Episode 2.15: Foiled Abroad resumes the story of Anthony Eden and his struggle to implement the once perfect plan upon his unwilling nation. Having been challenged passionately at home by a disbelieving political nation in the last episode, here we see this suspicion and fear transplanted to Britain’s supposed allies, and to the United Nations. It was within the UN that some of the sneakiest and indefensible behaviour took place, as Britain was forced to veto measures which would have ordered a ceasefire between Egypt and Israel. This put her forward, alongside France, as a disturber of the peace, and as the hypocritical Soviets rushed to condemn her actions, the American reaction also became apparent. Having operated on the ludicrous assumption that President Eisenhower would fall into line, Eden was faced instead with the quite predictable scene of a confused, hesitant and deeply suspicious President, who could not bring himself to believe that Eden had actually done what he had done. Evidently, the PM was operating according to his own interests, and had failed to consider the fallout of his schemes, yet Eden never seemed to have paused for a moment, before it all kicked off, to think about what would happen if anything went wrong.

As further attempts were made to class the British act as legally justified, to the immense consternation of those legal officers who had insisted this was impossible, British foreign policy bungled its way through negotiations in the UN General Assembly, as John Foster Dulles came out strongly against the Anglo-French act. The news of an ultimatum had been delivered in the late afternoon of 30th October, according to their carefully laid plans. Now, the Egyptians would resist, the Israelis would compromise and make peace, and all would see that Egypt was the problem which only Anglo-French arms could solve. This delusional plan, while it had demonstrated several holes already, remained the hymn sheet of the British government. For better or worse, as Hungary was crushed under Soviet boots, and an Anglo-French flotilla approached the first military target in Egypt, everything must go according to plan.

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Hello and welcome history friends patrons all to 1956 episode 2.15. Last time, we took an in-depth look at the response in British domestic politics to the news that an ultimatum had been sent to Egypt, and that Britain and France had bypassed the auspices of the UN. Anthony Eden’s government was heavily criticised and weakly defended in the days of 30th and 31st October in particular, but what about events occurring outside of Westminster’s walls? What was the foreign reaction to the looming escalation of the conflict, how was the Egypt-Israel conflict progressing, and what solutions were already being brought forward by hopeful but naïve statesmen unaware of the collusion between those three very naughty powers? Well, in this episode we’re going to try and find some answers to these questions, so without any further ado, I will now take you to the early hours of 31st October 1956…

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Selwyn Lloyd was in the midst of a crisis; one of conscience and policy both rolled into one big problem, which he was now facing the full extent of. He hadn't even wanted this – he had tried to intimate, when he had first landed in Sevres on 22nd October, that the Egyptians were soon to make some kind of diplomatic deal. It was all the fault of the Israelis, Lloyd claimed, as David Ben-Gurion had been ‘in a rather aggressive mood, indicating or implying that the Israelis had no reason to believe in anything that a British minister might say.’[[1]](#footnote-1) Lloyd may well have believed that the responsibility for the Crisis was not wholly his own to bear, as one historian observed that ‘It was not difficult to guess’ that Lloyd had travelled to Sevres ‘on his master's orders.’[[2]](#footnote-2) Yet, this was all in the past – in fact, more than a week had now passed since Lloyd had reluctantly made that trip to the unassuming French suburb. A great deal, too much in fact, had happened since, for the British FS to somehow claim that he had only been following orders. He had helped make this bed, even if he had not supplied the bedsheets, fluffed the pillows or placed that fancy chocolate under them – now he would have to lie in it. And what a bed it was.

By 31st October, the US was becoming increasingly loud and irritated in its opposition towards the Anglo-French behaviour; the UN SC had demonstrated its desire for peace, and then its members had recoiled when the British and French had been forced to veto these peaceful proposals in a bid to ensure their timetable was adhered to. The Arab states had turned against the British for their aggression against one of their own. The war plan had also hit a snag at the news that the US 6th fleet was cruising in the Mediterranean, which made the Anglo-French force predictably jumpy and anxious that the Americans would attempt forcefully to prevent any scheduled landing. For their part, the US 6th fleet engaged in a kind of psychological war of its own against the British and French flotilla moving out of Cyprus, as fighters flew over all vessels flying a Union Jack or French Tricolour. One historian even believes that this American buzzing in Anglo-French ears delayed the departure of the flotilla for Egypt for as much as 24 hours.[[3]](#footnote-3)

