



MALCONTENT NEWS RUSSIA-UKRAINE SITUATION REPORT

November 15, 2023



Malcontent News

Russia-Ukraine War SITREP

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SUMMARY – DAY 629

It has been 3,579 days since Russia occupied the Crimea Peninsula on January 27, 2014, and one year and 264 days since Russia expanded its war against Ukraine.

[Jump to the Action Report.](#)

Summary:

Getting back into the swing of things. Full summary back tomorrow.

DAILY ASSESSMENT

We assess the following:


1. We maintain that Russian commanders have put mission objectives over all other considerations and remain committed to capturing the Avdiivka salient regardless of the cost.
2. Our assessment that there was a growing possibility that Ukraine would attempt a battalion or larger sized force crossing over the Dnipro River was accurate.
3. We have serious concerns over the amount of military support Ukraine will receive in 2024, with the United States Congress in paralysis and the European Union not meeting their promised 2023 deliveries.
4. Russia is stockpiling missiles and drones for large-scale attacks on Ukraine's energy infrastructure as the weather continues to degrade, and the extended pause from large attacks is likely due to the historically warm and dry October throughout Ukraine.
5. We maintain that the continued sharp drop in missile and drone strikes in Ukraine is meant to keep the Russia-Ukraine War out of the news cycle as global interest is fixated on the Israel-Hamas War supported by information warfare efforts launched by the Kremlin.

6. While the possibility of an intentional nuclear accident caused by Russian occupiers at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant remains low, the threat should be taken seriously.

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
TODAY'S WAR IN UKRAINE MAP



About the maps: Red triangles are sites of significant events unrelated to missile attacks, insurgencies, or ground combat, such as the sinking of the Moskva and the explosion at the Saky Naval airbase. Gray circles indicate an area where fighting has ended with no change in the line of conflict. The archived offensive layer is turned off by default, but you can toggle it on/off in the Map Legend. If you see a settlement name highlighted [like this](#), it is a link to our war map that will take you to the location explained in the Situation Report.


[Russia-Ukraine War Report Map](#)

KHARKIV



Russian Objective New: Recapture all territory from Kupyansk to Pisky Radkivski and push Ukrainian forces west of the Oskil River, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians near the line of conflict


Ukrainian Objective: Liberate the northeastern corner of the oblast, hold defensive lines in the Dvorichna and Kupyansk Operational Areas, protect civilians and civilian infrastructure



In the Kupyansk AO, Russian forces have increased operational tempo while returning to offensive operations. Fighting continued north of [Synkivka](#) and west of [Lyman Pershyi](#). East of Kupyansk, Russian forces have made marginal gains from Pershotravneve, with significant fighting ongoing in the forested regions northeast of [Petropavlivka](#). Russian forces also continued offensive operations east of [Ivanivka](#), where the situation remains stable.


DONBAS REGION

LUHANSK



Russian Objective New: Support Russian offensive operations in the Kupansk AO or Kharkiv and push Ukrainian forces to the Oskil River, maximize casualties, control insurgent activity, and capture the rest of the oblast

Ukrainian Objective: Break Russian defensive lines, advance on Svatove, Kreminna, and Lysychansk, and support insurgents




In the Svatove AO, mutual fighting continued west of [Raihorodka](#) with no change in the situation.

Further south, Russian commanders continue to deprioritize the **Kupyansk** and **Lysychansk AOs**, focusing on artillery duels, counterbattery, and airstrikes supported by harassment attacks, positional fighting, and reconnaissance in force. Ukrainian positions in the [Serebrianskyi Woods](#) were attacked by the Russian

Aerospace Forces (VKS). Russian and Ukrainian forces continue to trade off the same defensive positions as they have for a year. The Azov Brigade was able to stabilize the situation over the summer but could not mount meaningful offensive operations due to superior Russian artillery support.


