



# MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

May 27, 2023 – A



# Malcontent News

## Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

### 5/27/23-A 23:59\* PST

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## Notes on Sourcing Information


**Malcontent News** uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.



**SUMMARY – DAY 457 ..... 7**

**DAILY ASSESSMENT ..... 8**

**TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP ..... 10**

**UKRAINE WEATHER ..... 11**

**SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY ..... 12**

**KHARKIV ..... 13**

**DONBAS REGION ..... 16**

**LUHANSK ..... 16**

**NORTHEAST DONETSK ..... 20**

**SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK ..... 25**

**ZAPORIZHIA ..... 29**

**BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION .... 31**

**WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE ..... 32**

**NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE ..... 33**

**RUSSIAN FRONT ..... 35**

**THEATERWIDE ..... 39**

**RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES ..... 40**

## SUMMARY – DAY 457

This is the first update for May 27, 2023. It has been 3,374 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 90 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

Monday, May 29, 2023, is a federal holiday in the United States, and we will give the team a well-deserved day off. If there is a major event or World War III, we will summon the writing and analyst team.

- The Daily Assessment will be updated with each report
- Weather and soil conditions will be in the last report of the day
- If an anticipated report is not created, weather and soil conditions will be released as a Flash Report
- Each report will contain unique information and continue in a condensed format

The map is back! [War Map](#)




## **DAILY ASSESSMENT**

We assess the following:

1. Russian tactics have validated our assessment that the Kremlin is launching fewer missiles more frequently due to inventory restrictions and a shift in strategy. These attacks have had little success due to their inability to overwhelm ever-improving Ukrainian air defenses.
2. In preparation for larger offensive operations, Ukrainian forces continue shaping operations on multiple axes, creating panic and uncertainty among gauleiters, Russian administrators, and military leaders.
3. Current weather models indicate soil conditions will become favorable for large-scale military operations by June 3.
4. We have identified shaping activity by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in four locations that could indicate a larger attack is being prepared.
5. While Russian forces are continuing limited localized attacks in the Dvorichna, Kreminna, Siversk, Avdiivka, and Marinka operational areas, the decreasing number of attacks and increased use of artillery indicates that Russian forces are in a defensive

- posture and waiting for Ukraine to launch its offensive.
6. Anger and frustration among Russian state media, propagandists, milbloggers, and residents of the oblasts that border Ukraine continue to swell due to the Kremlin's inability to respond to continued border incursions, with growing criticism of Russian President Vladimir Putin and Russian Minister of Defense Sergei Shoigu.
  7. Despite being declared the commander of all Russian forces in Ukraine, Chief of Staff for the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Valery Gerasimov, has been nearly invisible while outlasting all previous Russian generals given the responsibility of capturing the Donbas.
  8. Assigning a person deep within Putin's inner circle, such as Gerasimov, to oversee Russian military operations in Ukraine makes it near impossible for President Putin to dismiss him despite continued failures to achieve critical military objectives.
  9. We assess that Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.

# TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP




**About the maps:** Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

## [Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)




# UKRAINE WEATHER



Thunderstorms and heavy rain continue to pound southern and eastern Ukraine, with localized cells dropping up to 18 millimeters of rain possible through May 30 before the unstable air mass moves out of the region. Temperatures will start to warm up through the week, with highs from 18° to 28° Celcius and lows from 9° to 17°. The full moon is on June 4, the new moon is on June 18, and the longest day of the year is June 21.


## SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



*The June 4, 2023 GFS forecast indicates soil saturation to 40 centimeters deep will be between 15 to 40% in eastern Kherson and Zaporizhia and 50% to 75% in the Donbas.*


More thunderstorms moved through Ukraine on May 27, causing urban, street, and small river flooding in the Donbas, where soil saturation is near or at 100%. Conditions will worsen through May 30, with a gradual drying trend now in the model. Ground conditions will be marginal starting on June 3 and able to support heavy equipment and armored vehicles theaterwide.

# KHARKIV



**Russian Objective:** Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, hold current defensive lines, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

**Ukrainian Objective:** Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



## Dvorichna Operational Area

There was conflicting information on the status of [Masyutivka](#), with Ukrainian source DeepState claiming Russian forces were able to advance one kilometer south of the hamlet in the direction of Lyman Pershyi.<sup>1</sup> The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (GSAFU), as well as Russian mercenary milblogger WarGonzo, claimed that Russian attacks “in the area” of Masyutivka were unsuccessful, and the Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD)

<sup>1</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16679>

reported continued fighting with no change in the situation.<sup>2 3 4</sup> We did not adjust the map.

DeepState added that Russian forces have numerical superiority in troops and drones and are using human wave tactics and drone-delivered IEDs to support their localized offensive operations.