In Cyprus, Anglo-French bombers were about to take off in their quest to destroy the Egyptian airforce when they were informed of a hasty emergency note – their departure would be delayed for 12 hours. The reason for this delay, in the afternoon of 31st October, was that Selwyn Lloyd had been informed of the nearly two thousand American citizens who had flocked to the West Cairo airport for evacuation, as per Eisenhower’s instructions. This delay caused a chain reaction, as David Ben-Gurion immediately jumped to the conclusion that his allies were pulling out, and leaving Israel in the lurch. He threatened to abandon the Sinai altogether, and would certainly have spilled all the beans on the nature of the collusion between the three powers had the British and French actually pulled out. However, in less than 12 hours, once Lloyd had been informed of the American exit, the bombing began in earnest. So total was the surprise that British planes were greeted with the message ‘can we help you’ as they entered Egyptian airspace. ‘Yes please – beam us in’, came the cynical British pilot’s response, whereupon the first wave of Anglo-French pilots were led to the runways, and thus to the place where the Egyptian airforce was caught napping on the ground. It was almost totally destroyed in the two days of bombing which followed.[[4]](#footnote-4)

Anthony Nutting, for so long an outspoken voice and later to be an invaluable resource for learning what actually went down behind the scenes in British government during this stage, resigned his post on 1st November. Nutting, the long suffering voice of reason in the British FO, told Anthony Eden to his face that ‘we would convince the entire Arab world that they had been right all along in believing that we had created Israel as a beachhead from which we would one day return to establish ourselves in the Middle East.’ Nutting’s remarks were almost immediately justified by the news that hostile elements in Syria had destroyed the Iraq Petroleum Company pipeline, which was jointly owned by Britain, France and the United States, at that portion of the pipeline which traversed Syria.[[5]](#footnote-5)

Meanwhile, on 31st October 1956, and against the votes of the United Kingdom and France, the Security Council called an emergency special session of the General Assembly under the procedure in the ‘Uniting for Peace’ Resolution of 1950. The British and French had not come off well from their rejection of the two resolutions put forward by the Americans and Soviets, which had provided the supremely awkward moment when Moscow and Washington were for once on the same page in that body. The resolutions had first called for a ceasefire and then had condemned Israel as an aggressor; as we saw in the last episode, neither Eden nor Selwyn Lloyd presented the affairs of the UN SC accurately to their peers during the Commons debates of the 30th or 31st October. The PM and FS both reasoned that they had rejected the resolutions in line with France, because they had cast Israel as the sole aggressor and castigated her as responsible, which Eden insisted was not the case.

His horrified peers, both in opposition and some in the backbenches, looked on. Unable to make any headway in the SC, the GA was again brought together on 1st November, as the Anglo-French planes bombed Cairo and removed President Nasser’s airforce from the equation. The debate went on into the early hours of the following day, after rejecting an Anglo-French argument that the Assembly had been invalidly convened, it passed a resolution urging all parties to agree to an immediate ceasefire, but since this had been passed in the GA, it was not legally binding upon the British and French to adhere to it, nor did it stop the Israelis. Still, with information shedding some seriously negative light, or at least some rumours, on what these three powers were doing, it was apparent that London, Paris and Tel Aviv were painfully lacking in friends.

On 31st October, the British FO had cabled the following telegram to the British ambassador in Jordan, in a cynical attempt to fulfil a common theme up to this point – make it appear that the British action was justified under international law as well as the UN Charter. The telegram read:

The policy of Her Majesty's Government is to take the most decisive steps open to them to bring hostilities to an early end. They are advised on the highest legal authority that they are entitled under the Charter to take every measure open to them within and without the United Nations to stop the fighting and to protect their nationals and interests which are threatened by these hostilities.[[6]](#footnote-6)

Apparently it was now government policy to lace foreign telegrams with some healthy lies. On the one hand of course, Eden’s government had been given legal advice – Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice had been given the task of legally justifying British action against Egypt, and he had tied himself in knots in an effort to fulfil his duty. Yet, neither Fitzmaurice, nor Britain’s Attorney-General could in good conscience approve of the plan. The Lord Chancellor, Lord Kilmuir, had also tied himself in knots in efforts to justify the invasion, but he had seemed less tied by scruples or the clear fact that he was manipulating the facts on the ground, and was after all a committed interventionist from the word go. Eden’s government had been advised on the highest legal authority then, they just hadn't seen fit to actually listen to this advice.