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NORTHEAST DONETSK




Russian Objective: Complete the capture of Bakhmut AO, set conditions to attack Kramatorsk, Slovyansk, and Siversk, and capture the entire Donetsk region by December 31

Ukrainian Objective New: Defend Siversk, stabilize more advantageous defensive lines on the north flank of Bakhmut for winter, capture the T-513 Highway south of Bakhmut, and minimize civilian casualties




In the Bakhmut AO, Ukrainian forces have fallen back from the [Berkhivske Reservoir](#) and [Yahidne](#), returning roughly to their May 2023 positions. The lowlands north of Khromove are difficult to defend, with ridges on three sides. In June 2023, when Ukrainian forces reached Berkhivka and were pressuring Yahidne, they could not reach the M-03/E-40 Highway nor push the Russian 200th Arctic Separate Motor Rifle Brigade out of [Dubovo-Vasylivka](#). Any of those events would have likely forced Russian troops to withdraw north of the M-03/E-40 Highway on defensive lines from Pidhorodne to Krasna Hora. In our assessment, Ukrainian commanders decided to tactically withdraw from the lowlands east of the reservoir for the winter months and

have ended offensive operations. It will be equally difficult for Russian forces to advance through this area.




In the Klishchiivka AO, mutual fighting continued north and east of [Klishchiivka](#) and east of [Andriivka](#) with no change in the situation. We maintain that Ukrainian forces will continue attempts to reach the T-513 Highway and sever the Russian ground line of communication into southwestern Bakhmut.




In the Toretzk-Niu York AO, there is significant Russian chatter and videos that show that Ukrainian forces have advanced southeast of [Shumy](#) and secured the first terrikons in the direction of Horlivka, east of the Minsk II border. The Ukrainian mission objective is unclear.

SOUTHWESTERN DONETSK




Russian Objective: Capture the remainder of the Donetsk Oblast by December 31


Ukrainian Objective: Find and exploit Russian defensive weaknesses, lock Russian troops in place, destroy troop concentrations and command and control sites, interdict supplies, and disrupt logistics



Heavy fighting continued in the Avdiivka AO, with no territorial control changes recorded since the last full SITREP. Russian forces have suffered catastrophic losses measured in the thousands. Russian attempts to advance east of [Novokalynove](#) were thwarted, and a Russian advance [northwest of the Krasnohorivka Plateau](#) toward Ocheretyne was pushed back. Russian forces briefly crossed the train tracks toward [Stepove](#) and took some Ukrainian positions directly on the rail line but were pushed back out of the settlement. Russian claims of reaching the industrial areas of the Avdiivka and fighting within the Coke Plant are false.




On the southern flank of Avdiivka, fighting continued on the edges of [Pervomaiske](#), where Ukrainian forces were able to push Russian troops back toward Vodyane. Otherwise, there were no significant changes in the situation.



In the Marinka and Vuhledar AOs, it's like I never went on a break. Russian forces continued tactical assaults in western [Marinka](#) and east and south of [Novomykhailivka](#) with no change in the situation.


In the Staromlynivka AO, fighting is limited to harassing attacks, with Ukrainian forces containing the movement of Russian troops near [Staromaiorske](#).

ZAPORIZHZHIA



Russian Objective New: Defend against the continued Ukrainian offensive, maximize casualties, and terrorize Ukrainian civilians with continued attacks

Ukrainian Objective New: Capitalize on the breakthrough of the second echelon of the Surovikin Line, sever the Russian landbridge from Crimea to Donetsk, liberate Russian-occupied areas, and protect civilians



Ukrainian forces have made marginal gains in the Orikhiv AO, but not enough to adjust the map with changes remaining close to the current line of conflict (LOC). Ukrainian forces have once again reached the western edge of [Verbove](#) and pushed Russian forces slightly further west of [Robotyne](#). The intensity of Ukrainian offensive efforts on the northern edge of [Novoprokopivka](#) has increased in the last 72 hours. It appears Ukraine is setting conditions for another attempt to liberate the settlement, which would enable a drive through the last 3 to 4 kilometers of the strongest part of Russian defenses.

In Komyshuvakha, Russia struck a civilian infrastructure target with 3 Iskander-K ballistic cruise missiles, with the third missile used to commit a “double tap” attack. Nine people were killed, including two emergency workers killed by the third missile.


BLACK SEA, CRIMEA, MYKOLAIV, AND ODESA REGION

There was severe weather in occupied Crimea, which caused extensive flooding. The poor weather likely curtailed military operations for both combatants throughout the region.

