



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

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Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 517

It has been 3,437 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 152 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

- Severe weather is possible in Ukraine on July 28 and 29
- Russian gains in the direction of Borova were overstated
- Russian attempt to push Ukrainian forces from the edge of the Rose District of Bakhmut failed
- Ukraine controls half of Klishchiivka, and Andriivka remains a no man's land
- At the time of publication, Russian sources were claiming Ukraine had liberated Staromaiorske
- Ukrainian forces are bypassing Robotyne and continue to drive through the first line of Russian defenses southeast of the settlement
- A Kalibr cruise missile hit the Port of Odesa, killing one
- The Ukrainian military airfield at Starokostyantyniv was hit with up to five cruise missiles
- Ukrainian officials no longer hinted or minced words, declaring firmly the SBU was involved in the October 8, 2022, bombing of the Kerch (Crimean) Bridge

- Western allies haven't even completed a plan for training Ukrainian pilots to fly the F-16 and are still seeking United States permission and training aircraft
- Russia is reportedly building a drone factory with the help of Iran in Tartarstan
- The Russian State Duma raised the age of conscription, increased fines, changed the laws around electronic conscription and mobilization notifications, and gave President Putin specialized executive powers to form internal private military companies

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:


1. Russian complaints of ammunition shortages, which have spread from Zaporizhzhia to the Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction, are likely caused by the disruption of Russian logistics and the targeted destruction of large ammunition depots.
2. The Russian Federation's defacto blockade of the western Black Sea has put shipping in the territorial waters of Bulgaria and Romania at risk, and if the European Union, United Nations, and/or NATO do not respond with any action, preferably non-military, Russian aggression on the border nations of Ukraine

- will continue to expand and eventually lead to an international incident.
3. Ukrainian forces shifting to an artillery-centric war of attrition against Russian forces, leveraging an advantage in range, accuracy, and capacity, may be moving back to a period of increased ground operations in three operational areas supported by artillery.
 4. The current Ukrainian military activity is subordinate offensives and shaping operations, and the main operation has not started.
 5. We maintain that signals from Kyiv indicating the next phase of the summer offensive is being prepared are accurate.
 6. Despite Ukraine's plans to move to the next phase, we maintain that Western partners are not meeting their promised military training, heavy equipment, and ammunition dates, negatively impacting Ukraine's military capabilities.
 7. While public support for former FSB Colonel Igor Strelkov Girkin has rapidly faded, it still indicates that Russian President Vladimir Putin has been weakened after the failed Prigozhin Insurrection and continues to face a small but very real possibility of another insurrection or coup attempt.
 8. The Russian Ministry of Defense remains in a chaotic state, incapable of creating mission cohesion between

- penal units, mobiks, conscripts, elite forces, PMCs, and proxy forces.
9. Mistrust among the command structures of the Russian Ministry of Defense, intelligence, and security community is negatively impacting Russia's ability to wage war within Ukraine.
 10. Russian Chief of Staff Valery Gerasimov and Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu are some of the best allies available for the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense due to their acceptance of systemic corruption, political infighting, waste of military resources, and refusal to adapt to the realities within the theater of war.
 11. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)


TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the *Moskva* and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

UKRAINE WEATHER



CAPE values are increasing, and the forecast models are aligning that potentially severe weather will pass through wide areas of Ukraine on July 28 and 29 as a cold front passes through. Dry and hot weather with a chance of thunderstorms is forecasted for Thursday, with highs between 27° and 33° Celcius. Thunderstorms and heavy rain is expected during the evening of July 28 and July 29, with rain up to 25 millimeters in places and winds to 55 kph. After the front passes, temperatures will return to summer norms.


SOIL SATURATION AND HYDROLOGY



August 3, 2023, GFS predicts soil saturation will be between 20% to 40% in eastern and southern Ukraine.


The soil saturation model does not consider the lakebed of the Kakhovka Reservoir. Soil saturation is between 25% to 50%, with pockets as high as 85% in Zaporizhia and eastern Kherson. There is little change in the model through August 3, although tractability will likely be impacted in localized areas due to severe weather predicted.

KHARKIV



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict

Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorychna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure




Dvorichna Operational Area

There remain no specific or verifiable claims of Russian gains, Ukrainian counterattacks, or territorial changes in this area. No reliable or semi-reliable source reported fighting in the Dvorichna area of operation (AO). We maintain that the Russian actions of the previous two weeks were spoiling attacks and attempt to draw Ukrainian reserves away from other AOs. However, we remain reluctant to declare the effort over.

DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK




Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, set conditions to capture the rest of the region, and support September 2023 elections

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents

Free Luhansk

Operational Command East (OKE) spokesperson, Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty, reported that Russian forces fired 682 artillery rounds, mortars, Grad and Smerch rockets launched by multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS), drone-delivered IEDs, and indirect tank fire. The Russian air force and army aviation (VKS) carried out six airstrikes, concentrating their attacks on the Svatove AO.¹


¹ <https://t.me/luhanskaVTSA/12341>



Svatove Operational Area

Russian forces restarted attempts to flank [Novoselivske](#) from the south in the direction of [Stelmakhivka](#) after extensive preparation using artillery. The attack was unsuccessful.²

² <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10662>



Errors and omissions: With multiple reports of Russian forces capturing the settlements of Novojehorivka, Nadiya, and Serhiivka coming from multiple Russian and Ukrainian sources with different points of origin, we declared all three settlements under Russian control on July 25, 2023. We applied terrain analysis when updating our map. We were far more conservative than other sources due to the lack of pictures, videos, and NASA Fire Information for Resource Management Systems outage. Today, some Russian and all Ukrainian sources walked back part of the claims, declaring Nadiya still under Ukrainian control. We, in turn, adjusted our map, moving the Russian advance to the eastern edge of Nadiya and

coded the settlement as contested. When intelligence misses are made, we triage what can be done better in the future. In this particular case, there is no answer due to reports from the units involved, direct contact in Ukraine, and sources we have a degree of trust which includes DeepState and, to a far lesser extent, WarGonzo. When we traced the roots of the claim, they came from multiple sources, which meets the journalist standard of "confirmed." We thank you for your understanding as we cut through the fog of war.

Ukrainian forces were able to stabilize their defensive lines west of Raihorodka, stopping the Russian advance in the direction of Pershotravneve.³ The Russian Ministry of Defense (RMOD) reported that Ukrainian forces were on the offensive in the direction of [Raihorodka](#).⁴ Interestingly, RMOD reported that Russian troops continued offensive operations "in the area of" [Serhiivka](#).⁵ Based on the report, we moved the line of conflict to the western edge of Serhiivka but left the gray area unchanged.


ASSESSMENT: Stabilization in this area is still required, and we maintain our earlier assessment that the goal of the

³ <https://t.me/DeepStateUA/17210>

⁴ https://t.me/mod_russia/28629 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

⁵ https://t.me/mod_russia/28629 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]

activity here is to advance toward Borova and sever the P-79 Highway ground line of communication (GLOC – supply line).



Kreminna Operational Area


Mutual fighting was reported south of [Dibrova](#) and in the [Serebryanskyy Woods](#), with no change in the situation.^{6 7 8}

⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10662>

⁷ https://t.me/mod_russia/28629 [Russian Government Controlled Social Media Channel]


⁸ <https://t.me/rybar/50119>

NORTHEAST DONETSK



Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire region, set conditions for September 2023 elections


Ukrainian Objective: Defend Siversk and Bakhmut, collapse the Russian flanks while maximizing casualties, draw Russian reserves into the Bakhmut and Soledar operational areas, push into the Luhansk oblast, and minimize civilian casualties



Bakhmut Operational Area

The General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine reported a Russian attack north of [Khromove](#) failed.⁹ There were no other reports, and it was unspecified if this was fighting in the outskirts of the Rose District of Bakhmut or a failed Russian counterattack from Yahidne.

⁹ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10662>




Klishchiivka Operational Area

Ukrainian forces have established military control over the southern half of [Klishchiivka](#) and the defensive positions on the high ground west and northwest of the settlement. Intense fighting continued in the northern half of the town, with Russian ground troops supported by the Russian air force and army aviation (VKS).¹⁰ The last remaining reasonable milbloggers condemned, within the guidelines of the so-called don't say war laws, Russian propaganda

¹⁰ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10662>

claims of hundreds of dead Ukrainian troops killed in meat waves, declaring them false.^{11 12}

A geolocated video from July 25 showed a squad of Russian soldiers  [walking in the village's streets](#) in the northeast corner toward the administrative boundary of the settlement.¹³ The situation at [Andriivka](#) is also unchanged, with the village a no man's land and Russian forces at the train tracks east of the settlement. Ukrainian Deputy Minister of Defense Hanna Maliar reported intense fighting continued on the outskirts of [Kurdyumivka](#). "The enemy clings to every meter of occupied land, puts up strong resistance, uses reserves, and at the same time suffers significant losses," Maliar said.¹⁴


ASSESSMENT: If you're wondering why Berkhivka, Klishchiivka, and Andriivka still aren't liberated compared to how long fighting lasted in these settlements during PMC Wagner's assaults, Ukraine doesn't have 78,000 troops to throw into a meatgrinder and suffer an 82% casualty rate to achieve the goals.