Selwyn Lloyd was content to emphasise how the UN Charter, and Article 51 of the UN justified British intervention in the idea of the ‘self-defence’ of its interests, or was that in the interests of others, or maybe it was in the interests of its citizens living in Egypt? When the transparency of the British action was pointed out though, Lloyd then opined that:

We say that in the present international system, where the Security Council is subject to the veto, there must be the right for individual countries to intervene in an emergency to take action to defend their own nationals and their own interests.[[7]](#footnote-7)

Lloyd would know all about the SC being subject to the veto – the British and French had just made use of it twice to protect their investment! Lord Kilmuir was equally shameless about the grounds for intervention when he spoke in the Lords on 1st November, noting that:

We have…three good grounds of intervention: the danger to our nationals (for example, to those at Ismailia); the danger to shipping in the Canal, which shipping carries many hundreds, if not thousands, of people in their crews; and the danger to the enormously valuable installation of the Canal itself and the incalculable consequential effect on many nations if the Canal were blocked.[[8]](#footnote-8)

The Attorney-General had been reading the mail, and felt it necessary to make a correction, which he did in a telegram he sent to Selwyn Lloyd on 1st November, with contents that left no room for ambiguity. The AG wrote:

I am troubled about the legal basis for the action taken by Government in relation to Egypt and I am worried about the consequences for Her Majesty's Government should it become known that the Law Officers are not able to support the main legal contentions addressed…It may be that the advice given is distorted by the need to impact it into a telegram but I feel under a duty to make it plain that I do not agree with the advice Her Majesty's Government have been given if the telegram records that advice accurately. It just is not true to say that we are entitled under the Charter to take any measures open to us "to stop the fighting". Nor would it be true to say that under international law apart from the Charter we are entitled to do so. Further, it is not true to say that under international law entitled to take any measures open to us "to protect our interests which are threatened by hostilities."[[9]](#footnote-9)

The AG could send telegrams until he was blue in the face, and he did so, even while he must have recognised that it was an exercise which was increasingly futile as the days progressed. Whatever the contents, Eden’s government and Selwyn Lloyd as his second were bound to this course of action and could not waver even if they wanted to, which Eden certainly did not, regardless of what his FS thought. These extracts from the government’s legal officers are designed to show you guys that at no point, could Eden and company have been under any illusions – they must have known that they were going against the grain at all times, and I could spend several more episodes detailing the sometimes humorous, but always striking telegrams sent between the legal brain of the country to its political brain. One side of Britain’s brain was clearly content to ignore the other. Gerald Fitzmaurice, the FO legal adviser, concluded on 1st November that he and the AG…

…have discussed the present Anglo-French action to Egypt from the legal point of view, as to which we were neither of us consulted. The decision seems to have been a political one, but whatever justification it may possess on that basis, we feel bound to place it formally on record that we can see no legal justification for it, on the facts so far as they are known to us, and as they stand at present.[[10]](#footnote-10)

Tracing the reaction of the country’s legal officers to what Eden’s government had done, and their futile attempts to dress it up as a defensive measure or one which was legally justified also serves to tell us another story. If members the legal professions in Eden’s own country, and legal advisors to his own government, did not believe that the PM had a leg to stand on where legalities were concerned, then how could foreign observers see anything but an intervention presented in false terms and organised in bad faith? Scholars, for their part, were certainly not fooled, even those without access to privileged information. For example, the historian Quincy Wright, writing less than one year after the Suez Crisis had blown up, and before he had access to any of the legal documentation or correspondence between the relevant departments, was still able to deconstruct the flimsy argument put up by Eden’s government on several grounds. Wright said in 1957 that:

If the object was to stop hostilities between Israel and Egypt, it is difficult to see why the British and French should have vetoed the cease-fire order which had been accepted by a sufficient number of members of the Security Council, including all the other great Powers on October 30, 1956. Such a resolution was suggested by the Charter, and had for years been considered the appropriate method of stopping hostilities such as those in Sinai. Under the Charter the Members cannot constitute themselves policemen to stop fights between others, without United Nations authorisation. While the vital interest of Great Britain in the flow of traffic through the Canal cannot be questioned, it cannot be said that in nationalizing the Canal Egypt was guilty of an "armed attack" against Great Britain, which alone would justify defensive action under Article 51 of the Charter. Nor can it certainly be said that Egypt was guilty of violating international law or treaty in nationalizing the Canal.[[11]](#footnote-11)