KHERSON

Russian Objective New: Prevent Ukrainian forces from reaching the T-2206 Highway south of the Konka River, terrorize the civilian population in free Kherson, and maintain GLOCs to Zaporizhzhia

Ukrainian Objective New: Further expand existing bridgeheads on the left bank of the Dnipro and Konka Rivers, lock Russian troops and reserves in place, continue a southern advance into eastern Kherson toward the Crimean Peninsula, minimize civilian casualties



In Kherson, Ukraine has established two bridgeheads, is expanding its area of control, and is moving heavy equipment over the Dnipro and Konka Rivers. After weeks of denials and silence, Operational Command South finally confirmed that Ukrainian forces had “pushed up” along the entire bank of the Dnipro River from the Black Sea to [Krynky](#) from 3 to 8 kilometers in depth. The near historically warm and dry fall has likely aided Ukrainian offensive operations, a rare meteorological win for Kyiv since the summer of 2022.

The biggest change we can publicly discuss is that Ukrainian forces are starting to advance west of Krynky in the direction of [Kozachi Laheri](#). The remains of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry have been moved up to Krynky, with claims made that eight Ukrainian marines were captured in the forests south of the settlement. There are inconsistencies in the video, and we cannot authenticate the claim. Ukrainian forces are maintaining their positions near [Poima](#), [Pishchanivka](#), and [Pidstepne](#).

It will take a significant effort for Russian forces to break both bridgeheads and tactically, it appears Russian troops are preparing to hold defensive lines along the T-2206 Highway.

One footnote of interest. OCS reported that Ukrainian forces control an area from 3 to 8 kilometers in depth to the Black Sea on the left bank of the Dnipro, and yesterday, Russian milbloggers claimed that logistical support had been lost on the Kinburn Spit. Ukrainian special operation forces (SSO) and naval infantry have been conducting raids on the Kinburn Spit for months, and it does raise the question of whether there is an ongoing Ukrainian operation in the marshland east of [Heroiske](#). There is only one paved road that runs along the coastline.

WESTERN AND CENTRAL UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Launch terror attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Deter attacks and protect civilian lives

Russian missiles struck a facility in Kryvyi Rih (Dnipropetrovsk), with Ukrainian officials releasing no other information beyond there were no casualties.

NORTHERN AND NORTHEASTERN UKRAINE

Russian Objective: Lock Ukrainian military resources into place and launch terror attacks on civilians in an attempt to break morale

Ukrainian Objective: Maintain the integrity of the international border, deter attacks, and protect civilian lives

There wasn't any significant activity.

RUSSIAN FRONT

Russian Objective: Stabilize government control and civil order, prevent renewed insurrections, repel Russian partisan attacks, secure the state border

Ukrainian-Backed Russian Partisan Objective: Motivate other Russians to fight against the Putin regime, accelerate the downfall of the Russian government, foment civil unrest

In the **Tambov region**, Russian state media claimed that a drone struck the Tambov Gunpowder Plant, damaging the roof of a building but not sparking a fire or explosion.

THEATERWIDE

It has been almost two months since Russia launched a widescale drone or missile attack across Ukraine. We maintain that the Kremlin is building inventory to conduct saturation attacks when (or if) significant winter weather arrives.

After months of efforts, the European Union has agreed on a 12th sanction package against Russia, but the proposal still needs to be ratified. The High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs, Josep Borell, released a statement outlining the new package.

"The proposal provides for the imposition of sanctions against more than 120 individuals and legal entities for their role in undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine. This concerns representatives of the military, defense, and IT sectors of the Russian Federation, as well as "other important economic operators."

"The proposed measures also go after those who organized the most recent sham 'elections' in the areas of Ukraine that Russia has temporarily occupied, those in charge of forcing Ukrainian children to undergo 're-education' and individuals who disseminate propaganda and false information in support of Russia's aggressive war against Ukraine."

"The European Commission also proposes to introduce new bans on imports and exports, as well as measures aimed at

tightening the ceiling on oil prices and countering the evasion of EU sanctions."

The Defense Minister of Ukraine, Rustem Umierov, introduced the new commander of SSO in Ukraine, Colonel Serhiy Lupanchuk. On November 3, when the switch was announced, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said, "He is an experienced officer, a combat officer, the right man in command, and someone who can bring greater power to our Special Operation Forces."