¹¹ <https://twitter.com/MalcontentmentT/status/1684422211074154498>

¹² <https://t.me/wehearfromyanina/2340>

¹³ <https://twitter.com/i/status/1684051937916747776>


¹⁴ <https://t.me/annamaliar/962>



Toretzk-Niu York Operational Area

GSAFU reported that a Russian attack in the direction of [Druzha](#) was unsuccessful. There were no other reports of fighting in this area, and a direction of attack was not specified.


SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Set conditions for larger offensive operations, find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses,


destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



Avdiivka Operational Area

Longtime readers and podcast listeners will remember the days of, let's get this over with together. Russian attacks within [Avdiivka](#) ended in failure.¹⁵


¹⁵ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10662>




Marinka Operational Area

The fighting remained positional in [Marinka](#), with no change to the situation.¹⁶

¹⁶ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10662>



Lyubymivka-Staromlynivka Operational Direction

Ukrainian forces control 30% to 40% of [Staromaiorske](#) and are pushing Russian forces south and east. A Russian counterattack to retake the northern region failed.¹⁷ A video showed Ukrainian Special Operation Forces (SSO) taking  [Russian 247th Parachute Regiment members prisoner](#) after surrounding their positions within the settlement.¹⁸ We have also seen an uptick in videos from Ukrainian forces taking Russian POWs in other AOs. Russian milbloggers are reporting ammunition shortages, and the units defending Staromaiorske and Urozhaine have

¹⁷ <https://t.me/landforcesofukraine/10662>


¹⁸ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/107251>

little combat potential. One of the members of the 247th Regiment who was captured had a paper list of unit members showing the troops killed, wounded, and missing in action. The document indicated the unit is almost combat destroyed.

At the time of publication, Russian sources claimed that Ukraine had liberated Staromaiorske. We could not verify the reports before publication.¹⁹


¹⁹ https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2809

ZAPORIZHIA



Russian Objective: Defend against the Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, set conditions for September 2023 elections, capture the remainder of the oblast, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective: Exploit weaknesses on the line of conflict, break Russian defensive lines, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



Orikhiv Operational Area

Reports of Ukraine starting its main offensive south of Orikhiv appear premature and fueled by growing evidence that Ukraine has broken through the first major Russian line of defense at [Robotyne](#).²⁰ There is significant evidence that the line of conflict between Robotyne and Verbove has moved south of Robotyne as Ukrainian forces bypass the Russian strongholds in both settlements. However, our

²⁰ <https://t.me/annamaliar/962>

skepticism in the July 25, 2023, SITREP of Russian claims of a brigade sized attack by Ukraine was well placed. In our assessment, Ukrainian forces are making steady, near-daily progress between Robotyne and Verbove. The map X user Brady Africk used shows that [Ukrainian forces are past the first Russian defense line](#) and moving through a weakly defended area.²¹

Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant

There was no update on the status of the plant.

²¹ <https://twitter.com/bradyafr>

BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

Black Sea

Operational Command South (OKS) did not provide an update on the Black Sea Fleet, and there weren't any partisan reports from Sevastopol. The composition was likely unchanged, with 11 vessels at sea and one Kilo-class submarine capable of launching up to four Kalibr cruise missiles.²²

Odesa

Russian mercenary milblogger Rybar claimed that FAB500S-E UPMK glide bombs struck Snake Island. Their previous report earlier in the month was accurate, but we could not independently verify today's claim.²³

A Russian submarine launched at least one Kalibr cruise missile at Odesa during a thunderstorm, traveling just above the sea surface. The missile was able to evade detection, striking the Port of Odesa, destroying a

²² <https://t.me/Crimeanwind/37695>

²³ <https://t.me/rybar/50119>

warehouse and administration building, killing one person.²⁴

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

Khmelnyskyi

Russian cruise missiles, possibly Kh-47 Kinzhal air-to-surface ballistic missiles, struck the Ukrainian airbase near Starokostyantyniv. The base has been repeatedly attacked since last year, with Russian command appearing convinced that Ukraine keeps a big pile of Storm Shadow cruise missiles sitting outside waiting to be destroyed.²⁵