As Fitzmaurice sent several memos throughout the relevant departments filling in his legal peers, he received several horrified replies in response. Some had viewed ‘with very great concern’ the decision to attack Egypt in league with France. Another was ‘astonished’, at how in the dark the legal officers had been kept, and how the PM had decided simply to ignore their advice. Another told Fitzmaurice that they agreed ‘fully and unreservedly’ with the idea that Eden had acted incorrectly. But Fitzmaurice was then plagued by another fear – that because ‘outside this country practically no one has heard of the Lord Chancellor as an office, or understands his position’, he was immensely concerned that he and his legal peers would be blamed for giving their blessing to the action.[[12]](#footnote-12)

To clarify things a bit, Law Officers such as Fitzmaurice and the AG were the only persons who, apart from the various departmental legal advisers, had any *official function* to give advice to the government of the day. Lord Kilmuir, the Lord Chancellor, did not sit in Cabinet in the capacity of its general legal adviser but in his function as head of the judiciary, presiding officer of the House of Lords, administrative head of a department, etc. There was a critical difference here, especially when it came down to matters of interpreting international law – Lord Kilmuir, committed interventionist as he clearly was, simply was not qualified to give his blessing to any foreign action. This, though, did not matter to the PM, who acted as though the Lord Chancellor’s misunderstood role outside of the country *would* grant the Egyptian action a legal stamp of legitimacy.

This was entirely in keeping with Eden’s policy. Throughout the whole ordeal, not only had Eden ignored and lied when it suited him, he had also chosen to ignore the legal protocols in place which had governed British political decisions for years. It cannot be underestimated just how integral Anthony Eden was to the Suez Crisis – without him, it is impossible to imagine any such reaction to President Nasser taking place. Everything from the secret collusion with Israel and France laid down in the Sevres Protocol, to his deliberate exclusion of legal officers from the debate, paint a picture of a PM who had become increasingly dictatorial and out of touch with reality…and matters were soon to get worse.

Donald Logan was the Assistant Private Secretary for the FS, Selwyn Lloyd, and we met him before as he transported Lloyd to the airport and then went with him to the first part of the Sevres Protocol meeting on 22nd October. Logan was clued into all the developments which followed in those negotiations, and in 1991, he was interviewed by a project jointly sponsored by the UN and Yale, tasked with documenting the records of men who had been present during the crisis, the transcripts of which are all freely available online. Logan is not the only figure to have been interviewed in this capacity, as we’ll see in a bit, but here he does give us an invaluable, and underrated, primary source, as well as a window into the world which Anthony Eden had created. Logan recalled:

After the nationalization of the Canal Eden was determined that something quite serious had to be done, and Nasser deposed. And he made no secret of it. He was a man who had always liked to work with a small group of people with whom he felt empathy, working together. Increasingly he collected that kind of person around him as he faced what he recognized was a real national crisis and a personal crisis for him. Selwyn Lloyd was always in that group. Increasingly, as the advice he was receiving from the Foreign Office was more cautious than he wished, Eden was discarding his usual sources of advice and working only with those who were prepared to follow his line, and that led to the virtual exclusion of Foreign Office participation except by Lloyd himself and of Ivone Kirkpatrick the head of the Office. Then the counterpart to that was that, more and more, policy was being formed by ad hoc groups, groups being created for that purpose, groups which were very difficult to locate. They were partly military, they were partly intelligence, but they were mostly personal around Eden. The war cabinet was called the cabinet by the press but was in fact called the Egypt committee, whose members were appointed by Eden to take on the crisis.[[13]](#footnote-13)

The Egypt committee was an organ of the Cabinet which effectively streamlined Eden’s collective decision making processes, when he bothered to consult anyone that is. Rarely, we imagine, would this committee have had much good news to report once the Crisis kicked off. The Egyptians, while their defence against the Israelis had buckled over 29th October to 2nd November, had managed to conduct one critical piece of sabotage. Lacking an airforce or a coherently commanded army, they had managed to tow into place several block-ships, which were vessels laden with cement incepted for the express purpose of blocking the Suez Canal. The British and French, supposedly having intervened to guard the Canal and protect its shipping, had manifestly failed in their task by the time the first block-ship, the 5,000 ton *Akka*, was sunk.