Major General Viktor Khorenko transferred command of the SSO during a ceremony, where he addressed the personnel and his staff and thanked them for their service.

The change in command was made upon the request of Umierov, with Khorenko moved to "carry out special tasks" as part of the Main Defense Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine. Umierov refused to explain why the change was made but hinted that Khorenko was needed on a "certain front."

The table for equipment losses was **updated on October 28, 2023**, and includes the losses suffered during the Prigozhin Insurrection of June 23 – 24.

RUSSIA VS. UKRAINE HEAVY EQUIPMENT LOSSES

Russian and Ukrainian visually confirmed heavy equipment losses sourced from the [Oryx Database](#) from February 24, 2022, to October 28, 2023. 12,871 Russian (including [Chef's Rebellion](#)) vs. 4,666 Ukrainian

Equipment	Russian Losses	Ukrainian Losses	Ratio	Change
Main Battle Tanks	2279	307	7.42:1	↓
Medium Duty Tanks	158	375	0.42:1	—
Armored fighting Vehicles	1024	333	3.07:1	↑
Infantry Fighting Vehicles	2957	780	3.79:1	↑
Armored Personnel Carriers	368	360	1.02:1	—
MRAPs	49	175	0.28:1	—
Infantry Mobility Vehicles	223	388	0.57:1	—
Command and Communications Vehicles	254	18	14.11:1	↓
Engineering Vehicles	355	92	3.85:1	↓
Towed Artillery	328	165	1.99:1	↓
Self-Propelled Howitzers/Mortars	585	236	2.48:1	—
MLRS	299	50	5.98:1	—
SAMs	189	130	1.45:1	—
Mobile Radars	46	82	0.56:1	↓
EW/ECW	58	4	14.50:1	↑
Winged Aircraft	94	77	1.22:1	—
Helicopters	139	37	3.77:1	↑
Naval Vessels and Submarines	17	27	0.63:1	—


RUMORS


Many messages and e-mails we receive ask why we didn't cover a certain story or whether we are aware of a report and what we think. The rumor section is a list of claims or stories we are aware of but not reporting on because there isn't enough information to support or discover the truth.


- Is dictatorial president Vladimir Putin dead? No. Last day of entry.
- Were two Russian generals seriously wounded and one admiral killed in Sevastopol? There is no evidence to support that they were. Last day of entry.


Notes on Sourcing Information


Malcontent News uses a wide range of sources to create our daily Situation Report, the foundation for the Russian-Ukraine War Report Podcast. There are some notable sources that we frequently use and others that we don't. The most common sources currently, or in the past, we have used for the Theater of War section of the Situation Report include the following.


 **Russian Ministry of Defense Morning Report:** We use the RMOD Morning Report to identify combat reports, shelling locations, and territorial control change claims. We do not consider claims of Ukrainian troops killed, equipment destroyed, or military resources destroyed valid without videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation, or third-party confirmation from recognized Western news outlets or trusted Ukrainian sources.


 **Rybar:** We consider Rybar a mercenary organization because they are staffed by former Russian Ministry of Defense public relations officers who actively provide target information to the Russian military. Their operational budget is \$20,000 a month, while they claim they receive no government funding. We only use their reports to identify combat locations. We no longer consider their territorial control changes due to a three-month pattern from June to August 2023 of repeated publication of blatant disinformation and a years-long pattern of denying all Russian war crimes.


 **War Gonzo:** We consider War Gonzo a mercenary organization because their employees have recorded themselves actively engaging in direct combat, specifically in Marinka. Recently, War Gonzo admitted in their daily report to leveraging the information from the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. They intermix combat reports with their own on a 24-hour delay. We use their reports for **unique claims** about combat, territorial control change claims, and troop movement reports. Although the War Gonzo daily reports are moderately accurate, they occasionally engage in blatant disinformation and misinformation.

 **Readovka:** We consider Readovka to be a Kremlin-aligned propagandist organization. Their daily reports are a word-for-word repeat of the RMOD Morning Report and provide no value to our analysis. They occasionally provide credible information through videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation. This is by no means a complete list of the sources we monitor.