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<sup>2</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)


<sup>3</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/12779>

<sup>4</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/26889](https://t.me/mod_russia/26889) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]




# DONBAS REGION

## LUHANSK



**Russian Objective:** Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, prevent further Ukrainian advances, control insurgent activity

**Ukrainian Objective:** Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents




## Svatove Operational Area

Russian mercenary milblogger Rybar reported that Russian forces attempted to attack Ukrainian positions in [Novoselivkse](#) using reconnaissance in force and were unsuccessful.<sup>5</sup> RMOD also reported fighting between surveillance, reconnaissance, and sabotage (DRG) units.<sup>6</sup>

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
<sup>5</sup> <https://t.me/rybar/47658>

<sup>6</sup> [https://t.me/mod\\_russia/26889](https://t.me/mod_russia/26889) [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]



Ukrainian source DeepState reported continued fighting in the Serebryansky Woods in the [Siverskyi Donets Flood Plain](#) west of Shypylivka, with Russian forces attempting to improve their positions near Bilohorivka [Luhansk].<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16679>




## Lysychansk Operational Area

GSAFU reported that Russian forces attempted to recover lost positions east of [Bilohorivka](#) without success, while WarGonzo reported that Russian forces made marginal gains southeast of the settlement. Due to the conflicting information, we did not update the map.<sup>8 9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)


<sup>9</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/12779>

# NORTHEAST DONETSK




**Russian Objective:** Capture Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region

**Ukrainian Objective:** Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties



## Northwest Bakhmut

There was conflicting information about fighting in the area of Khromove, with GSAFU reporting a Russian attack “toward” the settlement was unsuccessful, DeepState reporting only positional fighting, and WarGonzo reporting some success advancing from Bakhmut “in the direction of” [Khromove](#) during positional fighting. We did not adjust the map.



## Bakhmut

Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Maliar reported, "...overall offensive activity was reduced. The enemy has made a bet on the tasks of airstrikes and intensive artillery fire. Yesterday and today, there are no active battles there – neither in the city nor on the flanks. Instead, the enemy [*Russia – Ed.*] is actively shelling the outskirts of the city and the approaches to it. We firmly hold the previously occupied dominant heights north and south of Bakhmut. At the same time, the advance during yesterday and today was suspended in order to fulfill other tasks. The decrease in the enemy's offensive activity is due

to the fact that troops are being replaced and regrouped. The enemy is trying to strengthen its own capabilities."<sup>10</sup>

The Institute for the Study of War confirmed our earlier assessment that military units from the so-called Donetsk People's Republic (DNR) are being rotated into Bakhmut for its defense. This is the fourth time since February 2022 that RMOD ordered the withdrawal of troops or reserve forces from the Avdiivka Operational Area into other regions. The previous redeployments were in May 2022, October 2022, and March 2023.<sup>11</sup>


Ukrainian forces hold approximately 1.50 square kilometers of Bakhmut (.58 square miles), or roughly 2.80% of the city.

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<sup>10</sup> <https://t.me/annamaliar/797>

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/05/28/7404192/>






## Klishchiivka Operational Area

Ukrainian sources reported positional fighting in the area of the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal east of [Predtechyne](#).<sup>12 13</sup>

<sup>12</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>13</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16679>


# SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



**Russian Objective:** Prepare for the Ukrainian offensive, consolidate gains made during the winter offensive, and set conditions for September 2023 elections

**Ukrainian Objective:** Lock Russian military assets in place, defend the existing line of conflict while finding and exploiting weaknesses, destroy troop concentrations and

command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics





## Avdiivka Operational Area

The People's Militia of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic, also known as the 1st Army Corps, reported that elements of the Russian 1st Army Corps around Avdiivka have switched to a defense posture. "The main tasks for them now are to monitor the enemy, support the incoming orders, as well as repelling enemy attacks."<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> [https://t.me/nm\\_dnr/10377](https://t.me/nm_dnr/10377)

Fighting was limited through the region due to ongoing Russian troop redeployments and severe weather, which caused  [localized urban, street, and stream flooding](#).<sup>15</sup>




Russian-aligned forces made renewed attempts to move through the no man's land between [Vodyane](#) and [Sjeverne](#) without success.<sup>16</sup> <sup>17</sup> The 1st Army Corps also tried to

<sup>15</sup> <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/77055>

<sup>16</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>17</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16679>

advance on [Pervomaiske](#) from the south, only capturing a trench line in the remains of a forested strip.<sup>18 19 20</sup>



## Marinka Operational Area

Checks the calendar and sees it is a day that ends in “Y.” Fighting for [Marinka](#) continued within the remains of the city and the area around it.<sup>21 22 23 24</sup>

<sup>18</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>19</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>20</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16679>


<sup>21</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – AM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>22</sup> [General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – PM Facebook Report](#)

<sup>23</sup> <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/16679>

<sup>24</sup> <https://t.me/wargonzo/12779>

# ZAPORIZHIA



**Russian Objective:** Prepare for a Ukrainian offensive, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks


**Ukrainian Objective:** Liberate Russian-occupied areas, prevent further Russian advances, exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, and protect civilians

## Free Zaporizhia

Russian forces conducted 96 fire missions, four drone attacks, and two missile attacks on 16 settlements along the line of conflict, targeting civilians and civilian infrastructure.<sup>25</sup> One person was killed in Novodanilivka.