The *Akka* was soon followed by *fifty* more such ships, and President Nasser, having evidently planned this aspect of his defence better than any other, proved masterful at frustrating any spectacle of the Anglo-French somehow ‘saving’ the Canal through their action. Not until April 1957 would the last such block-ship be towed away, and until then, several oil tankers and shipping containers were forced to go around the Cape, just as their ancestors had done a century before. This failure, and Eden’s claim that this was exactly what he was fighting to prevent, kind of made a lie of the whole exercise – it wasn’t until this great crisis emerged after all, that the Canal had suffered. Before that time, even when the British and French had tried to overwhelm the Egyptian pilots with additional ships in peacetime, the Canal functioned as normal. It was a further strike against the Anglo-French, but it was far from the last or most damaging.

On 1st November, John Foster Dulles stood up in the UN GA to make a stiff judgement on Anglo-French policy, and called for an immediate ceasefire. Up to that point, Selwyn Lloyd had hoped against hope that the US would soften its tone towards Britain, and that Washington would come to see things London’s way. This was clearly not the case – any confidence that the Atlantic alliance was simply too strong and valuable for the Americans to vote against it was declared void the moment Dulles spoke. Who should trip over himself to speak after Dulles, but the Soviet delegate to the UN GA, who echoed Dulles’ condemnation of the ‘aggressors’, and this less than three days before Hungary was to be aggressively attacked? Hypocrisy was in the air as usual when the Soviet delegate spoke,[[14]](#footnote-14) but such was the British isolation that they were far from the only negative voice in the UN GA. All assembled were, after all, only debating the measure of peace in the ME because Britain and France had collectively vetoed the proposals for a ceasefire two days’ before.

But what of Britain’s Commonwealth peers? Eden at least, unlike his French counterparts, could surely rely on a bank of Australian, Canadian, NZ etc. goodwill when the question of Suez was concerned…right? In actual fact, the response of Commonwealth Governments varied sharply. The Australian and New Zealand Governments concurred in the action of the United Kingdom in accordance with their tradition of accepting British leadership in foreign policy – for the moment at least. The Indian Government condemned the action taken as ‘a flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter’, in spite of the legal lingo to the contrary offered by Eden in the past. Pakistan similarly condemned the action and said the whole Moslem world was threatened. Ceylon expressed ‘dissent and disapproval’ and saw ‘the continuation of colonialism’ in British actions. South Africa simply noted for future reference that there had been no consultation. Canada ‘regretted that Britain and France found it necessary to take military action while the Security Council was discussing the Canal problem.’[[15]](#footnote-15) The Canadians, evidently, had the strongest, most active and most informed position on the entire crisis, and it is the Canadian position, spearheaded by their FS Lester Pearson, that will occupy us for the remainder of the episode.

Canada was destined to play a starring role in the Suez Crisis, largely because of the actions and reputation of one Lester Pearson. What made this Canadian FS so special in the halls of the UN GA though, and furthermore, what was it that made Canada so interested in the ME, when her own native FO had only begun to consider ME matters a few years before the Suez Crisis erupted? To answer the first question, we are pointed to Geoffrey Murray, who was appointed as Senior Counsellor in charge of Political Committee Items for the Canadian Permanent Mission to the United Nations in 1955. In short, this lofty title granted Murray access to some privileged information, and enabled him to sit on some critically important meetings, and see some fascinating things. Much like Donald Logan before, Murray’s observations were recorded for posterity by the UN-Yale partnership, and it is from an interview between Murray and the project’s interviewee that I now draw. In response to why Lester Pearson was seen as such a household name, Geoffrey Murray replied that:

Certainly my first impression when I first got to New York was that Lester Pearson was regarded not only as a folk hero but one of the household gods. Whenever we were going about in our contacts there would be some reference, sooner or later, to Lester Pearson and roles he had played. I think of course it derived basically from the emphasis which he had placed on United Nations affairs, almost from the time – and perhaps before the time – he became Secretary of State for External Affairs…I think he was quite prominent in consultations in the corridors and in pressing for a sort of specific role for the so-called middle powers in the organization. That was one of Canada's main efforts at San Francisco, to ensure that…the membership at large were not disposed to let the organization be dominated entirely by the five Permanent Members of the Security Council, the so-called Big Five…People of Pearson's generation no doubt felt strongly that countries like Canada, that had made a substantial contribution to both wars, should have a greater say in arrangements for international organization after the Second War. That's my impression of what Pearson said about various things, it's also my impression from reading and watching, of course, the way Canadian policy evolved in the post-war period; because the key to our policy was cooperating with other likeminded states to make collective security work effectively in pursuit of peaceful solutions.[[16]](#footnote-16)

