



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

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Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 580

It has been 3,501 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 216 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

- In Luhansk, there were pockets of fighting near Dibrova
- Russian forces attempted to advance on Hryhorivka
- Fighting continued east and north of Klishchiivka
- There wasn't any significant fighting in the Avdiivka area of operation (AO)
- Marinka was Marinka
- Fighting restarted near Pryyutne
- The operational pause in the Orikhiv area continued, with significant artillery strikes
- Russian artillery and the VKS continue to batter free Kherson
- A Russian fuel depot in occupied Hola Prystan was destroyed
- Open-source intelligence suggests a large Ukrainian ammunition depot was hit by Shahed-136 kamikaze drones in Kirovohrad

- Ukraine named three new deputy ministers of defense
- Ukraine doesn't see a need to accelerate mobilization – for now
- Russian engineers are building a railroad line from Taganrog to occupied Donetsk, and that could be trouble for Ukraine
- Bulgaria will send expired S-300 anti-aircraft missiles to Ukraine, which will be refurbished
- President Putin officially bans State Duma deputies from traveling to the occupied territories
- Russian Lieutenant General Oleg Volynkin was arrested for abuse of power and bribery
- The September 13 missile strike on the LLS Minsk and the Kilo-class submarine Rostov-on-Don very likely wounded and killed crew members of both vessels
- Magyar used his magic pointer to make a Russian D-44 artillery piece vanish
- President Putin says to fix the oil crisis in Russia faster

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:


1. The repeated soft response by Ukraine's allies after Russian aggression on Ukraine's border will continue to encourage Moscow to take additional risks, with the

- potential to cause an international incident that could lead to a military response.
2. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, and proxy forces.
 3. The inability of Russian military leaders to stop the ongoing Ukrainian offensive and retake the battlefield initiative has put significant pressure on Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov, who has been in charge of all Russian forces in Ukraine since January 2023.
 4. Ukraine continues to hold the initiative theaterwide, and the number of combat ineffective and combat destroyed Russian units is growing, eroding Russian combat potential in numerous areas of operation.
 5. Russian Chief of Staff Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to accept the realities within the theater of war.
 6. At the direction of President Vladimir Putin, the Russian government is in the largest purge of dissident voices and perceived internal enemies since the Soviet era, including the leaders, mercenaries, and employees of PMC Wagner, objective state media journalists and war bloggers, far-right nationalists

- who want the Kremlin to take more aggressive action in Ukraine, and human rights activists. This is the last day of this entry.
7. There remains a possibility of partisan violence within Russia after the killings of Yevgeny Prigozhin and Dmitry Utkin. President Putin's stature, both inside and outside of Russia, remains in a weakened state. This is the last day of this entry.
 8. The perceived slow progress of the Ukrainian summer-fall offensive, questions about the capabilities of Ukrainian military commanders at the battalion and brigade level, and ongoing anticorruption measures highlighting the problems within the Ukrainian government are unfairly straining Western support.
 9. Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition delivery dates, and these continued delays are negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
 10. We maintain that Russia will attempt to destroy Ukraine's energy infrastructure over the fall and winter.
 11. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.




TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.

[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure

There weren't any verifiable events in this region.

DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, and capture the rest of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents


Kreminna Operational Area

Multiple Russian sources continue to report positional fighting and probing attacks in the [Serebryansky Wood](#) near Dibrova.^{1 2} These are not described as major operations, and there haven't been any significant changes to the line of conflict in months.

¹ https://t.me/mod_russia/30873 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


² <https://t.me/wargonzo/15301>

NORTHEAST DONETSK




Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region

Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk, collapse the Russian flanks north of Bakhmut, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, liberate the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, advance to the administrative border of Luhansk, and minimize civilian casualties



Soledar and Bakhmut Operational Area

Russian forces attempted to advance on [Hryhorivka](#) without success, and a geolocated video showed Ukrainian forces attempting to advance in the direction of [Zaliznyanske](#) from the M-03/E-40 Highway, losing a BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle and retreating.



Klishchiivka Operational Area


Heavy fighting continued at and east of the railroad grade near [Klishchiivka](#), with no change in the situation.³

The director of communications for Operational Command East (OCE), Ilya Yevlash, said that offensive operations in the areas of Klishchiivka, Ozarianivka, and Shumy were ongoing.⁴ He added that Ukrainian forces are keeping a section of the T-513 Highway, a vital Russian ground line of

³ https://t.me/mod_russia/30873 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁴ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116480>


communication between Bakhmut and Horlivka, under fire control.⁵



The Russian Ministry of Defense has periodically reported fighting in the Mayorsk area, which is northeast of Shumy and north of Ozarianivka. In our assessment, this is the first acknowledgment by Kyiv that there is activity in this area, and the fighting is likely between the Siverskyi Donets-Donbas Canal and the T-513 Highway.

⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116480>

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive until the winter and maximize casualties

Ukrainian Objective: Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics

Marinka and Staromlynivka Operational Areas

There were no changes in and near [Marinka](#), where fighting continued.^{6 7} In the Staromlynivka area of operation (AO), Russian and Ukrainian sources reported mutual fighting near [Pryyutne](#).^{8 9}


⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12371>

⁷ <https://t.me/wargonzo/15301>

⁸ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/12371>


⁹ https://t.me/mod_russia/30873 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, prepare to launch a fall-winter offensive to capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Expand the breakthrough at the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



Orikhiv Operational Area

Multiple Russian sources reported that the fighting intensity has declined but believe this is only a lull. We maintain that Ukrainian forces are in a brief operational pause.¹⁰

Operational Command South (OCS) released a statement saying, "No signs of the formation of offensive groups were detected in the enemy's actions. The movement of forces and means between their positions continues. The counter-battery fight continues, and the enemy is actively using

¹⁰ <https://t.me/wargonzo/15301>

tactical aviation."¹¹ The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported that the current objective is "inflicting losses in manpower and equipment on the occupying troops, exhausting the enemy along the entire front line."

Both combatants are using a significant number of drones and artillery.

Fighting continues along the entire axis from west of [Robotyne](#), the northern edge of [Novoprokopivka](#), and along the Surovikin Line following the 160-meter and 140-meter heights to [Verbove](#).

Occupied Zaporizhzhia

Russian sources are spreading rumors that the Russian military plans to withdraw from Tokmak. We believe this is a psychological warfare operation, and the reports are untrue.

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

There were no updates on the status of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP).

¹¹ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116457>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

OCS reported two Russian Black Sea Fleet ships are on patrol, with no missile carriers.^{12 13}


KHERSON



Russian Objective: Prevent Ukrainian advances into eastern Kherson, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks on Ukrainian civilians, lock Russian troops and military assets in place, and protect civilian lives

¹² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116457>

¹³ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116528>




Kherson Oblast Administrative and Military Governor (OVA) Alexander Prokudin said Russia carried out 109 fire missions on free Kherson, firing 604 munitions, rockets, and bombs.¹⁴ Two people were killed and one wounded during today's attacks. A business was  [hit by Russian shelling](#) in Kherson, and firefighters had to keep  [leaving the scene](#) due to Russian artillery attempting to do a "double tap" by targeting emergency services personnel.¹⁵

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¹⁴ <https://t.me/khersonskaODA/10630>

¹⁵ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/43400

¹⁶ <https://t.me/hueviyherson/46448>

Russia  [struck the grain silos at Beryslav](#) on the banks of the Dnipro River with four FAB-500S-E UMPK glide bombs.^{17 18} Shockwaves from the bombing damaged the hospital and area buildings.

Occupied Kherson

Ukrainian artillery targeted the  [fuel depot in Hola Prystan](#), destroying it.¹⁹

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

Kirovohrad

Russia launched 44 Shahed-136 kamikaze drones targeting southern, western, and central Ukraine, with 34 shot down.²⁰ NASA Fire Information for Resource Management

¹⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116437>

¹⁸ https://t.me/dva_majors/26367

¹⁹ https://t.me/kherson_non_fake/10383

²⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116532>

Systems indicated that the Cold War-era Military Unit A1201 storage facility in Bohdanivka, Kirovograd, was hit. The compound is listed in the BICC report, with hundreds of tons of expired munitions and missile components awaiting disposal. Kirovohrad Oblast OVA Andriy Raikovych said, "The enemy drone attack did not bypass Kirovohrad region. Part of the Shahed over the region was destroyed. However, there are also hits. There were no deaths, injuries, or damage to civil infrastructure. All relevant services are at the scene."

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity in this region.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

There wasn't any significant activity in this region.

BELARUSIAN FRONT

There wasn't any significant activity in this region.

THEATERWIDE

Ukraine named three new deputy ministers of defense.^{21 22} Deputy Minister of Defense for Social Development Nataliia Kalmykova, has been the executive director of the Ukrainian Veterans Fund since February 2022. Previously, she was an advisor of the Ground Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Deputy Minister of Defense for Development, Digital Transformations, and Digitization, Kateryna Chernohorenko, is the head of the Army of Drones project. Since 2018, she has been the project coordinator for the yeMaliatko electronic services for sick leave and headed the project to add proof of COVID vaccination to the Diia app.

Deputy Minister of Defense Yurii Dzhyhyr has consulted for the World Bank for the past three years. From 2018 to 2020, he worked as Ukraine's Deputy Minister of Finance. He has over 20 years of experience supporting economic reforms, social policy, and fiscal decentralization in Ukraine, the Balkans, and Central Asia.

²¹ <https://t.me/uniannet/112696>

²² <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/09/27/7421686/>

First Deputy Minister of Defense, Lieutenant General Aleksander Pavliuk, said that Ukraine has no plans to change the ongoing mobilization, which started on February 25, 2022. "This is the task of every man - to protect his state, we must prepare for this and be ready. We are doing everything not to increase the pace of mobilization, but you yourself understand everything depends on the aggressor and the front."