## Occupied Zaporizhia

Storm Shadow cruise missiles struck the Berdyansk area at least three times.

In Novopetrivka, one cruise missile hit a Russian training ground, and a second hit a Russian barracks at a former recreation center.<sup>26</sup> <sup>27</sup> The personnel of the Russian Armed Forces was stationed there, the exiled Deputy Chairman of the Berdyansk District Council Viktor Dudukalov said, identifying the  [Khimik and Vesna recreation centers](#) as the targets.

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<sup>25</sup> [https://t.me/zoda\\_gov\\_ua/19037](https://t.me/zoda_gov_ua/19037)

<sup>26</sup> <https://t.me/brdnews/12712>

<sup>27</sup> <https://t.me/zaborzp/45067>

Later in the day, the Azovkabel Plant in Berdyansk was struck for the second time in less than a week.<sup>28</sup>

## **Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant**

Our assessment that there would be no provocation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant was accurate, with no change in plant operations or radiation levels reported.

## **BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION**

### **Black Sea**

Ukrainian Operational Command South (OKS) reported that four vessels of the Black Sea Fleet were on patrol with no missile carriers.

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<sup>28</sup> <https://investigator.org.ua/ua/news-2/255023/>



## WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

### Free Kherson

Russian forces conducted 73 fire missions firing 335 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad and Smerch rockets, drone-delivered IEDs, and bombs, with the city of Kherson targeted three times, wounding one civilian.<sup>29</sup>

### Zhytomyr

Serhii Sukhomlyn, the Zhytomyr mayor, reported a Russian Shahed-136 kamikaze drone struck civilian infrastructure, with no casualties reported.<sup>30</sup>

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<sup>29</sup> <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/6210>


<sup>30</sup> <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/05/28/7404201/>

## NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

**Russian Objective:** Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

**Ukrainian Objective:** Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

### Kyiv

Russian forces launched the largest drone attack of the war on the Ukrainian capital, launching 54 drones, with up to 53 targeting the city. Ukrainian air defense shot down 52 of the 54 Shahed-136 drones, achieving a 96% success rate. Falling debris from spent air defense missiles and downed drones  [damaged roofs, windows, and cars](#), damaged the facade of a seven-story apartment building and caused several small fires throughout the city.<sup>31</sup> Kyiv mayor, Vitalii Klitschko, said, "A 35-year-old woman has been hospitalized in the Solomianskyi district of the capital as a

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<sup>31</sup> <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/77144>

result of UAV fragments falling near a gas station, and a 41-year-old man has been killed."<sup>32</sup>

Russian reports that the headquarters of the Ukrainians Security Service (SBU) was destroyed are false.

Captain Nataliya Humenyuk, director of the United Coordination Press Center for OKS, said that Russian forces took an unconventional approach and "tried to bypass the southern air defense as much as possible, so they mainly bypassed the temporarily occupied territories and then dispersed throughout Ukraine...They gravitate towards the channel rivers in order to hide the movement directions of the Shaheds."

## Sumy


Russian forces carried out 16 fire missions and two airstrikes on seven border hromadas, firing 88 artillery rounds, mortars, and rockets. There were no casualties reported.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>32</sup> <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/05/28/7404190/>

<sup>33</sup> [https://t.me/Sumy\\_news\\_ODA/16488](https://t.me/Sumy_news_ODA/16488)

# RUSSIAN FRONT



**Russian Objective – New:** Repel Russian partisan attacks, stabilize the border, and maintain civil order

**Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective – New:** Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

## Belgorod

Belgorod Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov attempted to visit Shebekino but was blocked due to ongoing artillery strikes, described as the  [most intense since Russia expanded its war of aggression](#) against Ukraine and reportedly killed a Russian civilian.<sup>34 35 36</sup> "The first time, having entered the city, they came under fire. I couldn't even get out of the car. Shells exploded in the next street."

## Bryansk

According to Russian sources, anti-Putin Russian partisans crossed the border near Sushany and Brovnichi, and engaged in localized battles between DRG units.<sup>37</sup> Local officials initiated the Edelweiss Protocol, which activates the entirety of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.<sup>38</sup> Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) run State media channel Mash reported that area residents were forced to hide in basements due to the ongoing fighting and artillery strikes.

