Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective:** Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

There wasn't any significant activity.

## THEATERWIDE

There were no reports of drone or missile strikes beyond the line of conflict. This was likely due to winds as high as 33 meters per second (74 MPH), rain, fog, sleet, and snow across most of Ukraine and the occupied territories. Poor weather is expected to continue through November 21, with cold temperatures in the week ahead. It is unclear if Iran or Russia addressed the cold weather operational issues that impact Shahed-136 drones.

Fulfilling the request made by Minister of Defense Rustem Umerov on November 17, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has dismissed Major General Tetiana Ostashchenko from the office of the Commander of the Medical Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.<sup>26</sup> In a rare public rebuke, Zelenskyy said, "The task is obvious - and this has been repeatedly discussed in society, in particular in the community of our combat medics – a fundamentally new level of medical support for our soldiers is needed. From high-quality [tourniquets] to full digitalization and

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<sup>26</sup> <https://t.me/odeskaODA/3243>

transparency in supply, from high-quality training to sincere communication with combat medics in those units where medicine is deployed...correctly and effectively. The experience of the effectiveness of specific units should be spread to all defense forces."

During the summer, we reported that cheap tourniquets from China were causing preventable deaths on the battlefield. The controversy in the public sphere caused several medical volunteers to abandon their work.

We also reported on the lack of a military standard for individual first aid kits (IFAKs) and how some soldiers were being deployed without IFAKs or with inadequate supplies. Ostashchenko was tasked with auditing military readiness and the state of IFAKs among deployed troops, which was never completed. The former commander argued that Ukraine couldn't create a quality standard because global supply chains couldn't meet their demands, and IFAKs had to be sourced from multiple vendors.

Former Deputy Minister of Defense Hanah Maliar publicly went after whistleblowers, with at least one person being reprimanded by the Ministry of Defense. In our assessment, this dismissal was long overdue.

Major General of the Medical Service Anatoly Kazmirchuk, head of the National Military Medical Clinical Center Main Military Clinical Hospital in Kyiv, has been named the new commander.

United States Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, arrived in Kyiv on an unannounced visit to help manage the growing concern among Ukrainian officials that the United States will not send additional military aid.

The table for equipment losses was **updated on October 28, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

## RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

*Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to October 28, 2023. 12,871 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,666 Ukrainian*

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
<b>Main Battle Tanks</b>	2279	307	7.42:1	↓
<b>Medium Duty Tanks</b>	158	375	0.42:1	—
<b>Armored fighting Vehicles</b>	1024	333	3.07:1	↑
<b>Infantry Fighting Vehicles</b>	2957	780	3.79:1	↑
<b>Armored Personnel Carriers</b>	368	360	1.02:1	—
<b>MRAPs</b>	49	175	0.28:1	—
<b>Infantry Mobility Vehicles</b>	223	388	0.57:1	—
<b>Command and Communications Vehicles</b>	254	18	14.11:1	↓
<b>Engineering Vehicles</b>	355	92	3.85:1	↓
<b>Towed Artillery</b>	328	165	1.99:1	↓
<b>Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars</b>	585	236	2.48:1	—
<b>MLRS</b>	299	50	5.98:1	—
<b>SAMs</b>	189	130	1.45:1	—
<b>Mobile Radars</b>	46	82	0.56:1	↓
<b>EW/ECW</b>	58	4	14.50:1	↑
<b>Winged Aircraft</b>	94	77	1.22:1	—
<b>Helicopters</b>	139	37	3.77:1	↑
<b>Naval Vessels and Submarines</b>	17	27	0.63:1	—

## WAR CRIMES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Ukraine accused Polish truck drivers of blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid and fuel into Ukraine. Poland and Ukraine are locked in another dispute over the movement of goods across the international border, with Slovakian truckers threatening to implement a similar blockade. At the time of publication, Polish officials had not released a statement.

UNICEF and Qatari officials worked to repatriate Ukrainian teenager Bohdan Yermokhin, who was illegally deported from the city of Mariupol to Russia. With his 18th birthday approaching, Yermokhin had received a mobilization notice from the commissariat in Russia, potentially in violation of International Humanitarian Law, Rule 95, Forced Labor, which prevents "the obligation of taking part in military operations."<sup>27</sup>

## GEOPOLITICS AND ECONOMICS

Iranian-backed Houthi militants hijacked the Bahamian-flagged British-owned Galaxy Leader, a car transport ship

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<sup>27</sup> <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/customary-ihl/v1/rule95>



transitting the Red Sea from Türkiye to India. Among the 25 crew members is at least one Ukrainian.


## **RUMORS**


Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.


- No rumors to report


## Notes on Sourcing Information


**Malcontent News** uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.