So Pearson had made a name for himself in the years before, and had characterised his work even before he came to the UN as one of its most passionate advocates. He would need these qualities to progress past the convoluted mess which debates in the GA could occasionally degenerate into. Lester Pearson’s greatest contribution to the Suez Crisis in terms of UN diplomacy was his inception of the UN Emergency Force, which would be approved of without any votes against on 4th November. In this case, Britain and France even voted for it, since they surely knew that by the time its members mobilised the force, their mission would be accomplished. It also gave Eden the chance to paint the Anglo-French intervention as one which safeguarded the Canal until the UN could arrive; even worse for those that knew the truth, it enabled Eden to take some kind of moral high ground, and argue that the British had forced the UN to take notice of a problem in the ME which they had been talking about for some time. Nobody had listened, Britain and France had taken the matter into their own hands, and now everything was destined to work out, with an international police force guarding the Suez Canal to the benefit of all.[[17]](#footnote-17) The truth, of course, was far more complex, and far from the British victory that Eden would later attempt to claim.

While Pearson was lobbying his way past the dejected British and French delegates in the UN GA, on 4th November, the fruits of these months of planning approaching Port Said, the mouth of the Suez Canal as it opens into the Mediterranean. The Anglo-French flotilla was nearing its first target, in defiance of all sense of reason and international opinion. Several miles away, Soviet tanks were crushing Budapest underfoot, as the Hungarian experiment in independence had plainly been exposed as a tragic non-starter. Eden cared little for this, instead he urged the flotilla onwards, as it moved through all sense of caution, peace-making and better judgement in order to fulfil the uncertain plan and achieve the unclear goals which Britain’s PM had imagined. Disaster had followed his every move so far, in both the political, strategic and diplomatic spheres, and now, with the critical arm of the plan about to whirl into life, disaster would soon strike in the military sphere as well.

Next time, we’ll resume our story of this flotilla, as the British and French, contrary to everything in the world it seemed, tried to turn back the clock, and everyone else looked on bewildered, still no closer to understanding exactly what the two European powers were actually doing. Until then though history friends and lovely Patrons, my name is Zack, and this has been 1956 episode 2.15. Thanks for listening and I’ll be seeing you all soon.

1. Cited in Avi Shlaim, ‘The Protocol of Sevres, 1956: Anatomy of a War Plot’, p. 516. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. *Ibid*, p. 516. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. See Howard J. Dooley, ‘Great Britain's 'Last Battle' in the Middle East: Notes on Cabinet Planning during the Suez Crisis of 1956’, p. 515. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. See Christopher Hitchens and W. W. Rostow, ‘Mad Dogs and Others: Suez 1956’, p. 112. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. *Ibid*, pp. 112-113. [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Cited in Geoffrey Marston, ‘Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: The Legal Advice Tendered to the British Government’, p. 802. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Cited in *Ibid*, p. 802. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Cited in *Ibid*, p. 802. [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Cited in *Ibid*, pp. 803-804. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Cited in *Ibid*, p. 805. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Quincy Wright, ‘Intervention, 1956’, *The American Journal of International Law*, Vol. 51, No. 2 (Apr., 1957), pp. 257-276; p. 273. [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. All cited in Geoffrey Marston, ‘Armed Intervention in the 1956 Suez Canal Crisis: The Legal Advice Tendered to the British Government’, p. 807. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Yale-UN Oral History Project – Sir Donald Logan by James S. Sutterlin, Interviewer, on 22 April, 1991, London, England, pp. 10-11. Available: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/481004/files/Logan22Apr91TRANS.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Richard N. Swift, ‘United States Leadership in the United Nations’, *The Western Political Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Jun., 1958), pp. 183-194. [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. See Graham Spry, ‘Canada, the United Nations Emergency Force, and the Commonwealth’, *International Affairs* (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-), Vol. 33, No.3 (Jul., 1957), pp. 289-300; pp. 291-292. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Yale-UN Oral History Project – Geoffrey Murray by James S. Sutterlin, Interviewer, on 10 January 1991, Ottawa, Canada pp. 10-12. Available: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/487450/files/Murray10Jan91TRANS.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. See Barry Turner, *Suez 1956*, pp. 345-346. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)