Russia has started building a railroad line from Taganrog to Mariupol, Volnovakha, and Donetsk. Satellite images show that work on building a bridge over the Kalmius River has started.²³ ²⁴ If the project is allowed to be completed, it will reduce the importance of the Kerch (Crimean) Bridge and improve logistics if the Crimean land bridge is cut. The project also indicates that Russia has given up on trying to advance through Vuhledar to secure the existing railroad line.

²³ https://t.me/smolii_ukraine/43391

²⁴ <https://t.me/uniannet/112687>

As expected, the Bulgaria parliament approved the transfer of its expired S-300 air defense missiles to Ukraine, where they will be restored to combat readiness.²⁵

The table for equipment losses was **updated on September 24, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

²⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/116503>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to September 24, 2023.

12,286 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,486 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2182	289	7.55:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	150	366	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	982	327	3.00:1	—
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2797	755	3.70:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	354	344	1.02:1	↓
MRAPs	48	161	0.30:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	210	373	0.56:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	251	17	14.76:1	—
Engineering Vehicles	343	84	4.08:1	↓
Towed Artillery	308	160	1.93:1	↑
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	536	220	2.44:1	—
MLRS	275	50	5.50:1	↑
SAMs	181	129	1.40:1	—
Mobile Radars	45	78	0.58:1	—
EW/ECW	54	4	13.50:1	—
Winged Aircraft	92	72	1.28:1	—
Helicopters	112	35	3.20:1	—
Naval Vessels and Submarines	17	27	0.63:1	—

RUSSIAN MOBIKS, MOBILIZATION, AND MIR

Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a law that bans State Duma deputies and other government officials from visiting the occupied territories without his prior approval.

Editor's Note: *We thought that September 30 was reunification day for Russia. Sorry, Ukrainian territories were annexed by Russia, which are now Russia, but they aren't Russia? That Russia, sorry, Ukraine, but you need permission to go to Russia – sorry, sorry – Ukraine.*


Russian state media reported The head of the Main Directorate of the Ministry of Emergency Situations for the Krasnodar Territory. Lieutenant General Oleg Volynkin was arrested in Sochi. Volynkin has been under investigation for over a year for abuse of power and bribery.²⁶

It is highly likely that the September 13 Storm Shadow missile strike on Sevastopol that destroyed the Ropucha-class large landing ship Minsk and the Kilo-class submarine Rostov-on-Don killed and wounded crew members of both vessels.

²⁶ https://t.me/shot_shot/57459

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) reported that the Minsk was supposed to leave the dry dock on September 14, and the crew was present for preparations. Up to 62 were killed and wounded. Our in-house analyst team could not verify the casualty number but confirmed that the Minsk was scheduled to leave the dry dock, and the crew was present.

The Russian organization, St. Petersburg Club of Submariners and Navy Veterans, announced a fundraiser to assist injured submariners from the Rostov-on-Don. Officially, neither Russia nor Ukraine claimed any of the crew were killed or injured.²⁷

Robert “Magyar” Brovdi, who we call the father of modern close air support drone warfare,  [released a video showing a Russian D-44 towed howitzer](#) being destroyed.²⁸

²⁹ The 85 mm D-44 was built between 1943 and 1953 and is still in service in 16 nations.³⁰ It's unclear if a lack of 122 and 152 mm ammunition or a dwindling number of

²⁷ <https://t.me/rusbrief/159115>

²⁸ <https://t.me/zloyodessit/20164>

²⁹ <https://twitter.com/TheDeadDistrict/status/1706884735455179223>

³⁰ <https://t.me/zloyodessit/20164>

serviceable D-1, D-20, and D-30 artillery pieces caused the D-44 to come out of storage.

ECONOMICS

Russian President Putin publicly addressed the ongoing fuel crisis. "The economy of companies is a goose that lays golden eggs. We must treat them with care. This is understandable, but nevertheless, I would ask you to respond to current events more quickly."³¹

In a sign that the fuel export ban will not go away soon, the State Duma is considering a measure that would ban the export of all petroleum products. While this may be an attempt to manipulate global fuel prices, the draft law would ban so-called "gray market" exports. A distributor that buys petroleum products for resale or consumption in Russia would be barred from redirecting their inventory to outside markets.³²

³¹ https://t.me/shot_shot/57458

³² <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/104099>


RUMORS


Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.


- Did Russia destroy two Mig-29s and three Su-25s at Kryvyi Rih with new long-range Lancet kamikaze drones?
- Have more than 260,000 Russian soldiers died in Ukraine since February 24, 2022?
- North Korean ammunition is coming to Russia?
- Will Ukraine get Taurus cruise missiles?
- Were two Russian generals seriously wounded and one admiral killed in Sevastopol?


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.