²⁴ https://t.me/our_odessa/51319

²⁵ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/107335>

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Complete the liberation of the Kharkiv oblast, maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent further insurrection, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

Samara Region

Partisans sabotaged railroad infrastructure in the Sloboda area. A relay cabinet that controls traffic lights was set on fire.²⁶

THEATERWIDE

Russian launched 36 Kh-101/Kh-555 missiles, the first since June 24, from eight Tu-95MS strategic bombers. The missiles took complex flight paths attempting to evade Ukrainian air defenses, with 33 shot down. Later, four Mig-31M fighter planes launched the previously mentioned Kh-47 Kinzhal missiles. Russia also launched at least four Kalibr cruise missiles in two waves, three and then at least one more toward Odesa in a second strike. All three Kalibrs in the first wave were intercepted. Additionally, eight Shahed-136 Kamikaze drones were shot down.^{27 28 29 30}

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has submitted a proposal to the Verkhovna Rada to approve another 90-day extension of martial law and general mobilization. The

²⁶ https://t.me/shot_shot/54660

²⁷ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/107365>

²⁸ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5588

²⁹ https://t.me/ukrarmed_forces/5585

³⁰ <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/107314>

current decree is set to expire on August 18 and, under Ukrainian law, can only be extended 90 days at a time.³¹

While Ukrainian officials had not looked into a camera and said, "Yes, we destroyed the Kerch (Crimean) Bridge on October 8, 2022," before today, the unquestionable declaration came. "The destruction of the Crimean Bridge is one of the implementations of the SBU," said the head of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Vasyl Malyuk.³²

Verkhovna Rada Deputy Yury Aristov is under investigation by the SBU and law enforcement after traveling to The Maldives in July, despite a ban against such travel.³³ Aristov stayed at the Waldorf Astoria Maldives Hotel with his family on the private island of Ithaafushi.

The deputy commander of the OMON forces of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic, Alexander Khodakovsky, declared that Ukraine now has superior artillery in the theater of war. "In one thing, [Ukraine] is outplaying us – in the accuracy of imported weapons. Well, traditionally, in range. But if we have leveled off in our mosquito air fleet,

³¹ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/26/7413005/>

³² <https://t.me/operativnoZSU/107277>

³³ <https://t.me/ShrikeNews/9656>

and in some places, we are ahead thanks to garage-knee production. In matters of heavy systems, we rely on the base under which our industry is formatted – in this area, the situation cannot be changed overnight. Ukraine is out shooting and out 'accuracying' us in artillery now."³⁴

Editor's Note: Ukraine also has a significant advantage in drone warfare, as reported by multiple frontline Russian units.

President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said, "I strongly condemn the Russian attacks on the Ukrainian grain storage and export infrastructure," while announcing another 1.5 billion euro aid package to Ukraine to help with state function and restore destroyed infrastructure.

The Secretary for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, James Cleverly, warned that Russia may follow through on its threats to attack civilian cargo ships in the Black Sea. "The UK believes that Russia may escalate its campaign to destroy Ukraine's food exports by targeting civilian ships in the Black Sea. We will highlight this unconscionable

³⁴ https://t.me/aleksandr_skif/2807

behavior at the United Nations Security Council. Russia should stop holding global food supplies hostage and return to the deal."³⁵

Editor's Notes: *Let me Check how many times Russia has changed its behavior after a meeting of the UN Security Council in the last 18 months questioned or condemned its actions. Zero.*

And while Western and NATO allies wring their hands over Russian turning the Black Sea into their private bathtub, discussions on training Ukrainian pilots to operate F-16 multirole fighter planes continue with no action. Western partners can't agree on who will provide F-16s and simulators, and the United States indicated that manuals would have to be translated. Other nations indicated they were still waiting for the White House to authorize the training program.³⁶

The table for equipment losses was **updated on July 24, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

³⁵ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/25/7412836/>

³⁶ <https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2023/07/26/7412906/>

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to July 24, 2023. 11,373 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,018 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2024	244	8.30:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	140	344	0.41:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	928	301	3.08:1	↓
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2569	654	3.93:1	↓
Armored Personnel Carriers	335	312	1.07:1	↓
MRAPs	46	128	0.36:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	199	342	0.58:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	244	16	15.25:1	—
Engineering Vehicles	326	73	4.47:1	↓
Towed Artillery	261	140	1.86:1	↓
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	463	186	2.49:1	↓
MLRS	246	50	4.92:1	↓
SAMs	133	117	1.14:1	↑
Mobile Radars	39	69	0.57:1	↑
EW/ECW	44	4	11.00:1	—
Winged Aircraft	84	69	1.22:1	↓
Helicopters	106	31	3.42:1	—
Naval Vessels	12	26	0.46:1	—