 **Igor "Girkin" Strelkov:** We consider Strelkov to be a convicted war criminal who is highly informed, specifically about the situation in the Donbas. We use his combat reports, territorial control change claims, and troop movement information. In the Donbas, we consider his reports to be highly accurate. The fidelity of information he provides in Zaporizhia, Kherson, and Kharkiv appears to come from other social media channels with a history of spreading misinformation and is of lower quality. Reports he shares outside of the Donbas provided by Russian Federation 1st Army Corps units have greater fidelity.

 **Andrei Morozov:** Morozov is a pro-Russian milblogger and a radio communications and logistics specialist with the Russian 2nd Army Corps. We consider him a provider of high-quality information, especially within his fields of specialty. In the fall of 2022, Morozov was detained by OMON for up to three weeks due to his content and has had his online material censored by the Kremlin several times over the last 11 months.

 **Private Military Company Wagner Group Social Media:** We consider reports from PMC Wagner of Russian victories as overstating gains and reports of Russian failures, particularly among the Russian Ministry of Defense and the 1st and 2nd Army Corps of the Russian Army, as overstating problems. We do not consider claims of territorial control changes from Wagner as authentic without pictures, videos, or **unique** Russian State Media reports that include a video that can be geolocated.

 **Luhansk People's Republic Joint Center for Control and Coordination:** The organization has not posted any update since June 9, 2023, and we have ceased monitoring.

⊖ **Leonid Pasechnik:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Luhansk People's Republic.

⚠ **Donetsk People's Republic People's Militia:** We only use their reports for videos and pictures that can be confirmed by date, time, weather, and geolocation.

⊖ **Donetsk People's Republic Territorial Defense:** We do not use combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from their public relations and social media channels. They have repeatedly engaged in misinformation and disinformation.

⊖ **Denis Pushilin:** We do not use any combat, territorial control changes, troop movements, casualty claims, or equipment destroyed claims from the illegitimate leader of the so-called Donetsk People's Republic.

⚠ **Ramzan Kadyrov:** The contribution and impact of Chechen forces in Ukraine have become minimal, and Akhmat no longer produces large volumes of video content that can be geolocated. We continue to monitor his channels.

✅ **General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine:** We consider the morning and evening reports, specifically combat reports, territorial control changes, and troop movements, from GSAFU to be high quality. The Ukrainian General Staff uses clever wording to create plausible deniability of battlefield failures. Combat reports start with "repelled attacks of the occupant forces in the vicinities of," which negates reporting fighting in areas where territory was lost. Instead of misinformation or disinformation, GSAFU engages in omission. Reports about problems within the Russian military are given more weight if the SBU or GUR reinforces them or if there is added confirmation in the Russian milblogger information space.

✅ **DeepState:** We use the Daily Report from DeepState for combat reports and territorial control changes. They frequently support their claims with geolocated, time, date, and weather-confirmed pictures and videos, making them a high-quality Ukrainian-based source. They occasionally overstate Russian territorial control claims but never present disinformation or

misinformation. Combined with the reports from GSAFU, gaps in combat reports are filled. We support DeepState through their Patreon at \$10 a month.

✔ **Institute for the Study of War:** We occasionally leverage the map and territorial control change information produced by the ISW when there is conflicting data. Their presentation of Russian-assessed, Ukrainian-assessed, and Russian-claimed information is helpful when our analysts have to make a judgment call due to the absence of verifiable information. We do not copy from their map but take their territorial control information as an additional data point when assessing our own changes.

⚠ **Ivan Fedorov:** We use information about insurgent activity and HIMARS strikes in Zaporizhia provided by Fedorov, the exiled mayor of Melitiopol.

✔ **Vitaly Kim:** When there are reports of potential air raids in Ukraine, we monitor Kim, the Mykolaiv Oblast Administrative and Military Governor, for realtime reports. Kim is consistently one of the first, if not the first, Ukrainian government officials to confirm kamikaze drones or missiles have been launched toward Ukraine.

⊖ **Oleksiy Arestovych:** We no longer use the information provided by Arestovych after being fired from his role as the Chief Advisor to the President of Ukraine. Before being terminated, Arestovych had developed a reputation for providing exaggerated, unverified, and false claims for Ukrainian successes and failures.