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<sup>34</sup> <https://t.me/vvgladkov/2329>

<sup>35</sup> [https://t.me/belgorod\\_informant/4467](https://t.me/belgorod_informant/4467)

<sup>36</sup> <https://t.me/rybar/47658>

<sup>37</sup> <https://t.me/zloyodessit/19263>

<sup>38</sup> [https://t.me/belgorod\\_informant/4447](https://t.me/belgorod_informant/4447)

Near Klimovsky, a Ukrainian kamikaze drone struck a Russian Ministry of Defense vehicle, killing two soldiers instantly.<sup>39</sup>


Russian propagandist Alexander "Sasha" Kots expressed frustration and outrage over the porous border between Ukraine and Russia. "First, reconnaissance drones began to fly into our border areas. Then the shock [*combat and kamikaze – Ed.*] drones of the Armed Forces of Ukraine – they hit military facilities, warehouses, and bases, and reconnaissance drones, meanwhile, flew deep into Russia. Then rockets went into the canonical territory, and attack drones, taking off in the central regions of Ukraine, are already hitting the Moscow Kremlin, strategic aviation bases, and various military facilities throughout the Western part of Russia. Well, now the direct seizure of territories has begun. Responsible persons [*The term responsible persons is used to avoid running afoul of the so-called 'don't say war laws' by not directly calling out the Russian Ministry of Defense – Ed.*] claim, 'This is a sabotage raid.' But stop! If we had not started to squeeze out these two companies...they would have remained, and even help would have come. Have I not discovered anything secret and secret? I do not write about the reaction of the military and, in general, the security forces and special

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<sup>39</sup> [https://t.me/shot\\_shot/52025](https://t.me/shot_shot/52025)

services. I would like, of course, to highlight the juicy details to the people. Now the seizure of canonical Russian territories is underway in the Bryansk region. ...they are fighting against us for real. We somehow try to pretend that nothing serious is happening. Well, it doesn't happen, and it doesn't happen. Everything somehow disappears by itself, wins by itself."<sup>40</sup>

## Pskov

The administrative building of the oil pipeline near Litvinovo in the Pskov region, 475 kilometers from the Ukrainian border, was hit by two kamikaze drones  [damaging the facility](#) but causing no casualties, according to Pskov regional governor Mikhail Vedernikov.<sup>41 42</sup>

## Moscow

Russian state media reported continued sabotage incidents on railroad infrastructure. In Domodedovo, Russian partisans set fire to four relay cabinets in the White Stolby Microdistrict, prying open one of the cabinets and throwing

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<sup>40</sup> [https://t.me/Sladkov\\_plus/7757](https://t.me/Sladkov_plus/7757)

<sup>41</sup> [https://t.me/romanov\\_92/38266](https://t.me/romanov_92/38266)

<sup>42</sup> <https://t.me/bbbreaking/156428>

a Molotov cocktail into it.<sup>43</sup> The fire then spread, destroying two more signal, communication, and safety relay systems.

## **THEATERWIDE**

The Russian versus Ukrainian equipment table has been updated. Our team appreciates the great work of the Oryx Database team.

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<sup>43</sup> [https://t.me/shot\\_shot/52027](https://t.me/shot_shot/52027)



## RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

*Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to May 27, 2023. 10,448 Russian vs. 3,374 Ukrainian*

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
<b>Main Battle Tanks</b>	1859	196	9.48:1	↓
<b>Medium Duty Tanks</b>	131	309	0.42:1	—
<b>Armored fighting Vehicles</b>	862	275	3.13:1	↓
<b>Infantry Fighting Vehicles</b>	2365	541	4.37:1	↑
<b>Armored Personnel Carriers</b>	309	265	1.17:1	↑
<b>MRAPs</b>	43	58	0.74:1	↑
<b>Infantry Mobility Vehicles</b>	188	315	0.62:1	↓
<b>Command and Communications Vehicles</b>	242	13	18.61:1	↓
<b>Engineering Vehicles</b>	306	57	5.37:1	↑
<b>Towed Artillery</b>	220	123	1.79:1	↑
<b>Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars</b>	405	159	2.55:1	↓
<b>MLRS</b>	202	45	4.48:1	↑
<b>SAMs</b>	114	113	1.02:1	↑
<b>Mobile Radars</b>	32	60	0.53:1	—
<b>EW/ECW</b>	37	2	18.50:1	↑
<b>Winged Aircraft</b>	82	66	1.24:1	—
<b>Helicopters</b>	90	30	3.00:1	—
<b>Naval Vessels</b>	12	26	0.46:1	—