RUSSIAN MOBILIZATION, MOBIKS, AND MIR

On July 25, the Russian Ka-52 Alligator attack helicopter shot down was piloted by Colonel Vitaly Vitalyevich Tabachnikov, the commander of the 112th Separate Helicopter Regiment of the 11th Air Force and Air Defense Forces of the Russian Federation.³⁷ Tavachnikov was the 68th Colonel killed in action since February 24, 2022.

FSB Lieutenant Colonel Vashunin Evgeny Alexandrovich was killed on July 6, 2023, when he accidentally blundered into a Russian minefield on the Ukrainian-Russian border near Brakhlov.³⁸

United States intelligence reported that Russia is building a plant for the serial production of kamikaze drones with the help of Iran. Analysts at the Defense Intelligence Agency told a small group of reporters that the UAV plant now under construction would provide Russia with a new supply of drones that are "orders of magnitude larger" than what it could buy in Iran today, warning the production could change the direction of the war in early 2024. The plant is being built in the special economic zone "Alabuga" in

³⁷ https://twitter.com/Maks_NAFO_FELLA/status/1684286138775740417

³⁸ <https://twitter.com/KilledInUkraine/status/1684166748377870337>

Tatarstan. Thankfully, the United States, Western, and NATO officials are wringing their hands over providing F-16s and other weapons to Ukraine. Had those decisions been made last year, it would be changing the direction of the war today, and the factory in 2024 wouldn't matter.

The Head of the Russian State Duma Defense Committee, Deputy Andrey Kartapolov, said that the amendments adopted during the last day of the spring legislative session "were written for a big war, for general mobilization, and now it smacks of a big war." Amazingly, Kartapolov did not get in trouble for calling the so-called special military operation a war twice in one sentence.

Kartapolov berated fellow lawmakers for creating protected classes exempt from mobilization and conscription. He spoke out against amendments that protect fathers of four or more children and fathers of disabled children protected from military service.³⁹

Modifications to the September 21, 2022, partial mobilization decree included,^{40 41}

³⁹ <https://twitter.com/i/status/1683861891481731073>

⁴⁰ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/89756>

⁴¹ <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/89754>

- Changing the maximum draft age to 30 years old, from 27, as it was during the Soviet era.
- Increasing the fine for not appearing at the military enlistment office to “verify” your information to 30,000 roubles.
- Increasing the fines for failing to provide requested assistance to the military commissar to 500,000 roubles and failing to provide a list of potential conscripts or mobiks when requested to 400,000 roubles.
- Mobilized and conscripted men will now be restricted from leaving Russia when they are added to the register, even if they have not received their paper or electronic notification. When they announced mobilization and conscription by app and SMS text, the Kremlin insisted that there would be a seven-day grace period, now eliminated by the State Duma.
- In certain cases, men as old as 55 can be mobilized, and military officers and certain specialists can be recalled up to 70 years of age.

The State Duma also gave Russian President Vladimir Putin special powers to instruct Russian regional governors to create specialized private military companies and paramilitary organizations. For now, the units would only

be used for internal security and can only be created with prior authorization.⁴² The Presidential power will end when mobilization and martial law is ended in all Russian regions. The units' powers and composition will include,

- Assist governmental security forces in maintaining public order, border protection, and fighting against sabotage
- They will be empowered to fight illegally armed groups and shoot down drones
- The federal government will issue military weapons and ammunition to the companies, and the government will determine what weapons are appropriate
- Employees will have the right to use firearms and live ammunition on gathers of people if they "commit an armed or group attack on protected objects"
- Employees of the companies will be authorized to carry their weapons anywhere, including in public places
- The employees will be obligated to surrender their weapons and unused ammunition 30 days after the announced disbandment of the group

⁴² <https://t.me/itsdonetsk/89771>

Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


⚠️ **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


⚠️ **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We use their reports and maps to identify combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. We do not use claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed because of a documented and historical pattern of producing fabrications. They frequently engage in blatant misinformation and disinformation and consistently deny all Russian war crimes.


⚠️ **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War


Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** We only use their reports about large-scale artillery and HIMARS strikes in the occupied territories.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government official to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.